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I. FROM THE REHNQUIST COURT TO THE REHNQUIST JUDICIARY
A. Developing New Norms
A struggle over the norms and boundaries of federal judicial authority is ongoing,
both within the United States Supreme Court and between the Court and Congress.
That debate is taking place not only in the Court's high-profile constitutional docket
but in ordinary cases and in work other than adjudication. The five-person majority
that has become famous for its jurisprudence on the Commerce Clause, the Fourteenth
Amendment, and sovereign immunity' has also revised the scope of federal equitable
and common law powers. The emerging legal rules stem from cases-such as Grupo
Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A., v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc.2 and Great-West Life &
Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson3 -that may not come trippingly off the
constitutional scholar's tongue but must be understood as working in tandem with the
majority's restrictions on the power of Congress to develop new federal rights. These
holdings instruct federal judges not to craft remedies without express congressional
permission, and, when permission has been granted, to read it narrowly.
Moreover, through collective action unprecedented in the American experience, the
Rehnquist Judiciary is attempting to convince Congress not to grant such permission.
The Article III judiciary has become increasingly active in Congress before legislation
is enacted-opining to Congress and the public about which litigants ought to be able
to bring substantive claims to the federal courts.
Eighty years ago, Congress chartered a conference of circuit judges to meet under
the leadership of the Chief Justice and-"in the interest of uniformity and expedition
of business"-to "survey ... the condition of business" of the federal courts.4 Thus
began an entity, novel for the United States, which provided a means for judges to
coordinate and collaborate. As I detail in a brief history below, during its first decades,
the Conference did not use its collective voice to comment on which litigants merited
access to federal courts. Thereafter, the Conference occasionally advised against
federal court remediation for certain kinds of cases.
A different posture has been adopted under the current Chief Justice. The Judicial
1. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Alden v.
Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999). The five in the majority are Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas. The dissenters include Justices Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer.
2. 527 U.S. 308 (1999).
3. 534 U.S. 204 (2002).
4. See Act of Sept. 14, Pub. L. No. 67-298, § 2,42 Stat. 837, 838-39 (1922) [hereinafter 1922
Judgeship Act]. The current formulation, at 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2000) (discussed infra notes 280-
311 and accompanying text), provides that the Judicial Conference survey the condition of
business in the courts of the United States and requires the Chief Justice to "submit to Congress
an annual report of the proceedings of the Judicial Conference and its recommendations for
legislation."
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Conference has proposed that Congress hold a general presumption against creating
new rights if enforced through federal courts. In the mid-1990s, through its first-ever
Long Range Plan,5 the Conference offered a vision of the appropriate allocation of
power between state and federal systems and of the appropriate size and shape of the
federal courts.6 The Conference made some ninety recommendations, including this
presumption against federal remediation. 7 The approach of the Long Range Plan is
paralleled by commentary by the current Chief Justice, who has regularly used annual
"state of the judiciary" addresses to criticize congressional decisions to empower
particular kinds of litigants to appear in federal courts.8
Examining the Rehnquist Judiciary's adjudication and advocacy together reveals a
particular, and in some ways contradictory, delineation of the role for the federal
judiciary: at once incompetent to help ordinary litigants who seek small-scale
remediation through adjudication predicated on fact-filled records subject to appellate
review, yet at the same time competent to use a collective voice to advise Congress on
the shape of the rights that "the people" ought to have. These activities also illuminate
the Rehnquist Judiciary's view of congressional capacities. Through constitutional
adjudication, the majority has disabled Congress from certain forms of generativity
and innovation. Through statutory interpretations and judicial policy prescriptions, the
majority has discouraged Congress from looking to federal courts as a means of
enforcing national agendas. While others have identified the majority as claiming its
supremacy 9 and assessed its political vision and its interpretative norms,'0 here I bring
into focus the effects of the Rehnquist Judiciary on the daily experiences of lower tier
judges, litigants, and members of Congress. The work of both judging and governing
at the national level becomes impoverished.
B. Sources of Judicial Authority, Exercised Individually and Collectively
This article both excavates the developing norms and analyzes them. Below, in Part
II, I document the Rehnquist Judiciary's stances towards rights and remedies through
discussion and critique of two cases, Grupo Mexicano and Great-West, with opinions
for the majority and dissent that track the now familiar 5-4 Supreme Court divide."'
5. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U. S., LONG RANGE PLAN (1995), reprinted in 166
F.R.D. 49 (1996) [hereinafter LONG RANGE PLAN].
6. Id. at 21-39, reprinted in 166 F.R.D. at 81-89 (recommendations related to "Judicial
Federalism").
7. Id. at 28-29, reprinted in 166 F.R.D. at 88-89 (Recommendations 6). See infra Part III.B.
8. See infra notes 355-56.
9. See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REv. 1 (2001); Robert
C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the People: Juricentric Restrictions
on Section Five Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1 (2003).
10. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, The Three Faces of Federalism: An
Empirical Assessment of Supreme Court Federalism Jurisprudence, 73 S. CAL. L. REv. 741
(2000); Richard H. Fallon, The "Conservative" Paths of the Rehnquist Court's Federalism
Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 429 (2002).
11. These cases merit more attention than has been paid. Great- West has begun to be of
concern to ERISA scholars and practitioners. See John Langbein, What ERISA Means by
"Equitable": The Supreme Court's Trail of Error in Russell, Mertens, and Great-West
(forthcoming, Jan. 28, 2003, manuscript on file with author); Colleen Medill, The Supreme
2003]
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Both cases involved ordinary creditor-debtor problems. In both, lower court judges
used their equitable authority to provide remedies for creditors. In both, the majority
reversed, holding that federal judges lacked the power to respond to the particular
claims of loss. In both, the majority rejected a conception ofjudicial authority evolving
with new forms of commerce or with statutes calling for judges to use equitable
powers. Instead, the majority insisted that contemporary federal judicial power be
limited to those remedies which the majority believed to have been available in equity
during the constitutional era. In these and other recent cases, 12 the Supreme Court's
majority has crafted a narrow role for federal adjudication. When choices exist to
imply or to enhance judicial power, the majority declines to make them.
In Part III, I turn to the statutes that authorize administrative judicial activities (such
as the Judicial Conference) and the interpretative choices made about what falls within
thejudiciary's policymaking purview. As I explain, the text of the mandate forjudicial
collective action is ambiguous, and the legislative history is suggestive but not decisive
of particular readings. Further, under the leadership of different chief justices, the
practices and positions taken by the Judicial Conference have varied.
Given the stautory mandate and the examples of cribbed reading of statutes by the
Court's current majority, one might expect a parallel narrow interpretation of the
statutory charter for the Judicial Conference. Further, the majority's insistence on
limited federal power is often linked to claims that judicial equitable power is suspect
because it lacks democratic accountability. One might therefore also expect that
Article Ill judges, serving in life-tenured, appointed positions-rather than as elected
government officers-would approach their own institutional charter conservatively,
refraining from using their collective authority as a springboard for commentary about
whether legislators ought to craft new rights.
Yet, as I detail, the Rehnquist Judiciary has chosen an expansive posture,
positioning itself as an advocate arguing generally against investing federal courts with
obligations to enforce new rights. Sometimes on its own initiative and other times in
response to congressional inquiries, the Judicial Conference has urged that Congress
not admit specific sets of litigants to the federal courts.
C. Collective Advocacy and Judicial Independence
I have two kinds of objections to these developments. 13 The first is about the legal
Court's New Federalism, ERISA Preemption, and the Future of Health Care in America
(forthcoming, on file with the author). Scholars of federal common law have also addressed
Great- West. See Daniel J. Meltzer, Discussion at the AALS Federal Courts Symposium, (May
2002); Daniel J. Meltzer, The Supreme Court's Judicial Passivity, 2002 Sup. Ct. Rev. 59
[hereinafter Meltzer, Judicial Passivity]. Grupo Mexicano has not generated a sustained law
review literature. The one major discussion comes from Professor Stephen Burbank. See Stephen
B. Burbank, The Bitter with the Sweet: Tradition, History, and Limitations on Federal Judicial
Power-A Case Study, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1291 (2000) [hereinafter Burbank, The Bitter
with the Sweet], discussed infra note 121.
12. See infra notes 25-34 (discussing the implication of causes of action from the
Constitution and from statutes).
13. Here I share the views of Barry Friedman, urging more frank engagement on the merits
of the choices made. See Barry Friedman, The Counter-Majoritarian Problem and the
[Vol. 78:223
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possibilities for national governance. I disagree with some specific positions taken by
the governing body of the judiciary. Elsewhere, I have analyzed why the Constitution
can be read to permit more national powers than the current majority finds and the
Judicial Conference calls for in its Long Range Plan; I have also explained why
proponents of new rights ought not to focus on national law as the only or central
source of innovation.14 1 will not reargue these points here.
Rather, in Part IV, I focus on the other objection, based on concerns about the
judicial role rather than on the merits of any particular position adopted. The new
norms turn the judiciary into a strategic institutional actor, a role largely neglected in
the literature on judging. Indeed, when public choice theorists address the judiciary, they
typically model it as external to the special interests among which it mediates.15 The idea
Pathology of Constitutional Scholarship, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 933, 952-54 (2001).
14. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Categorical Federalism: Jurisdiction, Gender, and the Globe,
11 YALE L.J. 619 (2001) [hereinafter Resnik, Categorical Federalism]. In that essay, I disputed
the claim, made by the majority in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), that
Congress lacked power to enact the civil rights remedy of the Violence Against Women Act,
which had provided a new federal right to be free of violence animated by gender bias. As I
detailed, constitutional and federal statutory rules shape the institution of marriage, define
families, and attach economic and social effects to membership in families. But, as I also
analyzed, a diverse set of efforts, at local, national, and international levels, are aimed at
engendering greater equality between women and men. Thus, I questioned the wisdom of
assuming that national legislation is the only or the most desirable route for long-term shifts in
equality norms.
15. See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest
Group Perspective, 18 J. LAW & ECON. 875 (1975) (modeling judges as enforcing the agreements
made by others); JOHN M. DE FIGUEIREDO & Rui J.P. DE FIGUEIREDO, JR., THE ALLOCATION OF
RESOURCES BY INTEREST GROUPS, LOBBYING, LITIGATION, AND ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8981,2002) (modeling courts, however, only
in their adjudicative capacity).
Some discussions do focus on the preferences of individual judges. See, e.g., Richard Posner,
What Do Judges Maximize? The Same Thing as Everyone Else, 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1 (1993);
RICHARD POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 109-144 (1995) (Ch.3, What Do Judges Maximize?). Both
the book chapter and the essay discuss the "judicial utility function," which (Judge Posner argued)
stemmed from the fact of fixed salaries, some interest in leisure, and preferences for prestige,
avoiding reversal, achieving and maintaining reputation, having impact as a member of a multi-
judge panel, and securing deference from others. See also Stephen M. Bainbridge & G. Mitu
Gulati, How do Judges Maximize? (The Same Way as Everybody Else Does-Boundedly): Rules of
Thumb in Securities Fraud Opinions, 51 EMORY L.J. 83 (2002) (analyzing incentives to avoid
complexity in this area of law); Frederick Schauer, Incentives, Reputation, and the Inglorious
Determinants ofJudicial Behavior, 68 U. CINN. L. REv. 615 (2000) (focusing on the motivations of
extraordinary judges).
Others take up, and disagree about, the question of how panels ofjudges work together. See,
e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV.
1717 (1997) (discussing whether decisions of three-judge panels vary depending on the
composition including two judges appointed by Republicans or Democrats); Harry T. Edwards,
Collegiality and Decision Making on the D.C Circuit, 84 VA. L. REv. 1335 (1998) (disagreeing
strongly with Prof. Revesz's view of the relevance of sources of appointments), and Richard L.
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of the judiciary as a principal, acting on its own behalf to forward particular agendas, has
yet to become a regular feature of their discussions.1 6 Nor do many constitutional
theorists regularly address the propriety of such collective action, although commentators
rely on the concept of separation of powers to argue for special limitations on the
exercise of federal adjudicatory power.' 7
But, as this article details, the judiciary has entered the policymaking sphere, weighing
in on a wide range of topics. Here, I focus on one aspect: whether the judiciary ought to
comment when Congress is contemplating enacting new causes of action, conferring
rights of access to litigants not heretofore eligible for federal adjudication. My view is
that the judiciary ought not take positions related to new federal rights-whether in
support or in opposition of legislation creating access to the federal courts. Below, I
sketch the argument for an institutionally restrained approach, seeking to sustain a
judiciary responsive to litigants in specific cases but self-conscious about the boundaries
of its own authority as a collective actor.
To preview my conclusions, conceptions of the judiciary as a faithful agent of
Congress do not support judicial efforts to direct Congress about what new causes of
action to create. Nor can the judiciary claim special expertise when opining about
claims not yet in existence. While the judiciary may be able to bring knowledge to bear
on its own staffing and other material needs, it cannot know-and has been shown to
have predicted poorly-the demands that new causes of action will impose.
18
Revesz, Ideology, Collegiality, and the D. C. Circuit: A Reply to ChiefJudge Harry T Edwards, 85
VA. L. REv. 805 (1999).
Yet others focus on the dynamics that create the predicates for judicial institutions to be
independent. See J. Mark Ramseyer, The Puzzling (In)Dependence of Courts: A Comparative
Approach, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 721 (1994); J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Judicial
Independence in a Civil Law Regime: The Evidence from Japan, 13 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 259 (1997)
(both discussing the relative infrequency of independent judiciaries and the degree to which the
structure of political governance, with frequent changes of parties in power, create incentives for
independence). Still others address the interaction between courts and legislatures elaborating the
meaning of statutes. See generally Mark Tushnet, Alarmism Versus Moderation in Responding to
the Rehnquist Court, 78 IND. L.J. 47 (2003) (discussing the variables affecting the congressional
response to judicial decisions).
16. Two analyses do include a collective dimension look at the judiciary shaping federal rules
of procedure. See Jonathan R. Macey, Judicial Preferences, Public Choice, and the Rules of
Procedure, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 627 (1994) (calling attention to the judiciary as a bureaucracy and
arguing that, when shaping civil rules, judges will maximize their discretionary powers, their
interest in remaining generalists, and their reliance on lawyers); Janet Cooper Alexander, Judges'
Self-Interest and Procedural Rulemaking: Comment on Macey, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 647 (1994)
(questioning whether, in light of the nature of judges' incentives, the effects are substantial and
calling for public choice theory to develop a richer theory ofjudicial preferences).
17. See, e.g., John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1
(2001), discussed infra notes 86, 89.
18. See discussion infra note 356 (discussing the difficulty of assessing the effects of
potential legislation); discussion infra note 409 (detailing the predictions by the Administrative
Office of the U.S. Courts in the early 1990s of the volume of filings and costs imposed by the
then not-enacted Violence Against Women Act and the disparity between the tens of thousands
of cases forecast and the fifty or so reported cases extant six years later when the
[Vol. 78:223
CONSTRICTING REMEDIES
Further, using its collective voice to advise Congress on such policy matters enmeshes
the judiciary in politics. Of course, judges are the by-product of politics. The
Constitution stipulates a political process for the selection of life-tenured judges.1 9
However, once individuals become judges, they can create conditions that enmesh or
distance themselves from being perceived as political players, actively engaged in
shaping social policy.
Here, a distinction between individual and collective action is important. Individual
judges, cognizant of legal, ethical, political, and moral understandings of how a person
(bearing the obligations of judgment) ought to behave, have decisions to make about
what role to play in the world around them. Some judges may have special expertise,
commitments, or passions, moving them to comment on or to work for certain social or
political movements. To the extent such individuals do attempt to influence policy,
whatever credibility and authority they have will make them more or less effective.
Further, when they engage in behavior that appears partisan and that puts at risk their
ability either to judge the merits of a particular case or to be perceived as unbiased,
mechanisms exist for their recusal, disqualification, or sanction.20 Thus, the involvement
of individual judges in social policymaking may bring some benefits and does not impose
grave institutional costs.
Less flexibility exists at the institutional level, however. While individual judges
may be replaceable, the judiciary as a whole is not. The more enmeshed in
policymaking, the more difficult it becomes for the institution to be seen as distant
from partisanship. Further, when the official policymaking organ for the institution
speaks, the positions taken gain status and have, in fact, produced results. The judiciary
has succeeded in altering the texts of certain statutes.2 1 Formal positions by the Judicial
Conference also serve an educational function, socializing new members on what
attitudes are seen to be appropriate for those who become judges.
In addition to affecting the substance of various legislation (whether for better or for
worse) and the attitudes ofjudges, the Rehnquist Judiciary's chosen route-to become a
visible advocate, repeatedly, on specific legislation proposing new federal rights-
causes significant harm to the judiciary itself. The legitimacy of adjudication is
constitutionality of the legislation was before the Supreme Court).
19. See Charles G. Geyh, Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability, and the Role of
Constitutional Norms in Congressional Regulation of the Courts, 78 IND. L.J. 153 (2003)
[hereinafter, Geyh, Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability] (arguing that, given the
rarity of impeachment, democratic input occurs only at the time that life-tenured judges are
appointed). See also Judith Resnik, Statement and Testimony, The Senate's Role in the
Confirmation Process: Whose Burden?: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the Courts, 107th Cong. I st Sess. 179 (Sept. 4,
2001) (arguing that the Senate ought to take an active role in assessing the appropriateness of
nominations), reprinted in 50 DRAKE L. REv. 511, 539-52 (2002).
20. See, e.g., Debra Lyn Bassett, Judicial Disqualification in the FederalAppellate Courts, 87
IOWA L. REV. 1213 (2002) (discussing the ethical and legal requirements for individual judges to
recuse themselves, describing the psychological insights about implicit biases, and proposing
additional means by which to recuse appellate judges).
21. Amendments to the 1984 Bankruptcy Act, discussed infra note 278, and the wording of the
Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence Against Women Act, discussed infra notes 397 and 409, are
two examples.
2003]
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undermined when decisions reached through adjudication can be compared to the
policies advocated, as the judiciary's positions are assessed to discern whether they
accord or diverge from advocacy postures taken earlier.
Of equal concern, the judiciary becomes a place for lobbyists to go to enlist support
for their special interests. Through choosing to become active in shaping legislative
policy about rights holding, the Judicial Conference inevitably invites advocates to
attempt to influence its positions. Over time, the conception of the judiciary as an
institution apart from-and ill-at-ease in-politics diminishes. Many pressures already
are at work that can undermine judicial independence. 22 Given its utility in enabling
individual judges to enforce the rule of law even when at odds with popular
sentiments, collective judicial advocacy ought to be avoided when possible.
The conveners of this Symposium provided the title "Congressional Power in the
Shadow of the Rehnquist Court." I suggest a modest but important revision, for we
write not only in the "shadow of the Rehnquist Court" but also in the broader shadow
of the "Rehnquist Judiciary." Using the word "judiciary" helps to underscore that the
activities requiring attention are not limited to opinions issued from the bench. The
relevant literature includes the many statements made on behalf of the judiciary in
addition to decisions rendered in court. Similarly, revision is needed of the phrases
used to describe the various approaches taken by judges. "Judicial restraint," as
contrasted with "judicial activism," 23 is often claimed to be a desirable stance. But the
current majority is aspiring to something more than judicial restraint, a posture more
aptly termed "judicial disability." This phrase underscores the degree to which a
powerful segment of the federal judiciary is forging a new, and disheartening, role for
judges as they work on specific cases.
Further, when the Judicial Conference presses proposals to Congress about causes
of action, the judiciary should be understood as "lobbying," a word occasionally used
about, but not embraced by, the judiciary.24 Lobbying is identified with interest group
politics, and politics is an activity from which the Constitution has attempted to
insulate the federal judiciary. However, when seeking to persuade Congress to adopt
certain policies about how to implement substantive rights, the leadership of the
judiciary cannot avoid becoming perceived as allied with some groups also engaged in
22. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 122 S. Ct. 2528 (2002) (considering whether
state ethical rules may limit the speech of candidates for judicial offices and discussing the
challenges to judicial independence coming from both the election and selection of state and
federal judges).
23. See generally William P. Marshall, Conservatives and the Seven Sins of Judicial
Activism, 73 U. COLO. L. REv. 1217 (2002) (discussing the different kinds of decisions by courts
that could be characterized as "activist" and which ones could be used to forward an agenda
approved by conservatives); Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History
of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L. J. 153, 191-237 (2002) (detailing
responses, both popular and academic, to the Warren Court).
24. See, e.g., Vern Countryman, Scrambling to Define Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: The Chief
Justice, the Judicial Conference, and the Legislative Process, 22 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (1985);
Christopher E. Smith, Judicial Lobbying and Court Reform: U.S. Magistrate Judges and the
Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, 14 U. ARK. LITTLE RocK L. REv. 163 (1992); John W.
Winkle, III, Judges as Lobbyists: Habeas Corpus Reform in the 1940s, 68 JUDICATURE 262
(1985).
[Vol. 78:223
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convincing political officials of the correctness of a particular course of action.
Further, the Judicial Conference spends the political capital of the Article III judiciary
by affixing its imprimatur to certain choices.
Many of the specific decisions made by the Judicial Conference may appear
innocuous or affirmatively useful, in light of a particular situation. By using the term
"lobbying," I hope to give proponents of such efforts pause so that they might reflect
on how the sum total of the many instances of position-taking can affect the institution
of the judiciary. Article III judges, equipped with life-tenure, exercise a specific form of
governmental power. As they move further into the political advocacy sphere, they make
the federal judiciary resemble other government agencies, pursuing policy goals. Aware
that they enjoy unusual powers as life-tenured government office holders, Article III
judges ought to be especially conservative about giving collective voice to policy
prescriptions on how to shape enforcement of rights in this nation.
II. POLICING BOUNDARIES: REFRAMING THE POWER OF FEDERAL JUDGES BY
DISABLING THEIR REMEDIAL CAPACITIES
Through a series of decisions, the majority is developing a new theory of limitations
on the equitable powers of the federal courts. Just as those steeped in the jurisprudence
of federal constitutional law can recount, at least in retrospect, how two decades of
developments in the law of habeas corpus, sovereign immunity, the Commerce Clause,
and the Fourteenth Amendment interacted to limit rights, 25 one can now discern the
outlines of another trajectory, imposing comparable restrictions at the subconstitutional
level on what judges can do in cases often termed ordinary.26
25. For example, in the 1977 decision of Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), Justice
Rehnquist limited the ruling of Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), by permitting prisoners to
forfeit their federal habeas claims through decisions made by their lawyers. Thereafter, Fay's
demise was accomplished in Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991). A parallel can be
found in his decision in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974), linking congressional
authority to override sovereign immunity to the Fourteenth Amendment. That approach
progressed through Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976), to the majority's ruling in
Seminole Tribe ofFlorida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), concluding that the Commerce Clause
did not provide Congress with the power to abrogate states' immunity from suit. That legal turn
made congressional powers under the Fourteenth Amendment all the more important. But
thereafter, congressional powers under the Fourteenth Amendment were clipped by the majority
in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S.
62 (2000), and Board of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001). See generally Linda
Greenhouse, Court Had Rehnquist Initials Intricately Carved on Docket, N.Y. TIMES, July 2,
2002, at A l (describing his thirtieth year on the bench as the one in which the Court "moved far
toward accomplishing" the Chief Justice's "long-term goals," including "expanding the concept
of sovereign immunity"; also discussing that he had pursued his "constitutional vision" since his
graduation from law school fifty years ago).
26. See also Fallon, supra note 10, at 452-68 (exploring other areas, including sovereign
immunity, the doctrine of independent and adequate state grounds, and abstention, as part of a
"quiet front" in need of attention); Meltzer, Judicial Passivity, supra note 11 (elaborating on the
Court's use of federal common law); David M. Zlotnick, Battered Women & Justice Scalia, 41
ARIZ. L. REv. 847, 849 (1999) (focusing on United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 (1993), as an
example of Justice Scalia's "hostility toward contempt power" and his "general distrust of
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One aspect of the problem that has drawn attention comes within the frame of
"implied causes of action," both constitutional and statutory. Beginning in the 1960s
and continuing for more than a decade, the Supreme Court adopted a stance that
federal courts had the power to infer remedies-including private causes of action for
either injunctive or monetary relief-from the Constitution itself 7 and from statutes
otherwise silent about private enforcement. 28 The underlying premises of such rulings
were that rights were predicates for remediation and that courts were supposed to
respond to claims of wrongdoing. Thus, absent positive indications that federal
adjudication would interfere with congressional or state remedies, courts could imply
causes of action on behalf of individuals seeking to enforce constitutional or statutory
provisions.29
However, under the Rehnquist Judiciary, the approach shifted. Several cases
illustrate, at both constitutional and statutory levels, the new analysis-refusing
litigants entry to the federal courts. For example, in Correctional Services Corp. v.
Malesko,30 a federal prisoner in a facility operated by a private entity was left without
federal constitutional redress against the corporation for injuries suffered by alleged
inattention to his known medical needs.31 In the statutory context, Gonzaga University
expansive judicial powers," id. at 903).
27. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980) (implying from the Eighth Amendment a right of a
federal prisoner to bring a damage action for deliberate indifference to his known medical
needs); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979) (implying from the Fifth Amendment the right to
seek damages against a congressman, alleged to have discriminated against the plaintiff as an
employee because she was a woman); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (implying from the Fourth Amendment the ability of an
individual, subjected to an allegedly illegal search and not subsequently charged with a crime, to
bring a damage action against federal officials). Had defendants in these lawsuits been acting
under the color of state law, then they might have been subjected to liability through civil rights
statutes such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983. No such comparable general provision applies to federal
actors.
28. See, e.g., Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (implying a cause of action
under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975) (finding
that the particular securities law did not permit such a private damage action). Cort v. Ash
provided a test that permitted implication of private damage rights from federal statutes if a
plaintiff fell within the class for whose benefit a statute was enacted; a private right of action
was consistent with the legislative purpose; no evidence existed that the legislature sought to
preclude implication; and implication would not intrude on arenas of particular concern to states.
29. See Cort, 322 U.S. at 78. Judges thus retained discretion to interrogate particular statutory
schemes and their interaction with other laws.
30. 122 S. Ct. 515 (2001).
31. The Chief Justice wrote the majority decision, circumscribing the earlier decisions
recognizing constitutional remedies. Id. at 522-23 (also arguing the availability of other
remedies, including actions against the individual officers and prison grievance mechanisms).
Justice Scalia concurred to argue that such remedies were "a relic of the heady days in which
this Court assumed common-law powers to create causes of action ... [now] abandoned." Id. at
524-25 (Scalia, J., concurring, joined by Justice Thomas). The four dissenters, in an opinion
written by Justice Stevens, objected to the imposition of "notions of sound policy" in lieu of
exercising "the duty ... to apply and enforce settled law." Id. at 528 (Stevens, J., dissenting,
joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer).
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v. Doe, a case about the privacy of student academic records, 32 the majority concluded
that, absent specific directives from Congress, no private rights of action would be
inferred.33 In addition, the Court announced that no implied rights of action could be
enabled by 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 34 Rather, "if Congress wishes to create new rights
enforceable under § 1983, it must do so in clear and unambiguous terms . ... "35
Similarly, in Alexander v. Sandoval,36 the majority concluded that regulations
promulgated pursuant to Title VI were not enforceable by individual litigants.
One might view such decisions, at least in the statutory context, as examples of the
Court's preference for Congress to be the central source of both rights and remedies.
Moreover, by implying causes of action, federal courts give litigants access to federal
adjudication. Again, the Court's actions can be explained as evidence of its preference
for congressional judgments on the jurisdictional question. But, even when litigants are
properly before the federal courts because of diversity jurisdiction or by virtue of a
federal cause of action expressly provided by Congress, the 5-4 majority deploys the
same analytic approach, presuming prohibitions on judicial remediation to defeat
32. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 122 S. Ct. 2268 (2002) (holding that an alleged violation of the
federal statute did not permit a private action for damages). The Chief Justice wrote for the
Court, in an opinion joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. The student
had won more than a million dollars in damages in ajury decision in state court on a claim that,
because of an investigation based on rumors that were not disclosed to him, he would not be
given a certification of good moral character-needed to obtain teaching positions in public
schools. Id at 2269.
33. Id. at 2277 (summarizing earlier precedents as mandating that "where the text and
structure of a statute provide no indication that Congress intends to create new individual rights,
there is no basis for a private suit, whether under § 1983 or under an implied right of action").
See also Barnes v. Gorman, 122 S. Ct. 2097 (2002) (refusing to permit the award of punitive
damages in private actions brought under the Americans with Disability Act and the Rehabilition
Act); Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347 (1992) (declining to imply a cause of action under the
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980). In Barnes, Justice Stevens, joined by
Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, concurred in the judgment but objected to the "expansive basis
asserted" by Justice Scalia's majority opinion in precluding punitive damages. Barnes, 122 S.
Ct. at 2103-05. Justice Souter, joined by Justice O'Connor, filed a separate concurrence,
agreeing that the majority had correctly used the analogy of the common law of contract to
conclude that damages were unavailable under the statute but reading the Court's opinion as
recognizing that the contract-law analogy might not give clear answers to other questions
interpreting remedies under statutes passed under the Spending Clause. Id. at 2103.
34. "We now reject the notion that our cases permit anything short of an unambiguously
conferred right to support a cause of action brought under § 1983." Gonzaga, 122 S. Ct. at 2275.
35. Id. at 2279. Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Souter, disagreed with this presumption.
They concurred that the particular statute at issue could not serve as the basis for private redress.
Id. at 2279-80. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, dissented, arguing that the statute
created an enforceable right and objecting to the Court's "novel attempt to craft a new category
of second-class statutory rights .... " Id. at 2280-86. Specifically, the dissenters objected to
imposing the requirement that, when Congress wanted enforcement pursuant to § 1983, it had to
so specify. Id. at 2284-86.
36. 532 U.S. 275 (2001). Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion. Id. at 278. The dissent,
written by Justice Stevens, was joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer. Id. at 293
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
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plaintiffs' claims.
A. A Dearth of Equitable Powers, If Unknown in 1789: Grupo Mexicano de
Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc.
A first example comes from the decision of Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v.
Alliance BondFund, Inc. 37 A creditor-Alliance-sought an injunction to prevent the
dissipation of assets while it pursued its contractual rights for money damages.
Alliance had invested in Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo ("GMD"), a holding company
for a group of construction firms located in Mexico and involved in building roads.38
Subsequently unable to meet its obligations, GMD restructured its debts by assigning
priority in specific notes to the Mexican government and other creditors.39
Invoking the diversity jurisdiction of the federal district court, Alliance brought an
action to collect damages for an alleged breach of contract. As an interim measure,
Alliance requested a preliminary injunction to freeze GMD's assets.40 Through
affidavits, GMD conceded that, by assigning assets to competing creditors, it had left
less than six million dollars to satisfy $75 million dollars of debt owed the Alliance
investors.4' After two hearings, the district judge found that Alliance was at risk of
irreparable harm. The court concluded that Alliance would "almost certainly" prevail
on the merits but, by then, the defendants' assets42 would be insufficient to pay the
judgment.43 Deciding that its final judgment would likely be worthless unless it acted,
the court enjoined the transfer of assets but specifically did not preclude GMD from
declaring insolvency.44
The Second Circuit agreed that, in the absence of an injunction, the resulting
judgment would likely be uncollectible against a debtor whose actions the court
characterized as "less than benign., 45 As for the source of the power to protect the
creditor, the Second Circuit considered two federal procedural rules. One, Rule 64,
authorized use of remedies available under state law "for the purpose of securing
satisfaction" ofjudgments 6 The other, Rule 65, provided for preliminary injunctive
37. 527 U.S. 308 (1999).
38. Id. at 310-11.
39. Id. at 311-12.
40. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc. v. Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A., 143 F.3d 688,691-92
(2d Cir. 1998).
41. Id. at 692.
42. Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 312-13.
43. Grupo Mexicano, 143 F.3d at 692 (summarizing the district court's conclusions). See also
Petition for Certiorari at Appendix 26a, Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond
Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308 (1999) (No. 98-231) (including the order dated Dec. 23, 1997 from the
Southern District of New York that had granted the preliminary injunction based on a finding
that "the probability that Plaintiffs will succeed on the merits of their underlying claim for
breach of contract is almost certain .... ).
44. Brief for Respondent at Joint Appendix 79aa, Grupo Mexicano (No. 98-231) (including
the transcript of the district court proceedings).
45. Grupo Mexicano, 143 F.3d at 697.
46. FED. R. Civ. P. 64 (providing that, after an action is commenced, "all remedies... for
seizure of person or property for the purpose of securing satisfaction of the judgment ultimately
to be entered in the action are available under the circumstances and in the manner provided by
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relief.47 The Second Circuit saw the two as "complementary, not mutually
exclusive. 48 While the parties agreed that New York law did not provide for a freeze
order,49 making Rule 64 unhelpful, the Second Circuit determined that federal "general
equitable power"50 could provide relief if the exacting requirements for a preliminary
injunction relief were met.5
The Supreme Court reversed through a decision split 5 to 4.52 The majority opinion,
written by Justice Scalia, concluded that because the remedy would not "historically"
have been available from a court of equity, the district court had no power to prevent
the disposition of assets pending adjudication. 53 Below, I examine the analytic choices
that generated this conclusion.
1. Requiring English History
The majority's decision assumed that federal equitable powers stemmed from
Congress. Focusing on the 1789 congressional grant of jurisdiction to the federal
courts over "all suits.., in equity," the majority read that provision to permit only
those remedies available during the constitutional era.' 4 The majority rejected the
dissent's argument that the "grand aims of equity" then entailed a flexible approach,
open to development as necessitated by circumstances. 55 The majority also rejected the
dissent's argument that later American precedents proved the existence of a federal
equity power broader than that of England.56 Justice Scalia's opinion distinguished
such cases as resting on independent statutory authority57 or on special public
the law of the state in which the district court is held," and referring to attachment, garnishment,
or "equivalent remedies, however designated").
47. FED. R. Civ. P. 65.
48. Grupo Mexicano, 143 F.3d at 692.
49. Id. at 693.
50. Id. at 695-96.
51. As to a bond, the trial judge had required the posting of $50,000, a small sum given the
amount of debt at issue but perhaps illuminating the trial judge's confidence in the likelihood
that the plaintiff would prevail. See Brief for Respondent at 5, Grupo Mexicano (No. 98-231).
52. Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308 (1999).
Justice Scalia wrote for the majority formed by the Chief Justice, Justices O'Connor, Kennedy,
Thomas, and himself. Id. at 309. Justice Ginsburg issued the dissent, joined by Justices Stevens,
Souter, and Breyer. Id. The decision was unanimous in one respect, that the issuance of a
permanent injunction had not rendered the controversy moot because, if as claimed, the issuance
of the preliminary injunction was wrongful, GMD would be able to recover on the bond. Id. at
315, 335 n.2.
53. Id. at 333. For those accustomed to the historical approach invoked by Justice Scalia in
cases involving the Due Process Clause, the discussion was familiar for its focus on early
practices. See, e.g., Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990) (Scalia, J., plurality
opinion) (holding that personal jurisdiction obtained by personal service within the forum state
comported with due process requirements because that method had been available historically).
54. Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 318-19 (as excerpted in the majority's decision).
55. Id. at 321-22, 342 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and
Breyer).
56. Id. at 337.
57. Id. at 324-25 (discussing Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282 (1940),
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interests. 8
As is familiar to those steeped in Justice Scalia's craft, a good deal of rhetorical
flourish was deployed in service of these claims. Like parallel developments in
sovereign immunity cases that also constrain the remedial powers of the federal
courts, 59 the opinion insisted that it had only applied (rather than created) a rule. As
Justice Scalia explained, the ruling was consistent "with the democratic and self-
deprecating judgment we have long since made: that the equitable powers conferred by
the Judiciary Act of 1789 did not include the power to create remedies previously
unknown to equity jurisprudence., 60 Further, the majority positioned itself as
preventing errant judges from harmful overreaching. Justice Scalia repeated a
commentator's characterization of a freeze-asset injunction as a "nuclear weapon."' 6
And Justice Scalia quoted Justice Story about the horrors of English equity, "the most
formidable instrument of arbitrary power, that could well be devised. 62
2. Insisting on Courts as Agents
The Grupo Mexicano majority presumed federal judges incompetent to shape new
remedies unless so directed by statute. That decision shares an intellectual kinship with
a position that its author, Justice Scalia, has expressed in lectures-what he has termed
the "uncomfortable relationship of common-law lawmaking to democracy (if not to the
technical doctrine of the separation of powers). 63 Further, for Justice Scalia, "in the
federal courts ... there is no such thing as common law. Every issue of law I resolve
as a federal judge is an interpretation of a text-the text of a regulation, or of a statute,
or of the Constitution.'""
Thus, the consideration of federal courts' remedial powers implicates the
constitutional meaning of allocated powers. The constitutional word "court" has not
and the Securities Act's provisions for equitable relief).
58. Id. at 325-26 (quoting Virginia Ry. Co. v. Ry. Employees, 300 U.S. 515, 552 (1937))
(distinguishing United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378 (1965)). See discussion infra
Part II.A.6 (discussing the majority's assertion that federal courts may have broader equitable
powers when public interests are at stake).
59. See generally Daniel Meltzer, State Sovereign Immunity: Five Authors in Search of a
Theory, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1011 (2000) [hereinafter, Meltzer, State Sovereign Immunity];
Vicki C. Jackson, Holistic Interpretation: Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer and Our Bifurcated Constitution,
53 STAN. L. REv. 1259 (2001).
60. Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 332.
61. Id. at 329, 332 (quoting RICHARD N. OUGH & WILLIAM FLENLEY, THE MAREVA
INJUNCTION AND ANTON PILLER ORDER: PRACTICE AND PRECEDENTS xi (2d ed. 1993). See infra
notes 124-128 and accompanying text (discussing Mareva injunctions).
62. Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 332 (quoting I JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE § 19 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1886)) (also describing equity as placing "the
whole rights and property of the community under the arbitrary will of the Judge").
63. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution andLaws, address given at Princeton University
(Mar. 8-9, 1995), in THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 1995 at 86, available at
http://www.tannerlectures.utah.edu/library.html [hereinafter Scalia, Common-Law Courts].
64. Id. at 88. Justice Scalia there noted that "a qualification so small" existed but did "not
bear mentioning."
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(yet) prompted a literature comparable to that devoted to the constitutional word
"case," 65 but the reference to "the judicial power" has brought forth sustained
consideration about what kinds of powers were meant to be included (then) and what
to make of those words (then and now).66 Much of that discussion seeks to understand
how judges ought to read statutes. In addition, scholars ofthe federal courts have many
times addressed federal common law,67 a discussion that expanded in light of the 1938
decision of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,68 which prohibited federal rules of decision
in cases arising under state law.69
How might one reason about the charter that runs with the job ofjudge? Does the
conception of a judge shift if modified by the word "federal"? One might derive
theories of role from practice, by looking at what judges in fact do. In those terms, the
claim that federal judges do not "do" common lawmaking ignores many examples of
that genre of decisionmaking. Illustrations include cases about relations with other
65. See, e.g., Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN. L. REv. 277 (1990); Cass R.
Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1432 (1988).
66. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the
"Judicial Power" in Statutory Interpretation, 1776-1806, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 990 (2001)
[hereinafter Eskridge, All About Words]; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, the Unknown
Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. REv. 1509 (1998); Manning, supra note 17. See generally GUIDO
CALABRESi, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting
Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REv. 405 (1989); John M. Walker, Jr., Judicial
Tendencies in Statutory Construction: Differing Views on the Role of the Judge, 58 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 203 (2001).
Commentators also address courts' inherent or supervisory powers and the degree to which
Congress may or should regulate such powers. See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, Reconsidering
Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases: Constitutional and Statutory Limits on the Authority of
the Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1433 (1984); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers
of Federal Courts and the Structural Constitution, 86 IOWA L. REv. 735 (2001); William F.
Ryan, Rush to Judgment: A Constitutional Analysis of Time Limits on Judicial Decisions, 77
B.U. L. REv. 761 (1997).
67. See, e.g., Alfred Hill, The Law-Making Power of the Federal Courts: Constitutional
Preemption, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1024 (1967); Daniel J. Meltzer, Customary InternationalLaw,
Foreign Affairs, andFederal Common Law, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 513 (2002) [hereinafter Meltzer,
Customary International Law]; Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law,
89 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1975).
68. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
69. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REv. 693 (1974);
Alfred Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 Nw. U. L. REv. 427 (1958). The Erie-
based argument that federal courts lack common law powers has sometimes been read
contextually to mean that federal courts cannot make common law only in those cases that arise
under state law. Proponents of this position, such as Professor Martha Field, also detail the many
instances of federal common law making to undercut the argument that federal courts are
incompetent to develop law. Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common
Law, 99 HARV. L. REv. 883 (1986). Moreover, given the murky bases of the decision in Erie
itself(which lacks specificity on what exactly was unconstitutional), it may itself be an example
of a genre of federal common law making. My own view is that Article 11i'sjurisdictional bases,
including diversity, support authority for judge-made law but that judges may well decline to
develop law based on principles of comity, such as deference to state or legislative lawmaking.
See Meltzer, Customary International Law, supra note 67.
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nations,70 commercial transactions with the United States,7' labor law,72 admiralty,73
and statutes of limitations.7 Indeed, Justice Scalia is himself the author of a major
contemporary federal common law decision, creating a federal defense of immunity for
government contractors despite congressional inaction on statutes proposing such
defenses to liability.
75
Alternatively, Justice Scalia's claim might be aspirational-that judges should do as
little common law making as possible. Justice Scalia's concern about a democratic
deficit for judge-made law would seem to include all judges, 76 although in some cases,
he has appeared to draw distinctions between federal and state judges. 77 If the
argument is that federal judges ought to do little (and possibly less than their
counterparts in other jurisdictions), it would be based either on some reading of the
Constitution, or on historical practices, or on a view that conditions now require
situating federal judges as specially limited.
Starting with the textual reference in Article III to "courts," we know that courts-
unlike some other institutions created by the Constitution-were familiar to the
Framers through experiences with English, colonial, and fledgling state courts. The
Constitution designed a distinctive court system and stipulated special attributes for
judges in federal courts-such as life-tenure, guaranteed salaries, and competency over
certain subject matters. But the Constitution did not generate a novel iteration of courts
70. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
71. United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United
States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
72. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
73. Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp. v. Garris, 532 U.S. 811, 820 (2001). See
generally Joel K. Goldstein, Federal Common Law in Admiralty: An Introduction to the
Beginning of an Exchange, 43 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1337 (1999).
74. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985); Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S.
454 (1975).
75. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988). See also Semtek Int'l Inc. v.
Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (2001) (holding, in an opinion written by Justice Scalia
for a unanimous Court, that federal law governed preclusion of federal judgments, and that
federal law required the use of state law in a state-based claim unless that law was incompatible
with federal interests). See generally Stephen B. Burbank, Semtek, Forum Shopping, and
Federal Common Law, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1027 (2002).
76. See Scalia, Common-Law Courts, supra note 63, at 121 ("the interpretation and
application of democratically adopted texts comprises virtually all the work of federal judges,
and the vast majority of the work of state judges"). If the problem is framed as the absence of
democratic input into the resolution of an individual decision that "makes" a rule of law, electing
judges (as some states do) would not solve it.
77. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 122 S. Ct. 2528 (2002) (holding that
Minnesota's restrictions on candidates for the judiciary were overbroad). The same five
members of the Court formed the majority that struck Minnesota's rules, and Justice Scalia
wrote the opinion for the Court in which he stated that "state-court judges possess the power to
'make' the common law." Id. at 2539. Both Justices O'Connor and Kennedy filed their own
concurrences. Id. at 2542, 2544, respectively. In dissent, Justice Ginsburg (on behalf of herself
and Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer) quietly departed from the majority's distinction
between state and federal judges as to their common law powers. The dissent did so by not
distinguishing between state and federal judges when stating that judges have the power to
"develop common law or give concrete meaning to constitutional text." Id. at 2551.
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with practices and remedial authority radically divergent from other jurisdictions'
courts.78
Indeed, we know that practices of other courts influenced both the provisions ofthe
First Judiciary Act and the methods and rulings of early federal judges. In 1789,
Congress required lower federal courts to align themselves with state courts' practices,
at first in a static fashion but subsequently in a dynamic manner. 79 And, through many
histories of the early period,80 we know that federal courts generated decisions shaped
by the demands of adjudication and the political exigencies of the time.8 1 Moreover, in
the early period, neither law nor practices came pre-coded as "state" or "federal" or
"English" or "American."8 2 Only through jurisdictional struggles, provisions for
78. But see Pushaw, supra note 66 at 738-47 (arguing that three "basic" constitutional
principles-of a written constitution with enumerated powers, of lawmaking by the legislator,
and of congressional control over the judiciary's structure-require the judiciary to use only
those inherent powers essential to executing the laws and to forego those powers which, while
"helpful, useful, or convenient" are not essential to the work).
79. See Conformity Act of 1872, Ch. 255, 17 Stat. 196; Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity
Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135
U. PA. L. REV. 909, 930-31 (1987).
80. See, e.g., MARY K. BONSTEEL TACHAU, FEDERAL COURTS IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC:
KENTUCKY, 1789-1816 (1978); Susan L. Block & Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Celebrating the 200th
Anniversary of the Federal Courts of the District of Columbia, 90 GEO. L.J. 549 (2002); Wythe
Holt, "Federal Courts as the Asylum to Federal Interests": Randolph's Report, the Benson
Amendment, and the "Original Understanding" of the Federal Judiciary, 36 BUFF. L. REv. 341
(1987); Wythe Holt, "To Establish Justice": Politics, The Judiciary Act of 1789, and the
Invention of the Federal Courts, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1421. Whether to use early practices to ascribe
meaning to Article III is a question about which scholars disagree. See ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL
JUDICIARY: ESSAYS ON THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1992) and specifically
Maeva Marcus & Natalia Wexler, The Judiciary Act of 1789: Political Compromise or
Constitutional Interpretation?, in id. at 13-39.
81. Stewart Jay, for example, has examined the question of why, in 1793, five Supreme Court
justices, invoking separation of powers, declined the Executive's request for advice on the
obligations of the United States as a neutral in the European Wars. See STEWART JAY, MOST
HUMBLE SERVANTS: THE ADVISORY ROLE OF EARLY JUDGES 1-9 (1997). Professor Jay
documented English judges' roles in drafting particular statutes, id. at 10-50, as well as the many
functions performed by early American judges and justices, id. at 57-112. He concluded that the
decision to refuse to provide advice on constitutional questions was a choice, driven by the
particular confluence of the political views and affiliations ofjustices and their concerns about
protecting other decisions. Id. at 171-77. In general, he argued that the claimed prohibition on
advisory opinions, now "an abstraction" allegedly compelled by Article Ill, in fact grew from
"particular circumstances, rather than abstract principles." Id. at 176-77.
82. William Fletcher has looked at case law in the early days of the federal system and
shown that, at least in certain areas, judges successfully created, administered, and saw
themselves guided by a shared common law, neither state nor federal. See William Fletcher, The
General Common Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789: The Example of Marine
Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1513 (1984). See also Eskridge, AllAbout Words, supra note 66, at
1043 (invoking, in response to a critique that federal courts would displace state law, James
Iredell's comment that "common law would remain the baseline of Americans' duties and
rights, subject to lawful statutory alterations"); id. at 1058-87 (discussing federal court reliance,
in the first fifteen years of decisions, on the "law of nations").
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separate rules of practice and procedure, and advocacy-from judges, politicians,
lawyers, and law professors-have we come to develop ajurisprudence that insists on
bodies of law as "state" or "federal. 83
The constitutional charter for "courts" with jurisdiction "in law and equity" can thus
be read to authorize institutions that, like other countries' courts, have the capacity to
respond to changing demands, so long as federal courts work within the boundaries of
their subject matter authority. 84 The history of the federal courts is filled with examples
of decisions in which judges extrapolated meanings and provided remedies beyond the
text of statutes. 85 Specifically in terms of equity, both Professor William Eskridge
(focused on the early periods)8 6 and Professor John Leubsdorf (concerned about
83. See Resnik, Categorical Federalism, supra note 14, at 619-26, 642-57.
84. As to what was intended then, see Eskridge, All About Words, supra note 66, at 1044
(discussing the shared understanding in England and in the United States that, when judges
offered equitable interpretations of statutes, they were not engaged in illicit lawmaking or
exercising inappropriate discretion). Further, even Robert Pushaw, an opponent of many implied
and inherent powers, offers the view that neither the text of the Constitution nor discussion at the
Convention or during ratification addressed the inherent powers of courts. Rather, theories of
constitutional structure are required to develop normative approaches to what might have been
intended then and what ought to exist now. See Pushaw, supra note 66, at 822.
85. See David A. Strauss, The Common Law Genius ofthe Warren Court, 2002 U. CHI. PUB.
L. & LEGAL THEORY RES. PAPER SERIES 25, available at http://papers.ssm.com/abstract_
id=315682 (arguing that common law caution coupled with careful innovation marked the
jurisprudence of that era).
86. Professor William Eskridge has reviewed English, early state, and early federal cases and
distinguished the kinds ofjudicial contributions made for the "unprovided-for case." Eskridge,
All About Words, supra note 66, at 995-97. For example, he noted an English case in which a
statute specified property transfers that could be disregarded if used to avoid the king's seizure
of church property. A court, dealing with an unlisted method for transferring property,
concluded that its role was to "suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy ... " Id. at 1004
(quoting Heydon's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 637, 638 (Ex. 1584)). See also id. at 1004-14
(considering other instances of equitable interpretation to advance statutory ends and finding no
evidence of the "follow-the-words-notwithstanding the consequences approach" in federal cases,
and only once in state cases). The most controversial judicial practices in early America, he
concluded, were those which he terms "suppletive." Some commentators feared that such
exercises of judicial power would come at the expense of either the powers of the states or the
liberties of individuals. Id. at 996-97.
Professor Eskridge's article is part of an ongoing debate about the role of judges, and was
written in response to Professor John Manning, who has disagreed in many respects with
Professor Eskridge. Id. at 992-94. Professor Manning has argued that English judges did upon
occasion see themselves as having a broad charter to interpret Parliamentary directives; they
relied in part on the doctrine of "equity of the statute." But, in his view, that approach "does not
translate well" to the United States, which deliberately departed from many of the features that
characterized the English relationship between the judiciary and the executive. Manning, supra
note 17, at 1, 6-8, 71-105. Manning claimed that the "faithful agent" model provided a more
accurate description of how early Americans hoped their federal judges would behave and of
how those judges did in fact rule. Further, he argued, it fit the political theory of separation of
powers adopted by the United States Constitution. Id. at 58, 121-24. Although Manning
disagreed with Eskridge about what judges ought to do, Manning concurred with Eskridge that,
in the early precedents, federal judges did not only match their actions to statutes authorizing
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awards of preliminary injunctive relief)8 7 have demonstrated that federal judges
repeatedly responded to litigants' claims through devising remedies other than those
stipulated in statutes and rules.
Thus, Grupo Mexicano is less about constitutional text and practice and more about
establishing a new and distinctive charter for federal judges-based on a normative
theory of how judges ought to behave. That position might well be predicated on a
view that, given the many changes in both courts and legislatures since the founding,"8
new solutions are required. Among competing theories, the majority has chosen the
model of judges as "faithful agents," constrained absent congressional direction to
remediate.8 9 Implicitly, the majority has rejected conceptions of a "cooperative
partnership" between judges and Congress, sharing in the undertaking of lawmaking,
or a more eclectic approach, open to shifting roles depending on the context. 9° The
Grupo Mexicano ruling, one of several limiting affirmative federal remedies, fits
within a series of opinions written by Justice Scalia---on contempt powers,91 on the
lack of historical precedent for certain kinds of injunctions,92 and on the limits that
federal rules impose on the inherent powers ofjudges. 93 One might be tempted to call
Grupo Mexicano's holding an example of common law making itsele 4 but for its
failure to build on or to explain its departure from precedent. Instead, the majority
particular remedies. See Eskridge, All About Words, supra note 66, at 1096-1100; Manning,
supra note 17, at 87-88.
87. John Leubsdorf, The Standardfor Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HARV. L. REv. 525 (1978)
(discussing both state and federal cases, as well as English practice, and arguing that "dizzying
diversity of formulations" existed, in contrast to more recent efforts to craft a single standard).
88. As many have explained, however, the judiciary and Congress now are different on so
many dimensions that the historical inquiry itself may be misguided. See, e.g., Eskridge, All
About Words, supra note 66, at 1087-1106; Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury:
Transforming the Meaning ofArticle III, 113 HARV. L. REv. 924, 933-49 (2000) [hereinafter
Resnik, Trial as Error].
89. Manning, supra note 17, at 5-22, 102-05. See also John F. Duffy, Administrative
Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REv. 113, 130-39 (1998) (arguing that federal
courts lack the power to fashion a common law for administrative adjudication but must rely
solely on the APA). This approach would result in limiting development of the common law of
due process in administrative processes.
90. See Eskridge, AllAbout Words, supra note 66, at 991-92 (objecting to the dichotomous
formulation of a judiciary as either agent or partner because it misses both theory and practice
and arguing that the role ofjudges in statutory interpretation ought to vary, sometimes coming
closer to the judge as faithful agent and other times as a cooperative partner).
91. See, e.g., Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils, S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 816-17
(1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that only the executive branch had the authority to
decide to prosecute contempt).
92. Int'l Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 839-44 (1994) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (arguing that modem injunctions departed from historical equity practices).
93. See Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416 (1996), discussed infra notes 98-104. See also
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 461 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Justice
Thomas) (objecting to the majority's upholding of Miranda warnings as a "boundless doctrine of
judicial empowerment").
94. As noted, Justice Scalia wrote one of the leading recent common law opinions, licensing
a federal defense for government contractors. See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500
(1988).
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created new, and atextual, constraints on the federal judicial role.
3. Reading Federal Rules as Prohibitions
In Grupo Mexicano, Justice Scalia suggested another source ofjudicial constraint-
the text of federal rules. Justice Scalia noted that, while none of the participants had
raised the point, a federal rule dealing with joinder of claims did not specifically
authorize preliminary relief when monetary damages were sought.95 The issue was not
dispositive, given that it had neither been considered nor briefed below. 96 But the
majority commented that Rule 18's silence (like the silence of statutes) implied a bar to
judicial provision of remedies.97 That approach posits that, when federal rules codify
and structure practices, the rules eliminate flexible response to the particulars of a
given case.
Although dicta in Grupo Mexicano, the lack of a federal rule's textual directive has
formed the basis to limit trial judges' authority in other cases. For example, in Carlisle
v. United States,98 a district judge concluded that a criminal defendant was legally
innocent of a crime for which ajury had convicted him." Rule 29 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure authorized defense counsel to move to set aside verdicts within
seven days.'00 A defendant's lawyer missed the deadline by a day. The trial court
reasoned that "no prejudice" resulted to the Government from treating the motion as
timely filed and that a refusal to hear the motion would result in "grave injustice."''
95. See FED. R. Civ. P. 18(b) (a "plaintiff may state a claim for money and a claim to have set
aside a conveyance fraudulent as to that plaintiff, without first having obtained a judgment
establishing the claim for money.").
96. As the Court noted, the issue of fraudulent conveyances was not involved in the case.
Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308,324 n.7 (1999).
97. Id. at 324.
98. 517 U.S. 416 (1996).
99. Transcript of Sentencing Proceeding/Discharge on Oct. 14, 1993, United States v.
Carlisle, No. 1:93:CR:66-02, slip op. at I (W.D. Mich. Oct. 28, 1993), reprinted in Petition for
Writ Certiorari, Appendix A, Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416 (1996) (No. 94-9247) and
Joint Appendix at 33-34. The district judge had initially written two decisions, one granting and
one denying the motion. In August, the judge issued the decision denying relief but, by the time
of sentencing in October, concluded that the motion had to be granted because the defendant was
legally innocent. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the motion for acquittal was untimely.
See United States v. Rupert, 48 F.3d 190 (6th Cir. 1995).
The Government's brief before the Supreme Court noted that by October of 1993, the trial
judge had received a presentence report, informing him of a sentencing guideline range of 63 to
78 months, the mandatory minimum of five years, and of the defendant's distinguished military
service in Vietnam. Brief for the United States at 7-8, Carlisle (No. 94-9247). The defendant's
reply brief objected to the implicit claim that the trial judge's ruling was motivated by sympathy
and argued that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the conviction. Reply Brief for
Petitioner at 2-13, Carlisle (No. 94-9247).
100. FED. R. CRuM. P. 29(c) provides that motions forjudgment of acquittal "may be made or
renewed within 7 days after the jury is discharged or within such further time as the court may
fix during the 7-day period."
101. See United States v. Carlisle, No. 1, 93:CR:66-02, slip. op. at 1, n. 1 (W.D. Mich. Oct.
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Through an opinion written by Justice Scalia, 10 2 the Court disagreed, holding that the
rule was the sole source of authority to act-preventing a judge from relying on
inherent powers to craft other remedies.10 3 In dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the
rules did not sap trial judges of the "power 'inherent in every court ofjustice so long as
it retains control of the subject matter and of the parties, to correct that which has been
wrongfully done by virtue of its process.""'0
4
The use of federal rules as a limitation on judicial equitable power does not quite fit
the rationale of courts as agents of Congress. The agency model is premised on a
preference for lawmaking coming from the democratic processes embodied in
congressional legislation rather than emanating from courts. But Federal Rules (of civil
or criminal procedure) do not express the unvarnished will of the legislature because
the role played by Congress in procedural rulemaking is less direct than when enacting
statutes. In 1934, Congress delegated the power of rulemaking-for rules of "practice
and procedure" that cannot abridge "substantive rights"-to the judiciary,'0 5 which
drafts rules through committees. The Chief Justice appoints the members of the
27, 1993), reprinted in Joint Appendix at 37-44, Carlisle (No. 94-9247). The trial court
concluded that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, was
"insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt" that Charles Carlisle had "knowingly and
voluntarily joined" a conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to distribute it. Id. at 44.
102. Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court was joined by the Chief Justice, Justice O'Connor,
and Justice Thomas. Carlisle, 517 U.S. at 417-33. The concurrences by Justice Souter and by
Justice Ginsburg (joined by Justices Souter and Breyer) are discussed infra note 103.
103. Carlisle, 517 U.S. at 421-24. The opinion insisted on the correctness of its own reading
of the rule, described as "plain and unambiguous." Id. at 421. The decision did note that earlier
precedents had viewed the mandate in another Federal Criminal Rule, Rule 2, as a charter to
deviate from other rule-based time limits. That rule states that courts are "to provide for the just
determination of every criminal proceeding... and to secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in
administration, and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay." Id. at 424-29 (quoting
FED. R. CiM. P. 2). Justice Scalia distinguished the other cases as resting on historical practices
and argued that, in contrast, setting aside guilty verdicts had no comparable historical pedigree.
Id.
Justice Souter concurred to note that congressional limitations on the inherent powers of
courts could raise Article III issues but that Rule 29's time limits on ajudge's power, sua sponte,
to grant a judgment of acquittal were not such an "unconstitutional interference with the court's
inherent authority." Id. at 434 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg's concurrence,joined by
Justice Souter and Justice Breyer, understood Rule 29(c) to impose time prescriptions but noted
that alternative remedies-including a motion for post-conviction relief based on ineffective
assistance of counsel--remained. Id. at 434,435-36 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Justice Stevens,
joined by Justice Kennedy, dissented. Id. at 436-55 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
A more generous approach to rules can be found in United States v. Cotton, 122 S. Ct. 1781
(2002). There, the Court concluded that the plain error test of Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 52(b) did not invalidate a conviction despite a defective grand jury indictment
because no real threat to the "fairness, integrity, or public reputation ofjudicial proceedings" had
been posed. Id. at 1786.
104. Carlisle, 517 U.S. at 437 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Arkadelphia Milling Co. v.
St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co., 249 U.S. 134, 190 (1919)).
105. See Rules Enabling Act,.Pub. L. No. 78-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2077 (2000)).
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drafting committees, 106 whose products are reviewed by other committees, the Judicial
Conference itself, and the Supreme Court, which has the option of transmitting to or
withholding rules from Congress.10 7 While once lawyers played a central role, judges
now dominate the drafting process. 0 8 Their rules become effective, absent
congressional override, within a fixed period of time.109 The silence of the rules is thus
the silence of the judges themselves.
Given the odd legal status of rules, Robert Cover argued that their legality hinged
on their inability to infringe on judicial remedial authority. I10 In light of what he
termed "the problematic character of the Federal Rules under the Constitution,"'1 they
could not be read to remove the power of a court to create remedies. "Remedial
creativity" had to be exercised apart from and in addition to the Federal Rules for,
otherwise, the Rules would violate the statutory mandate not to "abridge, modify, or
enlarge" substantive rights."12
Moreover, a question exists as to whether the rules were silent. As was argued in
Grupo Mexicano, the 1938 Rules, providing for a single form of action-known as a
"civil action"' 13-represent the merger of law and equity. Those rules were functional
in their approach, eschewing earlier encrusted procedural formats. Indeed, some have
criticized the Rules as incorporating too much of equity's practices."14 If the rules were
106. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 331, 2072-2074 (2000) (providing for the Judicial Conference to
authorize committees on rulemaking). The Chief Justice, as chair of the Conference, makes the
selection. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Ulysses Tied to the Generic Whipping Post: The Continuing
Odyssey ofDiscovery "Reform, " LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring/Summer 2001, at 197,248-
52 (detailing the composition of specific committees and charting the influence of Chief Justices,
and arguing, id. at 250, that Chief Justice Rehnquist has "made appointments that surely were
designed to result in a narrowing of discovery"). See also Jeffrey W. Stempel, Politics and
Sociology in Federal Civil Rulemaking: Errors of Scope, 52 ALA. L. REv. 529 (2001).?
107. The Court has recently declined to transmit a proposed rule to Congress. The Advisory
Committee on Criminal Rules had drafted a modification of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
26(b) on video-taped deposition testimony. Justices O'Connor and Breyer filed a dissent, and
Justice Scalia offered a statement supporting the refusal to promulgate the rule and explaining
his view of the constitutional questions that the proposed rule raised. See Statement of Justice
Breyer and Justice O'Connor on Amendments to Rule 26(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, 122 S. Ct. R-49 (Apr. 29, 2002), and Statement of Justice Scalia on the Amendments
to Rule 26(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 122 S. Ct. R.-46 (Apr. 29, 2002).
108. See Stephen C. Yeazell, Judging Rules, Ruling Judges, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Summer 1998, at 229, 238-39.
109. See 28 U.S.C. § 2074. As the Chief Justice has explained in another context, the
Supreme Court has "supervisory authority over the federal courts." The Court may use that
authority to "prescribe rules of evidence and procedure" that bind, subject to modification by
Congress and to constitutional constraints. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437
(2000) (declining to overrule Miranda and finding a congressional statutory override, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3501, unsustainable under it).
110. See Robert M. Cover, For James Win. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the
Rules, 84 YALE L. J. 718 (1975).
111. Id. at 736.
112. Id. at 735 (invoking the language of the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b)).
113. FED. R. Civ. P. 2.
114. Stephen Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1015 (1982);
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to be a source, they could have supported dynamic equitable regimes, especially
through the mandate of Rule I to construe and administer the rules "to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." 1 5 On the other hand, as
Professor Stephen Burbank has pointed out, 1 6 the history surrounding the drafting of
federal rules on provisional remedies might have suggested that special constraints
attend federal court inventions, particularly in diversity litigation. Oddly, in light of the
majority's expressed commitments (in this case) to history and (in so many others)' 1 7
to states' interests, neither that history nor the role of state law occupied the Court in
Grupo Mexicano.
4. Ignoring State Practices
Because Grupo Mexicano was predicated on federal courts' diversity jurisdiction, a
question existed as to whether the relief ought to mirror what state courts would have
done--either because federal rules so required (as discussed above) or because the
statute authorizing federal rulemaking itself requires deference to state law on the
question of remedies. Rule 64 of the Federal Rules directs federal courts to use state
provisional remedies absent a federal statute." 8 Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins 19 was
decided in 1938, the same year in which the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure came
into force. Erie, as interpreted through subsequent cases related directly to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure,' 20 requires that diversity litigants not gain substantively
different outcomes through invocation of federal jurisdiction.
Therefore, the lower courts might have thought that Rule 64 or the Rules Enabling
Act required them to turn to New York law. 12' Because the parties agreed in Grupo
Mexicano that New York did not permit prejudgment asset freezing, the courts might
either have concluded that the injunction was unavailable or have certified the question
Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 494 (1986);
Subrin, supra note 79 (raising concerns that the rules were too oriented towards equity, giving
too much discretion to judges).
115. FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
116. Burbank, The Bitter with the Sweet, supra note 11, at 1323-33 (describing the
impression that, when the rules were drafted, the federal courts were seen to be pro-creditor and
discussing the concerns expressed both in case law and in Congress about the effects of
permitting the federal judiciary to have the power to order monetary relief).
117. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
118. See FED. R. Civ. P. 64 (stating that "all remedies" providing for "seizure of person or
property... are available under the circumstances and in the manner provided by the law of the
state in which the district court is held").
119. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
120. See, e.g., Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996); Hanna v. Plumer,
380 U.S. 460 (1965).
121. In the major academic analyses of Grupo Mexicano, Professor Stephen Burbank took
both majority and dissent to task for not resting the decision on Rule 64, which he argued,
represented a substantive preference for conforming remedies in diversity cases to state law. See
Burbank, The Bitter with the Sweet, supra note 11, at 1331-34, 1337 (also arguing that, in light
of the implications for global capital investment, Congress was the institution well situated to
respond).
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to the state court. But the litigants did not raise any Erie issues until the Supreme
Court. The lower courts had invoked Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
governing the issuance of preliminary injunctive relief. At the Supreme Court, rather
than remanding, the majority used the occasion to rein in federal remedial authority
more generally. 122 (Since the decision, a few lower courts have, in diversity cases,
relied on state law remedies in conjunction with Rule 64 to distinguish Grupo
Mexicano and to grant injunctions.)' 23
The refusal to defer to state law in Grupo Mexicano links that decision to rulings on
preemption, another body of contemporary lawmaking about the relationship between
federal adjudication and state-based remedies. Although much of the majority's
discussion in its recent constitutional jurisprudence claims that Congress is specially
constrained when affecting arenas governed by state law, 24 the Court has taken a
different tack when interpreting federal statutes. Repeatedly, the Court has read federal
legislation as implicitly overriding state law provisions.S23 When Grupo Mexicano is
placed in the context of the willingness to read federal statutes as preclusive of state
remedies, the decision can be seen as a part of a broader hostility to remedies,
regardless of their source.
5. Refusing Transnational Jurisprudential Exchanges
I began by locating Grupo Mexicano within the majority's jurisprudence of rights
and remedies. As in the opinions refusing to imply causes of action, Grupo Mexicano
assumes that when faced with a claim of wrongdoing, the proper judicial posture is
inaction absent specific congressional direction. But the decision also aligns with other
approaches associated with the Rehnquist Court, specifically its disinclination to join
in transnational jurisprudential dialogues.
122. Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 318 n.3
(1999). The majority did note that the remedy was not "merely a question of procedure," id. at
322, and then applied its newly crafted federal rule.
123. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Rahman v. Oncology Assocs., P.C., 198 F.3d 489, 500
(4th Cir. 1999) (interpreting Maryland law and Rule 64); John Paul Mitchell Sys. v. Quality
King Distribs., Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d 462 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (concluding that, in diversity cases,
Rule 65 provides both the authority to issue and the standards for preliminary injunctions but
state law determines whether a litigant's cause of action can support an injunction); Cendant
Corp. v. Forbes, 70 F. Supp. 2d 339, 343-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), affdwithoutpublished opinion,
205 F.3d 1322 (2d Cir. 2000) (considering that Grupo Mexicano did not resolve the Erie issue,
and concluding that in diversity actions, federal courts must use state remedial possibilities even
if they are in excess of federal equitable powers because uniform federal equitable remedies
were not required; further that, when the remedy under state law was "inextricably entwined"
with the right-as was the case in a suit under New York law against an executive who had lost
a job but had not returned allegedly excess reimbursements agreed to be repaid--courts could
issue relief).
124. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616-19 (2000).
125. See infra note 460. In 2002, a unanimous Court concluded that state common law tort
claims were not preempted by either the Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971 or the decision of the
Coast Guard not to promulgate regulations requiring propeller guards on motor boats. See
Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 123 S. Ct. 518 (2002).
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As both the parties and amici discussed in Grupo Mexicano,' 26 the kind of remedy
sought by the creditors was not new to the common law world. Indeed, it goes by the
name of a "Mareva" injunction, so termed after a 1975 decision of the English
Chancery Court granting that relief.127 Since then, several common law jurisdictions,
including Australia, Canada, and New Zealand,128 have provided that form of relief,
recognized as important in light of the ease of transferring assets in a global
economy.' 
29
In Grupo Mexicano, Justice Scalia noted the existence of the Mareva injunction but
termed its development a "dramatic departure" from prior practice and, therefore,
inappropriate-given "our traditionally cautious approach to equitable powers which
leaves any substantial expansion of past practice to Congress." 30 Although England
126. See Brief for Petitioners at 16, Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond
Fund, 527 U.S. 308 (1999) (No. 98-231) (arguing that a 1975 English decision authorizing such
an injunction was evidence of the lack of a traditional predicate for the remedy); Brief for
Respondents at 34, n. 17, Grupo Mexicano (No. 98-231) (arguing that English equity recognized
the possibility that courts could issue such injunctions earlier than 1975 and that their use has
become widespread). See also Brief of Amici Curiae the Securities Industry Association and the
Emerging Markets Traders Association in Support of Respondents at 7-12, Grupo Mexicano
(No. 98-231); Brief of Amicus Curiae the Dominican Republic in Support of Petitioners at 8,21,
n.13, Grupo Mexicano (No. 98-231) (arguing that Mareva injunctions were limited to rare
instances; opposing the relief as intrusive on debtor-creditor regimes outside the United States,
and calling for restraint under principles of comity). The other amicus brief, filed for the United
States, Brief of United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, did not address this
issue.
127. See Mareva Compani Naviera, S.A. v. Int'l Bulk Carriers, S.A., 2 Lloyd's Rep. 509
(Eng. C.A. 1975). Under English statutes, courts had the power to issue injunctions in cases
when "just or convenient." See also General Public Act of 1981, ch. 54, § 37. In 1999, English
civil procedure provided for such injunctions under the term "freezing injunctions." See Peter
Devonshire, Mareva Injunctions and Third Parties: Exposing the Subtext, 62 MOD. L. REv. 539,
n.* (1999).
128. See Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd. v. Bond Brewing Holdings Ltd. (1991) 1 V.R. 386; United
States v. Friedland, (1999) 93 A.C.W.S. (3d) 552; Mooney v. Orr, (1994) 51 A.C.W.S. (3d) 704;
Natural Gas Corp. Holdings Ltd. v. Grand (1994) 2 N.Z.L.R. See generally Preliminary Draft
Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Oct. 30,
1999, art. 13, available at http://www.hcch.net/e/conventions/draft36e.html (permitting such
injunctions if the issuing court has jurisdiction over the defendant under specified conditions,
including property of defendant); Provisional and Protection Measures in International
Litigation: Mareva and Grupo Mexicano (Panel discussion), 94 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 60
(2000); Rhonda Wasserman, Equity Renewed: Preliminary Injunctions to Secure Potential
Money Judgments, 67 WASH. L. REv. 257 (1992) (offering an argument for when freeze orders
are appropriate).
129. See also Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 338-39 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Brief ofAmici
Curiae the Securities Industry Association and the Emerging Markets Traders Association in
Support of Respondents at 5-7, Grupo Mexicano (No. 98-231) (noting that more than 1,000
companies from fifty-five countries had registered in excess of $100 billion in securities for
public offerings in the United States; and arguing that, were equitable remedies unavailable,
higher rates of return on the loan of capital would inefficiently be imposed, especially for
emerging markets).
130. Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 327-29.
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could revisit its equity practices to enable evolution over time, the United States
(which had, under Justice Scalia's approach, relied on England as its model for equity)
was obliged to conform to earlier English practices. In the terms of proceduralists,
static (rather than dynamic) conformity was required.
What is refused, through this analysis, is judicial participation in a conversation
with other jurisdictions about what shape remedies need to take in light of
globalization. Instead, in the United States, equitable practices are posited as distinctly
insular, dependent either upon retrospective understandings of this country's
precedents and of 1789 English practices or upon congressional action. And, by using
the occasion to distance itself from remedies developed by common law courts in other
parts of the world, Grupo Mexicano fits with the unwillingness of some justices to
permit jurisprudence from outside the United States to affect this country's laws.13'
13 1. One such example involves the meaning of the Eighth Amendment. When Atkins v.
Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242 (2002) was pending, much attention was focused on whether members
of the Court would rely on international law to determine whether execution of the mentally ill
violated prohibitions on cruel or unusual punishment. Atkins was the second case that raised the
question; an earlier case had mooted. See McCarver v. North Carolina, No. 00-8727 (200 1), cert.
dismissed as improvidently granted, 533 U.S. 975 (200 1).
McCarver, and then Atkins, attracted international participants. Amici briefs were filed in
opposition to the execution by the European Union and by several United States diplomats who
argued the negative effects of executing mentally ill on diplomatic relations with other countries.
See Brief of Amicus Curiae the European Union in Support of Petitioner, 2001 WL 648609,
McCarver v. North Carolina, 533 U.S. 975 (2001) (No. 00-8727); Brief of Amici Curiae
Diplomats, 2001 WL 648607, McCarver (No. 00-8727). Those briefs were also before the Court
in Atkins.
In Atkins, Justice Stevens wrote for a majority, holding that the Eighth Amendment did not
permit such executions. He provided two premises: that, in light of legislative changes within the
United States, society has come to view mentally retarded offenders as less culpable and that an
independent evaluation by the Court provided no reason to disagree with that "legislative
consensus." Atkins, 122 S. Ct. at 2243. The debate about the effects of non-United States law
was noted only by way of a footnote to the comment about the "national consensus" within the
United States. See id. at 2249, n.21 (citing the Brief of Amicus Curiae the European Union in
Support of Petitioner in McCarver v. North Carolina (No. 00-8727) for the proposition that
"within the world community, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by
mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved.").
In contrast, the dissent by the Chief Justice, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, brought
other countries' views to the fore as if the majority's decision had turned on the point. (Perhaps
earlier drafts had done so.) The dissent argued that it failed "to see.., how the views of other
countries regarding the punishment of their citizens" provided support to the decision, that "the
viewpoints of other countries simply are not relevant," and that "international opinion" is not a
"well-established objective indicator[] of contemporary values." Id. at 2254, 2256 (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting). Justice Scalia also wrote a separate dissent, joined by the Chief Justice and
Justice Thomas. Justice Scalia objected to the majority's description of a national consensus
against this practice. He argued that the majority's comments deserved "the Prize for the Court's
Most Feeble Effort to fabricate 'a national consensus' because of its footnoted references to
submissions by religious and professional organizations and by "members of the so-called
'world community'." Id. at 2264. Noting "thankfully" that other nations' views were not
"always those of our people," Justice Scalia quoted one of his earlier dissents that "the views of
other nations, however enlightened the Justices of this Court may think them to be, cannot be
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Just as the United States stands apart from the International Criminal Court, 3 2 it is
kept apart from developing transnational legal norms. By proffering a conception of
federal courts as sui generis institutions unlike other court systems, the Grupo
Mexicano majority shored up "American exceptionalism."'' 33
6. Broader Equitable Powers for the Public Interest?
Questions remain about what to make of Justice Scalia's comment that federal
equity could be more far-reaching if acting "in furtherance of the public interest," as
contrasted with private interests. 134 Two cases are invoked for this proposition,' 35 but
the majority gives no explanation of the relationship between that more permissive
attitude toward affirmative public interest litigation and its general prohibition on
remedies "unknown in traditional equity practice."'1
36
The two prior decisions upon which the Grupo Mexicano majority relied do not
ground their greater willingness to respond to public interests in old English equity
practice. 137 Indeed, in the case Justice Scalia specifically invoked for the idea that
imposed upon Americans through the Constitution." Id. at 2264 (quotation omitted).
132. See Anthony Dworkin, The United States and the International Criminal Court: A
Briefing, CRIMES OF WAR PROJECT (May 15, 2002) at http://www.crimesofwar.org/onnews/
news-us-icc.html (describing the formal notice provided to the Secretary-General of the United
Nations of the refusal by the United States to become a party to the Rome Treaty).
133. See Oscar G. Chase, American "Exceptionalism " and Comparative Procedure, 50 AM.
J. COMP. L. 277 (2002).
134. Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 323-26 (quoting Virginian Ry. Co. v. Sys. Fed'n No. 40,
300 U.S. 515, 552 (1937)) (citing and distinguishing United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 379
U.S. 378, 383 (1965)). See also United States ex rel. Rahman v. Oncology Assocs., P.C., 198
F.3d 489,496 (4th Cir. 1999) (commenting that "a court of equity has enhanced authority when
the public interest is involved," such as when asked to respond by the government); id. at 499
(citing for that view Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U.S. 176, 185 (1935); Cent. Ky. Natural Gas
Co. v. R.R. Comm'n, 290 U.S. 264,271 (1933); City of Harrisonville v. W.S. Dickey Clay Mfg.
Co., 289 U.S. 334, 338 (1933)).
135. See Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 323-26 (distinguishing First Nat ' City Bank, 379
U.S. 378, which in turn had "relied" on Virginian Ry. Co., 300 U.S. at 552).
136. Id. at 327. The dissent, objecting to the constriction of authority altogether, did not raise
the problem of the inconsistency of the majority's approach.
137. One case that the Grupo Mexicano majority distinguished was First National City Bank,
379 U.S. 378, which involved a tax proceeding against a Uruguayan corporation and in which
the district court had temporarily enjoined property transfers. As Justice Scalia noted (see Grupo
Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 323), the government's request for an equitable lien there had relied on a
federal statute permitting the government to obtain injunctions "necessary or appropriate for the
enforcement of the internal revenue laws," as well as on the idea that equity was more flexible
when public interests were at stake. First National cited Virginian Railway for that proposition.
See First Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S. at 380.
When upholding the injunction, the First National Court mentioned the public interest and
cited two other American cases, United States v. Morgan, 307 U.S. 183 (1939), and Hecht Co. v.
Bowles, 321 U.S. 321 (1944). See First Nat 7 City Bank, 379 U.S. at 383. Neither Morgan nor
Hecht, in turn, explored English equity practice. Hecht Co., 321 U.S. 321; Morgan, 307 U.S.
183. Indeed, Hecht stated a broad proposition for the reach of equity:
The essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the Chancellor to do
20031
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public interests license broader equity powers, the issue was the legality of an equitable
order under the Railway Labor Act to negotiate with representatives certified by the
National Mediation Board. The Railway argued that, since equity lacked the power to
make parties agree, judges could not compel them to negotiate. 38 Writing for the
Court, Justice Stone concluded that "the extent to which equity will go to give relief
where there is no adequate remedy at law is not a matter of fixed rule [but] rests in the
sound discretion of the court." 39 Commenting that equity courts "may, and frequently
do, go much farther both to give and to withhold relief in furtherance of the public
interest," he then cited nine American cases, including one from state court. 40 As my
equity and to mould each decree to the necessities of a particular case. Flexibility
rather than rigidity has distinguished it. The qualities of mercy and practicality
have made equity the instrument for nice adjustment and reconciliation between
the public interest and private needs as well as between competing private claims.
Hecht, 321 U.S. at 329-30.
In First National, Justices Harlan and Goldberg dissented, objecting to the majority's
decision, which, they argued, had too easily permitted encumbrances on "foreign owned and
situated property." First Nat ' City Bank, 379 U.S. at 385 (Harlan, J., dissenting, joined by
Justice Goldberg). Their view was that while the court had the power, it ought not to have
exercised it because of the low likelihood that the court could obtain personal jurisdiction over
the defendant. Id. at 390. Neither the discussion by the majority nor by the dissenters turned on
English equity practice, although a footnote in the dissent noted one English case on the question
of whether the trial court had some power. Id. at 387 n.2 (citing Penn v. Lord Baltimore,
reprinted in 27 Eng. Rep. 1132 (ch. 1750)). That case, in turn, related to enforcement of an
equitable decree relating to the boundaries of what were then English provinces in North
America, and while addressing the rights of the private parties, entered the decree "entirely
without prejudice to any prerogative, right, or interest in the crown." See Penn, 27 Eng. Rep. at
1139.
138. Virginian Ry. Co., 300 U.S. at 549-50. Also at issue was the constitutionality of the
Railway Labor Act itself, upheld as a proper exercise of congressional powers under the
Commerce Clause and one that did not violate due process or the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Id. at
553-63.
139. Id. at 551 (citing Willard v. Tayloe, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 557, 565 (1869); Joy v. City of St.
Louis, 138 U.S. 1,47 (1891); Morrison v. Work, 266 U.S. 481,490 (1925); Curran v. Holyoke
Water Power Co., 116 Mass. 90, 92 (1874)). Of these four, only the 1869 decision (by Justice
Field)--on whether an equity court ought to enforce a contract providing for specific execution
upon application of a party who complied with its terms-invoked English sources. Willard, 75
U.S. (8 Wall.) at 565. The case, for Washingtonians, was about whether to compel the sale of
real property adjoining a hotel known as the Willard.
140. Virginian Ry. Co., 300 U.S. at 552-53 (citing Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U.S. 176,
185 (1935); Cent. Ky. Natural Gas Co. v. R.R. Comm'n, 290 U.S. 264,270-73 (1933); City of
Harrisonville v. W.S. Dickey Mfg. Clay Co., 289 U.S. 334,338 (1933); Beasley v. Tex. & Pac.
Ry. Co., 191 U.S. 492,497 (1903); Joy v. City of St. Louis, 130 U.S. 1, 45 (1890); Tex. & Pac.
Ry. Co. v. City of Marshall, 136 U.S. 393, 405-06 (1890); Conger v. New York, W.S. & B.R.
Co., 23 N.E. 983 (N.Y. 1890)).
Justice Stone relied on the congressional policy of the RLA and noted that equity ought to
respond to it, as it had by ordering injunctions to arbitrate. Virginian Ry. Co., 300 U.S. at 552-
53 (citing Tobey v. Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 1313 (No. 14,065), 3 Story 800 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845);
Red Cross Line & At. Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 119, 121 (1924); Marine Transit Corp. v.
Dreyfus, 284 U.S. 263, 278 (1932)). Again, aside from Tobey, none of these cases focus on
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footnotes following the threads of these cases indicate, many of these decisions
examined the propriety of granting equitable relief without expressing the obligation to
mine English sources for permission to do so.'41 In short, federal precedents support a
broader reading of equitable powers when public interests are at stake but do not
ground that position in English equity.
Perhaps the invocation by the majority in Grupo Mexicano of a more flexible equity
when public interests are at stake was an oblique response to a concern raised in
dissent. The dissent noted that the majority's approach prompted questions about the
validity of remedies that have become familiar in the wake of Brown v. Board of
Education. Included are a set of "diverse injunctions that would have been beyond the
contemplation of the 18th-century Chancellor," such as school desegregation and
antitrust decrees.142 Perhaps the majority's acceptance of "public interest" injunctions
signalled a willingness to limit its own ruling in some set of cases.
Whether the discussion of public interest equity will protect such remedies remains
to be seen. It does not necessarily protect other doctrines, now potentially in the
"shadow" of Grupo Mexicano. One example is the writ of corum nobis, which has
been assumed to be part of courts' inherent or common law powers 43 and is
occasionally used to address the lawfulness of a conviction.'" Another is the judicially
English practice. Tobey, 23 F. Cas. at 1320. Rather, they advert to the power of equity and
address the wisdom of particular discretionary orders. Tobey is the one case using English law.
That opinion was by Justice Story, sitting as a circuit justice. The case considered whether an
equity court ought to require the County of Bristol to submit to an arbitration, called for by a
special resolution of the 1839 Massachusetts legislature. Id. at 1318. Justice Story concluded
that, given the common law's view that agreements to arbitrate were revocable, equity ought not
to intervene. Id. at 1321.
141. A parallel exists here between the relevance of English law to remedies in equity and
the role of English law in determining when, under the United States Constitution, a civil jury
trial must be provided. According to one recent analysis, nineteenth century explications of the
availability of jury trials in "suits at common law" did not focus on English common law. See
Margaret L. Moses, What the Jury Must Hear: The Supreme Court's Evolving Seventh
Amendment Jurisprudence, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 183, 185-87 (2000). Moses invoked Waring
v. Clarke, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 441,458-59 (1847) for its abhorrence of interpreting constitutional
grants "according to any English legislation or judicial rule." Id. at 191-92. Moses argued that,
while commentators in the early twentieth century claimed English common law practices to be
the source of the right to a civil jury under the Seventh Amendment, it was not until the 1930s
(when the federal civil rules came into being and applied to all civil cases) that the Supreme
Court relied on analogies from English common law practices. Id. at 188-98. See also AKHIL
REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 81-91 (1998); Ann
Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, The Article III Jury, 87 VA. L. REV. 587, 612-13 (2001)
(both addressing whether the Seventh Amendment reference to preservation of the right ofjury
trials was intended to require state law to be used as the "yardstick").
142. Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 337 n.4.
143. See Pushaw, supra note 66, at 743 (describing some of those assumptions and
challenging some practices, including calling for repudiation of the "practice of exercising" what
he terms "beneficial powers without congressional authorization").
144. See Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 428-39 (1996), discussed supra notes 99-
104. Justice Scalia there questioned the continued availability of that remedy, described as no
longer likely to be "necessary or appropriate." See also United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502
(1954) (deciding that, although in 1946, when adopting amendments to Federal Rule of Civil
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imposed requirement that plaintiffs, receiving a "common benefit" because of the work
of co-plaintiffs and their lawyers, pay attorneys' fees to such lawyers. 145 Other
doctrines, such as forum non conveniens, depend on "inherent powers" of courts.146 In
short, by devising a rule of restraint but refusing to acknowledge that it was doing so,
the Grupo Mexicano majority neither justified normative choices, met the challenge of
explaining how earlier precedents accorded with its holding, nor clarified the reach of
its ruling.
7. Shadowing Equity
What then is to be made of Grupo Mexicano? As Mark Tushnet has counseled, 1
47
commentators ought to be self-conscious about whether they are reading decisions for
more or for less than they are worth. As has been illuminated subsequently by the case
law developed in Grupo Mexicano's wake, the majority's decision has sometimes been
characterized broadly and, at other times, more narrowly.
Recall the facts of the litigation. The lower courts in Grupo Mexicano had no doubt
that the creditor would prevail but, absent a freeze order, would be left without a
remedy.148 The provisional injunction had been accompanied by a small bond, further
evidencing the trial court's confidence of the plaintiff s likelihood of success and of
the equities.' 49 On interlocutory review, the judgment of the trial court had been
affirmed.15 0 By the time the case was decided by the Supreme Court, the predictions
had proven accurate, for GMD had lost on the merits.' 5' The Supreme Court could
Procedure 60(b), Congress abolished the common law writ of corum nobis, the writ remained
available in limited circumstances for criminal cases through courts' exercise of their powers
under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2000)); United States v. Sawyer, 239 F.3d 31, 36-38
(I st Cir. 2001) (discussing post-Carlisle considerations of the writ).
145. See, e.g., Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939) (as applied in
contemporary cases, generally by calculating a percentage of the fund). See generally John P.
Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients: Attorney Fees from Funds, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1597
(1974); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs 'Attorney's Role in Class Action
and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendationsfor Reform, 58 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1 (1991). Few will have incentives to raise this issue, as it is often linked to settlement of
large class actions or multidistrict litigations. On the other hand, those subjected to fee orders for
misbehavior may bring challenges to the authority of courts to do so. See Chambers v. NASCO,
Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991).
146. For discussion of the degree to which such powers are subject to congressional
oversight, see the exchange between Justice Scalia, Justice Souter, and Justice Stevens in
Carlisle, 517 U.S. at 426-28, 434, 437-43 (mentioning both the doctrine of forum non
conveniens and attorneys' fees awards).
147. Tushnet, supra note 15 at 48-56 (offering a "modest" interpretation of the Supreme
Court's recent decisions and contrasting that with a broader approach).
148. See Alliance Bond Fund, Inc. v. Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A., 143 F.3d 688,
692 (2d Cir. 1998).
149. The trial court had required the bond of $50,000, which saved the case from mootness at
the Supreme Court. See Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, 527 U.S.
308, 308 (1999).
150. Grupo Mexicano, 143 F.3d at 698.
151. Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 318.
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have made a narrower determination-for example, either that federal courts ought to
defer to state courts or that federal courts ought not issue freeze orders under the
particular circumstances of an offshore debtor facing bankruptcy. 1
52
Given that record, it is not surprising that some lower courts have seen the resultant
principle of Grupo Mexicano as far-reaching-that federal courts lack general
equitable remedies to provide freeze orders to unsecured creditors seeking money
judgments.'53 More generally, this ruling could be used to undermine the fusion of law
and equity and the authority of common law courts to apply equitable remedies.
Illustrative is an Enron-related ruling, stating that "a district court may not grant a
preliminary equitable remedy in an action at law [because] equitable devices may not
be used by a court exercising jurisdiction at law."' 54 Further, in conjunction with the
current law of implied remedies, Grupo Mexicano has been taken to mean that, when
faced with congressional provision of a particular remedy, no others can be inferred.1
55
Moreover, even when express congressional authority has been provided, courts have
read Grupo Mexicano as "counsel[ing] caution in" expansive reading of such statutory
provisions.156 And a majority of the Supreme Court itself has invoked Grupo Mexicano
for the prudential proposition that statutes specifying particular powers should be read
152. One might, for example, see the decision to freeze assets as an unwise use of equitable
powers given the third party effects that could flow. In Grupo Mexicano, that argument was
made, and the district court's order expressly provided that "nothing contained herein shall
prohibit the defendants from commencing any insolvency proceedings under any applicable
law." Order Granting Preliminary Injunction at 27a, Grupo Mexicano (No. 98-231).
153. For application of that precept, see ContiChem LPG v. Parsons Shipping Co., Ltd., 229
F.3d 426,430 (2d Cir. 2000); Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Beck Dev. Corp., 95 F. Supp.
2d 549, 552 (E.D. Va. 2000) (both concluding that, pending a final decision seeking only
monetary relief, injunctions were unavailable to prevent disposition of assets).
154. In re Enron Corp. Litig., No. Civ. A. G-02-0084, H-01-3624, 01-CV-3645, 2002 WL
1001058, at *3 (S.D.Tex. May 16, 2002) (rejecting requests for a TRO to enjoin Arthur
Anderson's efforts to dissolve or spin off on the basis that the underlying relief was "entirely
legal" rather than equitable). That court did find jurisdictional authority for requests made by
another group of plaintiffs seeking rescission and restitution but concluded that the requirements
for preliminary relief had not been met, in that dissolution per se would not necessarily result in
irreparable injury. Id.
155. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 221 F.3d 924, 927 (6th Cir. 2000)
(concluding that, "despite lack of legislative history and cases on point .... when Congress
provided for specific legal relief in the 1916 Anti-Dumping Act, it implied that other relief
would not be appropriate" and therefore declining to enjoin the importation of hot rolled steel).
For the proposition of the exclusivity of remedy, the Sixth Circuit also cited Transamerican
Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19 (1979). See Wheeling-Pittsburg Steel Corp.,
221 F.3d at 927. Further, the appellate court discussed the complications of such injunctions for
trade policy, which might have resulted in an argument about the reasons not to provide an
injunction as distinct from a discussion of the lack of power to grant injunctive relief per se. Id.
at 928.
156. United States v. Sriram, 147 F. Supp. 2d 914, 948 (N.D. I1. 2001) (authorizing the
freezing of more than $1.6 million in a case in which the United States sought funds for false
claims made for Medicare payments because that sum was "traceable to the violation" that the
government was likely to prove). The court concluded that the False Claims Act could not
provide the basis for freezing other assets to enable payment of treble damages and civil
penalties. Id.
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as counseling against permitting "further development" by courts. 157
Assuming that both equitable and legal relief might be available in a particular case,
other questions arise. Ought judges assess.whether one kind of relief predominates,
thereby developing ajurisprudence to identify when equitable relief is "incidental" or
"ancillary" as contrasted with central to a claim?'5 8 And how are judges to decide
whether the "ultimate relief sought" is "equitable in nature"? 59 That inquiry is
reminiscent of a newly imposed element of Commerce Clause jurisprudence, requiring
lower courts to assess whether a regulated activity is "economic in nature."'160 This
approach has prompted lower court judges to consider questions such as the link
between endangered wolves and commerce161 and the nexus that homemade and
allegedly pornographic photographs have to markets. 162 As I have elsewhere detailed,
nature does not create categories of "the economic," but human judgment-purposeful
rather than innate--does. 
163
On the other hand, since Grupo Mexicano, freeze orders have been upheld or
described as available under a variety of conditions. Lower courts have concluded that
157. See Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp. v. Garris, 532 U.S. 811, 820 (200 1). Justice
Scalia wrote the opinion for the Court, which held that a negligent breach of a general maritime
duty of care was actionable when it caused death. Id. Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Souter
and Breyer, concurred to disassociate themselves from this approach, which they characterized
as "dictum." Id. at 820, 821. The concurrence described the "development of the law in
admiralty as a shared venture" in which "federal common lawmaking" did not stand still, but
"harmonize[d] with the enactments of Congress in the field." Id. at 821 (quotations omitted).
158. That kind of problem has been faced in the context of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23, which requires notice to be provided at the time class actions are certified under 23(b)(3)
(often termed damage class actions) but not if certified under 23(b)(1) and (2) (sometimes called
injunctive or mandatory classes). See, e.g., In re Indus. Life Ins. Litig., 208 F.R.D. 571 (E.D. La.
2002) (denying class certification under 23(b)(2) of a proposed class of"[a]ll African-Americans
who own" or owned life insurance issued at a substandard rate because monetary relief
predominated). That court relied on Great-West, although "not directly on point," for the
requirement that courts search for "whether the real remedy is primarily for injunctive ... or
monetary relief." Id. at 573.
159. See, e.g., Wishnatzki & Nathel, Inc. v. H.P. Island-Wide, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 8051 (JSM),
2000 WL 1610790, at *I (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2000) (invoking Deckert v. Independence Shares
Corp., 311 U.S. 282 (1940)). A thoughtful effort to make such a determination comes from
Newby v. Enron Corp., 188 F. Supp. 2d 684, 702-04 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (analyzing whether the
remedy of "disgorgement" of insider trading proceeds, authorized under Section 20A of the
Securities and Exchange Act, permitted equitable relief and determining it did but that, because
irreparable harm had not been established through evidence of risk of removal of assets, no
temporary restraining order should issue).
160. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,613 (2000) (commenting that, "[w]hile we
need not adopt a categorical rule against aggregating the effects of any noneconomic activity...
, thus far ... our cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity only
where that activity is economic in nature"); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995)
(noting that, when intrastate "economic activity substantially affects interstate commerce,
legislation regulating that activity will be sustained").
161. See Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub nom. Gibbs v.
Norton, 531 U.S. 1145 (2001).
162. See, e.g., United States v. Kallestad, 236 F.3d 225 (5th Cir. 2000).
163. Resnik, Categorical Federalism, supra note 14, at 639-42.
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when litigants seeking monetary damages also have a basis for equitable relief&--
either by rights to specific assets165 or through equitable interests in assets'66--and can
establish a sufficient nexus between the assets to be frozen and the relief sought, freeze
orders are permitted.167 Further, all agree that, if specific statutory authority in addition
to equitable jurisdiction exists, 168 relief is available, and courts now debate whether
particular statutes so authorize. 69 Moreover, as noted, some have applied state law in
cases predicated on diversity jurisdiction and issued relief that might otherwise be
unavailable. 1
70
164. United States ex rel. Rahman v. Oncology Assocs., P.C., 198 F.3d 489,494-95 (4th Cir.
1999) (upholding a prejudgment injunction freezing assets in a federal False Claims Act suit,
upon a showing by the plaintiff United States that health care providers had defrauded Medicare
and were reorganizing and transferring assets to insulate themselves from liability).
165. Id. at 496 (describing the requirement of a "nexus between the assets sought to be frozen
through an interim order and the ultimate relief"); Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Kozeny, 115 F.
Supp. 2d 1231 (D. Colo. 2000) (granting a preliminary injunction freezing assets when both
equitable and monetary relief were sought); III Finance Ltd. v. Aegis Consumer Funding Group,
Inc., N. 99 Civ. 2579 (DC), 1999 WL 461808, at *4 n. I (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 1999) (distinguishing
Grupo Mexicano as inapplicable because the plaintiff claimed a "security interest in the assets
subject to the preliminary injunction").
166. Trafalgar Power, Inc. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 131 F. Supp. 2d 341,349 (N.D.N.Y 2001)
(relying on the equitable rights available under state law); Wishnatzki & Nathel, Inc. v. H.P.
Island-Wide, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 8051 (JSM), 2000 WL 1610790, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2000)
(granting an injunction to freeze assets on a showing of an equitable interest as beneficiaries of a
statutory trust).
167. Courts seek to assess that such claims are not only a matter of "artful pleading." See
Newby v. Enron Corp., 188 F. Supp. 2d 684, 700-01 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (distinguishing between
forms of restitution and noting that, in equity, constructive trust and equitable accountings were
undertaken). Further, orders restraining, rather than freezing assets, have been upheld. See
Walczak v. EPL Prolong, Inc., 198 F.3d 725, 730 (9th Cir. 1999) (upholding a preliminary
injunction in a shareholder derivative action alleging violations of RICO, fraudulent conveyance,
and breaches of fiduciary duties, and distinguishing the general "freeze" order in Grupo
Mexicano from that issued by the district court, which had provided that defendants could not
complete a specified transaction that would have dissolved the company).
168. See Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, 527 U.S. 308, 318,
321-22 (1999). See also In re Dow Coming, 280 F.3d 648, 657-58 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding that
the Bankruptcy Code provided "sufficient statutory authority" for injunctive relief, and therefore
that the court was not "confined to traditional equity jurisprudence available at the enactment of
the Judiciary Act of 1789").
169. Compare Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 267 F.3d 687 (7th Cir. 2001)
(granting injurnctive relief), cert. granted. sub nom. Scheidler v. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. 122
S. Ct. 1604 (2002), and Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 202 F. Supp. 2d 239 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
(holding that a private plaintiff in a RICO civil action may obtain injunctive relief) with
Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Wollersheim, 795 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1986) (concluding that injunctive
relief was not available). See also Newby, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 696 (concluding that authorization
for legal remedies in Section 10(b) and Section 20A of the Securities Exchange Act did not
preclude requests for equitable relief).
170. See cases cited supra note 123.
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B. Limiting the Meaning of the Mandate to Fashion "Appropriate Equitable
Relief': Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Company v. Knudson
But arguments for reading Grupo Mexicano narrowly are undercut by other recent
Supreme Court decisions. Illustrative is a 2002 ruling, also authored by Justice Scalia,
again addressing the remedial authority of federal judges to respond to creditors, this
time proceeding under a provision of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 ("ERISA"), which specifically permits the award of "appropriate equitable
relief."17' For those of us intrigued by shifts in the understanding of federal remedial
powers, Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson is worth exploring.' 72
As is detailed below, it builds on the conceptual framework underlying Grupo
Mexicano and may well signal an interest in exporting its narrow reading of ERISA's
grant of equitable powers to many other statutes.
A car accident left a woman, Janette Knudson, quadriplegic. 173 Her husband, an
171. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), § 502(a)(3)(B), 88 Stat.
891, 29 U.S.C. § I 132(a)(3) (2000). The decision on this question, Great-West Life & Annuity
Insurance Company v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002), is part of a series of cases, some
evidencing a narrow and others a broader reading of ERISA. Those cases include: Rush
Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 122 S. Ct. 2151 (2002); Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. Solomon
Smith Barney, Inc., 530 U.S. 238 (2000); Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v.
Dillingham Constr. N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316 (1997); Variety Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489
(1996); New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
514 U.S. 645 (1995); Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256 (1993); Massachusetts Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985). See Langbein, supra note 11; Medill, supra note
11. The issues include how to conceive of the purpose and scope of ERISA and what to make of
shifting attitudes toward preemption and the interrelationship among ERISA sections. An early
reading of Great-West left some practitioners unclear about what effect the decision "will
ultimately" have on ERISA jurisprudence. See Robert N. Eccles & David E. Gordon, Great-
West Life-The First 100 Days, 10 ERISA LITIG. REP. 1 (Apr. 2002).
172. See Meltzer, Judicial Passivity, supra note 11. Further, unlike some of the other ERISA
decisions, the majority that coalesced in Great-West is the same as that of Grupo Mexicano and
in the major constitutional decisions limiting congressional powers. In Great-West, 534 U.S. 204
(2002), Justice Scalia wrote for the majority, which also included the Chief Justice, and Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas. Id. at 710. Justice Souter joined the dissent by Justice
Ginsburg, as did Justices Stevens and Breyer. Id. at 720 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice
Stevens also filed a separate dissent. Id. at 719 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In contrast, in some
other ERISA decisions, such as Mertens, 508 U.S. 248 (1993), Justice Scalia wrote for a five
person majority consisting of Justices Blackmun, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas. Mertens, 508
U.S. at 249. Justice White's dissent was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens
and O'Connor. Id. at 263 (White, J., dissenting). Justices Ginsburg and Breyer were not then on
the Court.
173. By the time the case was before the Supreme Court, Mr. Knudson was described as her
"estranged husband." Ms. Knudson was described as a quadriplegic with sole responsibility for
raising her nine year old daughter. See Brief in Opposition for Respondent Janette Knudson at
2, 5, 10, Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002) (No. 99-1786)
(also arguing her lack of material interest in the dispute). Ms. Knudson's lawyer argued that she
had no reason to participate at the Supreme Court level. See Motion to Dismiss as
Improvidently Granted at 4-5, Great- West (No. 99-1786) (arguing that, while below jurisdiction
had been in dispute, the parties no longer disputed the applicability of ERISA, and therefore, no
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employee of Earth Systems, Inc., was covered by a health plan that provided some
$400,000 to her for medical expenses. Pursuant to an agreement with the plan, Great-
West Life & Annuity Insurance Company paid the vast bulk of those costs. The plan,
in turn, had provisions for recoupment if a beneficiary recovered from a third party.174
When the Knudsons settled a pending state court action with the car manufacturer for
$650,000,17' Great-West filed a claim against the funds, first in state court and then in
federal court.
1 76
As noted, the ERISA provision at issue expressly authorizes "appropriate equitable
relief." 77 Thus Great-West sought an injunction against the failure of the Knudsons to
case or controversy existed). The Supreme Court invited an amicus to argue in support of the
Ninth Circuit's decision. The Amicus stated that, by the time the case was before the Ninth
Circuit, Mr. Knudson was no longer participating in the litigation, although the "Right of
Recovery Agreement" that he had signed as the employee did run against him. See Brief of
Amicus Curiae in Support of the Judgment Below by Invitation of the Court at 14-17, Great-
West (No. 99-1786). In the record, some briefs name both of the Knudsons as litigants.
174. The Plan provided that the employer had:
the right to recover from the covered person any payment for benefits paid for
treatment of such loss... which the covered person is entitled to receive from a
third party. We will have a first lien upon any recovery, whether by settlement,
judgment or otherwise, [that] the covered person receives [from third parties or
their insurers, and that such liens] will not exceed the amount of benefits paid...
or the amount received by the covered person.., from the third party.
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 5, Great-West (No. 99-1786). Further, after the injury, the
employed spouse signed a "Right of Recovery Agreement" on behalf of his spouse. According
to Great-West, had Mr. Knudson not signed, the payment for medical treatment would not have
been made. Id at 6-7.
175. Of that amount, the lawyer received more than $370,000 in fees and costs. California
Medicaid was paid $5,000. Great-West received almost $14,000-leaving about $250,000 for
Ms. Knudson's care in a "special needs trust" established under California law. See Great-West,
534 U.S. at 207-08.
176. Great-West sought unsuccessfully to remove the state tort action. See Order Granting
Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand at B- I to B-4, Great- West (No. 99-1786). Thereafter, Great-West
filed an independent federal lawsuit. The district court concluded that, because the state court
had reviewed the fairness of the settlement and superintended the allocation of payments to
various creditors, that court's award to Knudson of $13,828 for medical treatment was the
amount due to Great-West as reimbursement. See Order Granting Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment at C- 1 to C- 12, Great- West (No. 99-1786).
In an unpublished decision, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment in
favor of Knudson, but on different grounds. See Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v.
Knudson, No. 98-56472, slip op. at 4 (9th Cir. Feb. 7,2000), Great- West (No. 99-1786), Petition
for Writ of Certiorari, Appendix at A- 1 to A-4. Relying on its earlier ruling (FMC Medical Plan
v. Owens, 122 F.3d 1258 (9th Cir. 1997)), the Ninth Circuit held that "reimbursement of
payments made to a beneficiary of an insurance plan by a third party" is not "equitable within
the meaning of § 11 32(a)(3)." Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, No. 98-56472,
slip op. at 4 (footnote omitted).
177. 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (a)(3), also referred to as section 502(a)(3), which provides that a civil
action may be brought
by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which
violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain
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reimburse the company and a request for restitution, which, it argued, were both forms
of "appropriate equitable relief."17 8 But, in Great- West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v.
Knudson, 179 the majority concluded that what Great-West sought was a remedy at law,
not available under the relevant ERISA provisions.
1. Editing Statutes
In the ERISA provision interpreted in Great-West, Congress had mandated
"appropriate equitable relief' but had neither defined nor refined that category. In an
earlier opinion (also written by Justice Scalia)--Mertens v. Hewitt Associates-the
Court had required that claimants under this provision establish not only that the form
of equitable relief they sought was "equitable" but also that it was "typically available
in equity."'180 The majority concluded that Great-West's request for an injunction for
specific performance of a contract to pay damages failed that test.'8
Although Justice Scalia's majority opinion acknowledged that restitution was an
equitable remedy, the majority sorted the forms of restitution-deeming some
historically available at law and others in equity.' 82 According to Justice Scalia, only
when a plaintiff could show that money or property in a defendant's possession could
"clearly be traced" back to the plaintiff was the restitution grounded in equity; then,
equity responded "ordinarily [by providing relief] in the form of a constructive trust or
an equitable lien."'183 Further, the majority did not narrow its ruling in response to an
amicus brief filed by the United States, arguing that because the Secretary of Labor
was authorized to bring civil actions to redress ERISA violations, 184 the case did not
other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any
provisions of the subchapter or the terms of the plan.
178. Petitioner's Brief Seeking Injunction at 12-32, Great-West (No. 99-1786).
179. 534 U.S. 204 (2002).
180. Id. at 210 (citing Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248,256 (1993), which held that
the reference in 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) to "equitable relief' entailed the forms of relief
"typically available" in equity). Not all commentators agree with that reading. See Langbein,
supra note I 1 (disagreeing about this interpretation of ERISA). Justice Scalia wrote the majority
decision in Mertens,joined by Justices Blackmun, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas. Mertens, 508
U.S. at 249. Justice White, joined by the Chief Justice, Justice Stevens, and Justice O'Connor
dissented. Id. at 263 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White noted that the majority agreed that the
phrase "appropriate equitable relief' could be interpreted to include remedies available in equity
for breach of trust and that compensatory monetary awards were available for such breaches. Id.
at 273-74 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White argued that the majority had wrongly assumed
that Congress had "stripped" trust beneficiaries under ERISA from remedies other beneficiaries
enjoyed "in the equity courts under common law," id. at 263 (White, J., dissenting), and that the
majority's construction worked to "deprive beneficiaries of remedies they enjoyed prior to the
statute's enactment." Id. at 274 (White, J., dissenting).
181. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 210-11.
182. Id. at 214-15. But see Langbein, supra note 11, at 30 (disagreeing with that view of
historic equity practice and explaining that "money damages were and are as much an equitable
remedy as a legal remedy").
183. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 213. Justice Scalia also noted a "limited exception for an
accounting for profits." Id. at 214 n.2.
184. See 29 U.S.C. § I 132(a)(5) (2000).
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involve only "the scope of private civil actions."1 85 Although commentary in Grupo
Mexicano had suggested the possibility of special rules for actions involving public
interests, 16 no mention was made in Great-West of using a different approach for
cases brought by the Secretary of Labor.
Rather, the majority imposed historical and factual burdens on plaintiffs. Take the
requirement that the relief sought be "typically available" in equity. What quantum of
proof suffices to establish the typicality criterion? The United States had argued in
Great- West that when the Mertens Court introduced the concept of typicality, it had
offered a laundry list of illustrative forms of relief--"injunction, mandamus, and
restitution"--all distinguished from compensatory damages. 8 7 Thus, the government
claimed, because the Court had defined typicality as related to the form rather than to
the frequency of a particular order, and because preventing unjust enrichment was a
form of relief typical in equity,188 Great-West should prevail. The majority's rejection
of that approach leaves plaintiffs' lawyers with difficult research challenges and lower
court judges with choices about what number of references, in original or secondary
references, suffices to meet the typicality requirement. Moreover, the combination of
Grupo Mexicano and Great-West counsels against assuming judicial capacity to
remediate.
These decisions also warn against inferring authority from statutory texts. The
Great-West majority reasoned that when Congress added the adjective "appropriate" to
its grant to provide "equitable relief,"'' 8 9 Congress must-at the same time-have
intended to remove some forms of remedial power. According to Justice Scalia, the
phrase chosen by Congress had to be read to mean "something less than all relief' that
"a court of equity is empowered to provide."' 90 And like his rhetorical choices in
185. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 2, Great-West
(No. 99-1786).
186. Above, I argued that, while such a reading fits the precedents, it was an ahistorical
addition, at odds with the opinion's test. See discussion supra Part II.A.6.
187. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 256. As John Langbein explains, this formulation misdescribed
English historical practices, under which mandamus was a common law bench writ, not an
equity writ. See Langbein, supra note 11. Moreover, some argued that the Mertens formulation
had been relegated to a footnote because, as evidenced by subsequent Supreme Court ERISA
decisions as well as lower court rulings, its strictures were sometimes avoided. See Brief Amicus
Curie of AARP and National Employment Lawyers Association in Support of Neither Party at 2,
Great-West (No. 99-1786) (arguing that the Court's holding in Harris Trust & Savings Bank v.
Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 530 U.S. 238, 250-51 (2000), which permittted the recession of a
transaction, restitution, and disgorgement as proper common law remedies for trusts has limited
Mertens and, further, that some circuits had recharacterized relief as money damages to meet the
Mertens requirements). See also Medill, supra note 11.
188. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 12-14, 19-26,
Great- West (No. 99-1786).
189. Under the holding of Grupo Mexicano, such statutory grants are required to license
federal judicial remedial powers. See Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Board
Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 325-26 (1999).
190. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 211-12 (relying on Mertens, 508 U.S. at 258 n.8). Great-West
also built on an earlier dissent by Justice Scalia in Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 917-
19 (1988), in which he had objected to the majority's interpretation of the Administrative
Procedure Act ("APA") to permit courts to reimburse states and therefore order the payment of
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Grupo Mexicano, Justice Scalia insisted on the correctness of his approach: "what
Congress has plainly done" was to limit the available relief, and any other construction
was "most implausible."'191 Moreover, Justice Scalia was confident that "Congress felt
comfortable referring to equitable relief in this statute... precisely because the basic
contours of the term are well known."'
192
In contrast, Justice Ginsburg (dissenting on behalf of herself and Justices Stevens,
Souter, and Breyer) questioned the majority's assumption that members of the 1974
Congress would have been attuned to the nuances of early equity practices and would
have enshrined them in ERISA.193 Rather, she argued, the majority thwarted the goals
of Congress, which had worked in the 1970s, some forty years after the merger of law
and equity, to craft a "uniform administrative scheme" enforceable in federal courts for
employment welfare plans and their beneficiaries.194 Further, the dissent argued that
restitution to avoid unjust enrichment was in fact a remedy typical of equity.195
The majority positioned itself as the faithful agent, dutifully fulfilling its principal's
mandate. But the language at issue cannot become plain simply by the assertion that it
is. The text "appropriate equitable relief' does not include the word "typical." Further,
the text does not detail the range of discretion accorded judges in determining what
qualified for the description "appropriate." Interpretative choices abound. 96 Why then
have an image of a retentive Congress rather than a generous one? Why assume that
ERISA was not a charter to develop new remedies to respond to changing economic
concerns? 197 Just as it has in recent rulings on congressional powers under the Eleventh
money as part of specific relief to an entitlement provided under federal Medicaid law. The APA
authorized judicial review against the federal government for actions "seeking relief other than
money damages." See 5 U.S.C. § 705. Justice Stevens, writing for the Court in Bowen, had
concluded that "the fact that a judicial remedy may require one party to pay money to another is
not a sufficient reason to characterize the relief as "money damages." Bowen, 487 U.S. at 893.
191. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 217-218.
192. Id. at 217. In one respect, Great-West departs from the mold of some of the earlier
decisions by acknowledging that prior cases did not necessarily make the same distinctions.
"Admittedly, our cases have not previously drawn this fine distinction between restitution at law
and restitution in equity, but neither have they involved an issue to which the distinction was
relevant." Id. at 214.
193. Id. at 224-228.
194. Id. (quoting Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 9 (1987)).
195. Id. at 228. See also Langbein, supra note 11, at 64-65 (discussing equity's provision of
damages, called "surcharges").
196. Indeed, as Justice Stevens wrote in dissent, more statutory language was relevant than
the portion that had commanded the interest of the majority. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 222-23. A
subdivision of the statute authorizing judges to issue "any appropriate order that prohibits or
terminates a violation of an ERISA plan" also used the word "enjoin." Id. at 222 (interpreting 29
U.S.C. § 502(a)(3)(A)). Mertens addressed aspects of this argument as well. See Mertens v.
Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248,255-62 (1993) (majority decision) and id. at 263, 265-69 (White,
J., dissenting, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Stevens and O'Connor). As Justice
Stevens explained in his dissent in Great- West, in the provision on "appropriate equitable relief,"
Congress has used the word "other--"other appropriate equitable relief." Great- West, 534 U.S.
at 222-23. Justice Stevens thus read Congress as giving federal judges leeway beyond that
historically provided by equity. Id.
197. Justice Scalia has argued that constitutional interpretation should take as its predicate
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and the Fourteenth Amendment, 198 the majority in Great-West placed demands on
Congress to use words that earlier Congresses had no reason to know were required.
2. Ignoring State Proceedings
To understand the potential breadth of Great- West, two other aspects of the case,
both relevant to federalism, are noteworthy. First, the Court did not address the
argument raised by litigants that, while the relief requested by Great-West might have
been characterized as "equitable," it was not "appropriate" because it would spawn
duplicative and unnecessary litigation. 199 The Court could have crafted a narrow rule
that, if a state court has superintended a settlement and made allocations of funds, a
federal court ought to avoid piecemeal litigation by refusing to revisit such decisions
through ERISA claims. Such a holding could have been premised in part on equity
(that Great-West had sat on its rights by not becoming active in the underlying state
tort litigation at an early stage) and in part on abstention doctrines (themselves
predicated on a mixture of equity and federalism). 20 0 That holding would have required
ERISA plans to intervene in state court proceedings, which in turn would require the
that the document is "dead." See Scalia, Common-Law Courts, supra note 63, at 112-120
(disagreeing with proponents of a "Living Constitution"). See also Maureen Squires, Scalia
Urges Inflexible Constitution: Supreme Court Justice Scoffs at Notion of a Changing
Constitution, PEORIA J. STAR, Oct. 25, 1996, at C 11, available at 1996 WL 6982219; David M.
Zlotnick, Justice Scalia and His Critics: An Exploration of Scalia's Fidelity to His
Constitutional Methodology, 48 EMORY L.J. 1377 (1999). Statutes, however, are creatures of a
Congress, itself an institution that is alive and able to alter their meaning. The capacity to revise
statutes supports interpretative leeway for courts for some judges and commentators, while
others point to that very capacity as justification for awaiting revisions by Congress. Of course,
by choosing a particular interpretative stance, the Court imposes its reading absent legislative
revision. See Tushnet, supra note 15.
198. See e.g., Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368-74 (2001) (rejecting
the sufficiency of evidence received by Congress on state-based discrimination against the
disabled); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000) (applying the "clear statement"
rule in sovereign immunity cases and thereby requiring Congress to use specific language if
seeking to subject states to suit). See generally Evan H. Caminker, "Appropriate" Means-End
Constraints on Section 5 Powers, 53 STAN. L. REv. 1127 (2001). Some argue that imposition of
clear statement rules enhances democratic processes by clarifying the stakes of a pending
legislative proposal. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Foreword: The
Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1984); Manning, supra note 17, at 99-102,
121-126. But when such rules are crafted long after legislation is enacted, that rationale is
difficult to sustain.
199. See Brief of Amicus Curiae in Support of the Judgment Below by Invitation of the
Court at 43-44, Great-West (No. 99-1786) (stating that "[i]t makes little sense to permit the
ERISA plan, after litigating the case in state court to generate a recovery, to file a separate
federal-court suit to litigate the distribution of the same money.").
200. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53 (1971) (requiring deference to state
criminal proceedings in the face of a challenge that they violated First Amendment rights); R.R.
Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941) (requiring deference to state courts in their
interpretation of an unclear law if such deference could avoid a federal court's determination of
a sensitive constitutional question).
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assumption that such claims were not preempted by ERISA.2 °'
Such an approach would have accomplished one of the goals expressed by the
Judicial Conference on behalf of the federal judiciary: reducing a form of ERISA
litigation.2 °2 The majority's holding did so as well, but also by foreclosing other
remedies and by signalling general contractions of federal remedial powers. Further,
such a holding would have been solicitous of another federalism-based concern, that
the federal courts ought to respect state laws on collateral sources of recovery in tort
litigation.2 °3 As one group of amici argued, some states did not permit subrogation of
tort awards by health insurers.20 4 Had the majority deferred to state court adjudication,
it could have linked its decision to federal common law doctrines that, absent an
overriding need for uniformity, incorporate state law by reference. 20 5 Thus, the Court
could have permitted state remedies to influence the exercise of federal equitable relief
rather than to preclude a remedy for the plaintiff and others similarly situated. I should
note that such a response would not be wise from the perspective of those who believe
ERISA located jurisdiction to enforce plan terms exclusively in federal courts to avoid
disuniformity.
20 6
3. Revising ERISA Jurisdiction
What may be the import of Great- West? Some of the problems it poses directly to
ERISA programs were argued in the case. As various amici warned the Court, some
programs may reduce their benefits if they are unable to enforce subrogation
201. Brief of Amicus Curiae by Invitation of the Court in Support of the Judgment Below at
46-49, Great-West (No. 99-1786) (noting that the United States side-stepped the preemption
problem and arguing affirmatively that preemption was not required in light of decisions such as
California Division ofLabor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Construction, N.A., Inc., 519
U.S. 316, 325 (1997), New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Insurance Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995), and Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency &
Service, Inc., 486 U.S. 825 (1988)).
202. See LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 5, reprinted in 166 F.R.D. 49, 95 (1995)
(Recommendation 12(b), discussed infra notes 258-259 and accompanying text.
203. Some of the Court's ERISA rulings lend support to such an approach. See Cal. Div. of
Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr. N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 325 (1997); N.Y.
State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 661-62
(1995).
204. See Brief of Amici Curiae Maryland Subrogation Plaintiffs at 2-10, Great-West (No. 99-
1786) (citing Riemer v. Columbia Med. Plan, 747 A.2d 677 (2000) and 29 U.S.C. §
1144(b)(2)(4) (2000) for the view that ERISA preemption rules permitted incorporation of state
collateral source rules).
205. See generally DAVID L. SHAPIRO, CIVIL PROCEDURE: PRECLUSION IN CIVIL ACTIONS
(2001).
206. The Court itself, in the 2002 Term, expressed ambivalence on the question of the need
for uniformity. In Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002), state
court enforcement of reimbursement provisions was not permitted. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 220-
21. But in Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 122 S. Ct. 2151, 2169-70 (2002), the Court, in
a majority decision by Justice Souter writing for himself and Justices Stevens, O'Connor,
Ginsburg, and Breyer, concluded that federal law did not preempt state insurance regulations
authorizing state boards to review denials of requests for treatments.
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agreements. °7 Others may increase their copayments and deductibles,208 and still
others lose their financial integrity. 20 9 Given the ruling, questions emerge for ERISA
plan writers about whether they can amend plans to identify assets of beneficiaries to
form constructive trusts subject to equitable restitution, 210 refuse to make payments
pending liability determinations, or devise alternative methods of enforcing
subrogation and reimbursement provisions through contracts to arbitrate.
In terms of case law application, the first wave of Great- West decisions have come
in ERISA litigation.2 1' As they reveal, Great- West is not only a case about remedies
but also about federal jurisdiction. Under ERISA, federal courts have exclusive
jurisdiction over actions by a fiduciary intending "to enforce ... the terms of the
plan.,, 212 As Great-West's certiorari petition noted, when interpreting the provision at
issue, circuits had split on whether it affected remedies or subject matter jurisdiction.2 13
The Ninth Circuit concluded that its order of dismissal could be characterized either as
a dismissal on the merits or one based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 214 Thus,
when ruling on the availability of a form of relief, the Court implicitly decided the
question of jurisdiction.
Unsurprisingly, after Great-West, a series of lower courts have dismissed
lawsuits. 2 5 Many efforts to avoid its strictures-through stipulations or by pleading-
have been unavailing. As one court put it, plaintiffs could not prevail "on the question
of jurisdiction simply by characterizing the action as one for restitution." 216 Further,
207. Brief of the Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Health and Welfare Fund as
an Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 2, 7-9, Great- West (No. 99-1786). See also Brief
as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitions by the American Association of Health Plans at 6-7,
Great- West (No. 99-1786) (arguing that, if Great-West did not prevail, the result would be
greater health care costs and less insurance).
208. See Brief Amicus Curiae of Self-Insurance Institute of America, Inc. in Support of the
Petitioner at 10, Great-West (No. 99-1786).
209. See Amicus Curiae Brief of National Association of Subrogation Professionals, Inc. in
Support of Petitioners at 8-10, 12, Great-West (No. 99-1786).
210. See, e.g., Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Brown, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1376, 1380-81
(M.D. Ga. 2002) (distinguishing the Great-West ruling on the grounds that the funds in issue-
paid to the tort victim but allegedly subject to subrogation-had been placed in a separate
account and were clearly traceable from the settlement).
211. See Eccles & Gordon, supra note 171.
212. 29 U.S.C. § 502(a)(3)(e), codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(2000).
213. Petition for Certiorari at 10, Great-West (No. 99-1786).
214. See Appendix to Petition for Certioriari at A-4, n. 5, Great-West (No. 99-1786),
available at 2000 WL 145374, **1, n.5 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 2000) (discussing the earlier ruling of
the court, on which the panel relied, as having rested "its dismissal on the lack of subject matter
jurisdiction .... For our purposes,.. . requiring the dismissal of reimbursement claims for third
party settlements under ERISA, the dismissal could be based either on lack of subject matter
jurisdiction or on the merits.").
215. See, e.g., Unicare Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Saiter, No. 00-3856,2002 WL 1301574 (6th
Cir. June 10, 2002) (per curiam); Hotel & Restaurant & Bar Employees Fringe Benefit Funds v.
Truong, No. CIV. 01-873, 2002 WL 171725 (D. Minn. Jan. 31, 2002) (mem.); Rego v.
Westvaco Corp., No. 1:99CV00702, 2002 WL 1009599 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 26, 2002).
216. Sheet Metal Local #24 Anderson, Tr. v. Newman, No. 01-3085,2002 WL 1033739, at
*2 (6th Cir. May 21, 2002) (per curiam) (unpublished opinion) (concluding that a failure to
allege that specific funds were wrongly held rendered the case a breach of contract suit for
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under the shadow of Great-West, one circuit rejected a request for declaratory
judgment to enforce terms of employee benefit reimbursement provisions, 21 7 even
when the funds at issue were arguably specific, identifiable, "in custodia legis. ',21 8
Another applied Great-West, which had not involved the breach of fiduciary duties, to
preclude a fiduciary from having to pay a beneficiary life insurance because such a
remedy was not "typical" in equity. 2'9 And, to the extent that litigants seek provisional
remedies to segregate funds or keep them from being dissipated, Great- West does not
220permit that option.
On the other hand, not all lower courts have read Great- West so broadly. A variety
of claims have gone forward, resting on theories that a case presented "an equitable
claim for unjust enrichment rather than a legal claim for interest as compensatory, 22'
that a constructive trust existed over which the court had jurisdiction,222 or that
fiduciary duties were allegedly breached.223
money damages, over which the federal courts lacked jurisdiction).
217. Bauhaus USA Inc. v. Copeland, 292 F.3d 439, 445 (5th Cir. 2002). But see Provident
Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Cohen, 193 F. Supp. 2d 845, 852 (D. Md. 2002) (permitting an
unjust enrichment claim to proceed for an insurer seeking a declaration that a disability was null
and void due to a participant's false representations); IBEW-NECA Southwestern Health &
Benefit Fund v. Douthitt, 211 F. Supp. 812 (N.D. Tex. 2002) (distinguishing Bauhaus and
denying a motion to dismiss because plaintiffs sought a constructive trust over specific funds
within the defendant's possession).
218. Bauhaus, 292 F.3d at 445, 451 (Wiener, J., dissenting) (also arguing that, unlike Great-
West, the request was for subrogation, not restitution or reimbursement). See also IBEW-NECA
Southwestern Health & Benefit Fund, 211 F. Supp.2d at 816 (denying a motion to dismiss by
finding funds "clearly traceable" for the pursuit of a constructive trust).
219. Kishter v. Principal Life Ins. Co., 186 F. Supp. 2d 438,444-45 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). Great-
West was also invoked in passing when a court held that a state lacked standing to bring suit
under ERISA provisions. See Connecticut v. Physicians Health Servs., Inc., 287 F.3d 110, 120
(2d Cir. 2002) (concluding that the criteria for Article III standing had not been met and citing
Great- West for the view that courts ought not to read ERISA to provide more by way of relief
that what was expressly stated).
220. See DeFelice v. Daspin, No. CIV.A. 0 1-1760, 2002 WL 1373759, at *6-7 (E.D. Pa. June
25, 2002) (dismissing an ERISA action for failure to state a claim in part because the only
remedies lay at law).
221. Dobson v. Hartford Fin. Servs., 196 F. Supp. 2d 152, 170-173 (D. Conn. 2002) (also
relying on the alleged breach of fiduciary duties and the lack of an adequate remedy at law); see
also Bauer v. Gylten, Nos. A2-00-161, A3-02-27, 2002 WL 664034, at *2-3 (D.N.D. Apr. 22,
2002) (holding that a plaintiffs amendment of its complaint to seek a constructive trust
substantiated the court's jurisdiction and reiterating its ruling that under the plan, plaintiff was
entitled to relief).
222. Admin. Comm. of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Assoc. Health v. Varco, No. 0168277, 2002
WL 47159, at *2-3 (N.D. II!. Jan. 14, 2002). Cases are also beginning to address what degree of
specificity on segregated funds and what chains of custody can sustain orders for equitable
accounting and restitutions.
223. See, e.g., Zack v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co, No. 01 C8277, 2002 WL 538851, at
*5-6 (D. Kan. Mar. 20, 2002); see also Carducci v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 204 F. Supp. 2d 796,
802 (D.N.J. 2002) (reading Great-West to be limited to claims brought by a fiduciary seeking
contractual reimbursement and not applying to relief sought by a participant or beneficiary
under § 502(a)(1), for which legal or equitable relief is available). But see Kishter v. Principal
[Vol. 78:223
CONSTRICTING REMEDIES
4. Seventy-Seven Statutes Providing for Equitable Relief
Great- West may prove to be a case about more than ERISA. As Justice Scalia's
decision noted, a "Westlaw search" found "the term 'equitable relief appeared in
seventy-seven provisions of the United States Code."224 What ought judges to make of
the reference to these other statutes, also using the term "equitable"? If, as Justice
Scalia argued, Congress was purposeful in its selection of the term "equitable relief' in
ERISA,225 should judges assume that Congress knew of these other statutory
references and read them as an interrelated set? For example, as the Great-West
majority and dissent debated through the example of Title VII, 226 Congress has
directed the payment of money as a part of an equitable award. Justice Ginsburg's
dissent argued that the Court's prior interpretations of Title VII to permit a type of
restitution as a form of equitable relief made appropriate a parallel interpretation for
the ERISA statute.227 Justice Scalia disagreed, dismissing the dissent's argument about
Title VII as having "nothing to do with this case." 228 Yet it was that majority that also
mentioned the many other statutes that use the term "equitable."
229
The majority's approach directs federal judges to parse each term in a statutory
phrase to understand the remedies chartered.230 A review of some of the textual
variations forecasts the interpretative problems to come. Consider congressional
provisions, such as the specification of the remedy of an injunction and authorization
of "any other appropriate equitable relief."' 231 Ought the words "any other" suffice to
license "all" forms of equitable relief? Do courts have a broader mandate when
Congress authorizes courts to provide "such legal or equitable relief as will effectuate
Life Ins. Co., 186 F. Supp. 2d 438,444-45 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (concluding that ERISA preempted
state claims and that in the case, involving an alleged breach by a fiduciary, the remedy sought-
forced payment of life insurance proceeds-was not one "typically available in equity").
224. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 217 n.3 (2002).
225. Id. at 216.
226. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (2000) (providing for "appropriate... equitable relief'
including "reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay").
227. See Great-West, 534 U.S. at 244, 230 n.2 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting, joined by Justices
Stevens, Breyer, and Souter) (and also noting that lower courts had provided various
characterizations of why back pay was an equitable remedy).
228. Id. at 218 n.4.
229. Id. at 217 n. 3.
230. On the Court's calendar for the 2002-03 term is the reach of the RICO statute. See Nat'l
Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 267 F.3d 687, 609-70 (7th Cir. 2001), cert. granted Scheidler
v. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc., 122 S. Ct. 1604 (2002). The Seventh Circuit held that, given the
text of RICO and its mandate to construe RICO remedies liberally, injunctive relief was
available in a private civil action seeking treble damages. A question before the Court is whether
"private litigants may obtain equitable relief in a civil RICO action under 18 U.S.C. § 1964. See
Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae, Scheidler v. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc., No. 01-
1118, 01-1119, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2002/3mer/lami/2001-
11 18.mer.ami.html.
231. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 8477(e)(3)(A)(iv), B(ii) in the Federal Employees' Retirement
System (providing that the Secretary of Labor and plan participants, beneficiaries, and
fiduciaries may bring civil actions against fiduciaries).
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the purposes" of a particular statute?232 And what is to be made of directives with other
modifications, such as to provide equitable relief "as may be necessary"? 233 Had
Congress constrained or simply described the conditions for equitable remedies?
Further, what about directives, such as a provision of federal securities law
234
authorizing relief "in addition to any and all other rights and remedies that may exist at
law or in equity"? 235 Has Congress through those words granted power to shape new
rights or is its reference to rights and remedies that "may exist" a requirement that
courts provide only those rights and remedies as existed in 1789? And more generally,
when statutes such as securities laws impose fiduciary obligations, do they endow
federal judges with authority to craft equitable remedies?
Yet another question is the effect of this body of law on bankruptcy judges. These
judges, serving for term and renewable appointments rather than with life-tenure, have
lower status than Article III judges. 236 But, in light of Grupo Mexicano, bankruptcy
judges may have more power to freeze assets than do life-tenured judges.237 Yet even
bankruptcy judges may find themselves restrained in their ability to order substantive
consolidation or to devise other remedies not detailed in the bankruptcy code.238
Federal judges may also find constraints in efforts to cope with the demands of
large-scale litigation, whether involving structural reform of institutions or aggregate
tort and consumer cases. For example, relying on equitable or inherent powers, judges
sometimes order litigants to contribute money for disbursements during the pendency
232. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 633(c) (2000) (authorizing remedies for age discrimination in
employment); see also 15 U.S.C. § 3414(b)(4) (2000) (providing for civil enforcement actions
related to National Gas regulation and authorizing courts to order injunctions or "such other
legal or equitable relief as the court determines appropriate, including refund or restitution").
233. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1817(j)(15)(B)(ii) (2000) (relating to penalties for violations of
Federal Trade Commission provisions); see also 46 U.S.C. § 1705(i)(3) (2000) (authorizing the
grant of "such other equitable relief as the court in its discretion determines necessary or
appropriate").
234. 15 U.S.C. § 78(bb)(a) (2000).
235. This example comes from the analysis provided by Judge Rosenthal in Newby v. Enron
Corp., 188 F. Supp. 2d 684, 699 (S.D. Tex 2002) (analyzing whether a claim of insider trading
should be read as a breach of fiduciary duty to persons owning stock, any profits from which
ought to be understood as held in a constructive trust).
236. See 28 U.S.C. § 151 (2000) (providing for Courts of Appeals to select and appoint
bankruptcy judges). See Judith Resnik, Uncle Sam Modernizes His Justice: Inventing the District
Courts for the District of Columbia and the Nation, 90 GEO. L.J. 607,629-43 (2002) [hereinafter
Resnik, Inventing the District Courts] (detailing the distinctions and overlap between sets of
judges working within Article III courts).
237. Debtors in bankruptcy may not transfer assets without court approval and, if they do so,
those transfers are either void or voidable. Thus, while district judges cannot freeze assets
pending monetary relief, bankruptcy judges can. The bankruptcy statute has been understood as
a specific authorization to do so. See In re Dow Coming, 280 F.3d 648,657-58 (6th Cir. 2002).
238. See, e.g., J. Maxwell Tucker, Grupo Mexicano and the Death of Substantive
Consolidation, 8 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 427 (2000) (discussing whether substantive
consolidation, not specifically authorized in the code but used to merge separate entities to
aggregate assets and liabilities, remains permissible). See also Steve H. Nickles & David G.
Epstein, Bankruptcy Symposium: Another Way of Thinking About Section 105(a) and Other
Sources of Supplemental Law Under the Bankruptcy Code, 3 CHAP. L. REv. 7 (2000) (raising
questions about bankruptcy judges' common law authority beyond the Code).
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of such cases, to fund document repositories, and to support common benefit
lawyers. 239 Great- West, coupled with Grupo Mexicano, established presumptions of
judicial incapacity that raise questions about the legality of such innovations.
Moreover, Great-West may forecast narrow readings of statutes such as the Alien Tort
Act, currently a significant font of international human rights litigation in the lower
federal courts.24°
5. Characterizing Declaratory Relief
A specific question arises about federal power under the Federal Declaratory
Judgment Act of 1934.241 The antecedents of that statute include English legislation-
circa 1852-recognizing the power of the Courts of Chancery to entertain cases in
which the remedy would be a declaratory decree or order.242 In 1917, Professor Edson
Sunderland, a major proponent, argued that developing declaratory relief marked a
civilization substituting words for physical force.243 He urged the United States to
adopt such provisions rather than continue to "canonize[] the ancient tradition of a
cause of action, in all its original crudeness [as] ... the condition and measure of
judicial action. 244 The need for legislation was predicated on the inadequacy of extant
legal and equitable remedies, seen as insufficient in light of changing social conditions.
Congress responded in 1934 that federal courts had the power, consistent with case
and controversy requirements, to enter declaratory relief in cases otherwise properly
before them.245 While Congress has expressly given authority for the remedy, that
239. In re Two Appeals Arising Out of the San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 994 F.2d
956, 966-67 (1st Cir. 1993) (upholding a district court order requiring defendants, who had been
dismissed as defendants from the lawsuit, to pay thousands of dollars for the costs of
maintaining a document depository); Dennis E. Curtis & Judith Resnik, Contingency Fees in
Mass Torts: Access, Risk, and the Provision ofLegal Services When Layers of Lawyers Workfor
Individuals and Collectives of Clients, 47 DEPAUL L. REv. 425,434-53 (1998) (describing such
aggregates).
240. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000), first enacted in 1789. Compare Harold Hongju Koh, Is
International Law Really State Law?, I I HARV. L. REV. 1824 (1998) with Curtis A. Bradley,
The Alien Tort Statute andArticle III, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 587 (2002).
241. See Declaratory Judgments Act of 1934, Ch. 512, 48 Stat. 955, now codified at 28
U.S.C. § 2201 (2000) (authorizing federal courts to issue declaratory judgments establishing "the
rights and legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration" in "a case of actual
controversy within its jurisdiction"). Noncompliance permits a court to order "further necessary
or proper relief." 28 U.S.C. § 2202 (2000).
242. See Edson R. Sunderland, A Modern Evolution in Remedial Rights-The Declaratory
Judgment, 16 MICH. L. REv. 69, 73 (1917). In England, a provision enacted in 1873, described
as a major reform over prior practice, authorized courts to make "binding declarations of right
whether any consequential relief is or could be claimed." Id. at 74.
243. Id. at 69-70. Another advocate was Professor Edwin M. Borchard, who also championed
enactment of a federal declaratory remedy. See Edwin M. Borchard, The Declaratory
Judgment-A Needed Procedural Reform, Part 1, 28 YALE L.J. 1 (1918); Part 11, 28 YALE L.J.
105 (1918); Edwin M. Borchard, Judicial Relieffor Peril andInsecurity, 45 HARV. L. REv. 793
(1932).
244. Sunderland, supra note 242, at 89.
245. Congressional enactment came after the Supreme Court had, through case law,
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statute does not, on its face, answer the question posed by Great- West. Could a court in
an ERISA case provide declaratory relief as a form of "appropriate equitable relief'?
Ought the response be negative, given that in other statutes, Congress has listed
declaratory relief as a part of equitable relief246 but has not done so for ERISA? Or
because declaratory relief came into vogue in England in the nineteenth century and
not in the eighteenth? Or because "declaratory relief is neither legal nor equitable, but
sui generis"?
247
The problem of characterizing declaratory relief is not novel.248 For example, after
the enactment of the 1934 Declaratory Judgment Act, judges faced the issue of
deciding when jury decision making was required.249 In the 1960s and early 1970s,
civil rights litigators facing statutory requirements of three-judge courts if seeking
injunctions against state statutes based on federal constitutional law 250 often argued
that, by requesting declaratory relief, they had avoided the need for that special form of
a court. Similarly, some jurists, seeking to limit the reach of doctrines prohibiting
federal courts from enjoining ongoing state proceedings, have detailed differences
between declaratory and injunctive orders.251 Now, given Grupo Mexicano and Great-
West, the incentives may shift. If declaratory judgments are a form of equity, it could
be a source of additional power for federal judges. On the other hand, declaratory relief
is not itself supposed to be a source of federal subject matter jurisdiction, which might
prompt some to interpret it as a form of a remedy at law.252
signalled an openness to upholding its constitutionality. See Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis
Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249, 264 (1933) (concluding that the Constitution did not require a
"case or controversy" to be "presented by traditional forms of procedure, invoking only
traditional remedies"). See generally Donald L. Doernberg & Michael B. Mushlin, The Trojan
Horse: How the Declaratory Judgment Act Created a Cause ofAction and Expanded Federal
Jurisdiction While the Supreme Court Wasn't Looking, 36 UCLA L. REv. 529, 560-72 (1989)
(discussing the legislative history). The provision has repeatedly been read not as a font of
jurisdiction but to define remedies available if jurisdiction is otherwise proper. See Franchise
Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1 (1983); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Haworth, 300 U.S. 227,.239-40 (1937). The federal act followed that of many states. See
generally Introductory Notes to UNIF. DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS ACT, 12 U.L.A. 309-12 (1996
& Supp. 2002).
246. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(l)(A) (2000) (providing for limited judicial review such
that courts may not "enter declaratory, injunctive, or other equitable relief' other than as
specified for aliens).
247. Edwin M. Borchard, The Federal Declaratory Judgments Act, 21 VA. L. REv. 35, 38
(1934). See S. REP. No. 73-1005 (1934).
248. Nor is the issue only one faced by federal courts. State courts have also variously
characterized declaratory relief, sometimes describing it as a form of equity and other times as a
legal remedy. See generally Willy E. Rice, Insurance Contracts and Judicial Discord Over
Whether Liability Insurers Must Defend Insureds 'Allegedly Intentional and Immoral Conduct:
A Historical andEmpiricalReview of Federal andState Courts'Declaratory Judgments-1900-
1997, 47 AM. U. L. REv. 1131, 1144-45 (1998) (detailing some of the variation).
249. See Beacon Theaters, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500,528 (1959) (holding that a request
for declaratory relief cannot divest a litigant of rights to a jury trial); United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Co. v. Koch, 102 F.2d 288, 295 (3d Cir. 1939) (requiring a jury trial).
250. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281-82 (repealed in 1976).
251. See, e.g., Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 462-73 (1974).
252. When the Declaratory Judgment Act is read against the background of a rule requiring
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6. Congressional Responses
A more general issue is what kinds of interventions Congress-if it had the interest
and political will---could make.253 One response, akin to the Declaratory Judgment
Act, would be to instruct federal courts that, in cases in which jurisdiction exists, they
have the power to issue all forms of relief, whether at law or in equity. Another,
specific to the ERISA context, would be to state that reimbursement or restitution,
whether characterized as a legal or equitable remedy, is available for all or a subset of
ERISA claimants. Proposals to amend ERISA have yet other formulations. One would
authorize courts to provide "such additional relief as a court of equity might have
awarded in a case involving the enforcement of the administration of a trust.
254
Another would be more expansive, replacing the provision of ERISA referring to
"other appropriate equitable relief' with the phrase "other appropriate relief, including
such relief as a court of equity might have awarded in a case involving the enforcement
or administration of a trust, other equitable relief, compensatory relief, or remedial
relief."255
But, were Congress to so state, would the Court defer? A central tenet of the new
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence is that Congress now lacks the unfettered power
to fashion remedies.256 Despite congressional findings, the Court takes it upon itself to
assess legislative records to make an independent evaluation of whether a proposed
remedy is proportionate to the injury and appropriate in scope. Were Congress to craft
statutory remedies and group them under a heading called equity, would the Court
defer completely? Perhaps so. In Grupo Mexicano, the majority said it would leave
"any substantial expansion of past practices to Congress." 257 But could a litigant
challenge congressional power to change historical equity practices by arguing that
federal question statutory jurisdiction to turn on a "well-pleaded complaint," the Court has
adopted an approach of evaluating which litigant would have filed what complaint for
affirmative relief in federal court. See Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667,
671-72 (1950); Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 9-12
(1983). But see Doemberg & Mushlin, supra note 245, at 547-72 (arguing that the Court has
misread the legislative history of the Declaratory Judgment Act and that it was intended to bring
certain excluded litigants, including those raising federal defenses, into federal court).
253. Proposals to amend ERISA have faced complicated interest group politics. As to the
likelihood of political mobilization to obtain responses in general, see Tushnet, supra note 15, at
56-63. Others argue for imposition of limitations on the Supreme Court's powers to invalidate
statutes. See Evan Caminker, Thayerian Deference to Congress and Supreme Court
Supermajority Rule: Lessons from the Past, 78 IND. L.J. 73 (2003) (recounting the history of
efforts by Congress to impose supermajority requirements on Court rulings); Jed Handlesman-
Shugerman, A 6-4 Rule: Reviving Consensus and Deference in the Supreme Court, 37 GA. L.
REv. (forthcoming 2003).
254. See The Employee Pension Freedom Act of 2002, H.R. 3657, 107th Cong., § 403(c)
(2002) (proposing to amend 28 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(5) by inserting that phrase after the
provision to provide "equitable relief').
255. See Retirement Security Protection Act of 2002, S. 1919, 107th Cong., § 403(a) (2002).
256. See Tracy A. Thomas, Congress'Section 5 Power and Remedial Rights, 34 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 673 (2001).
257. Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 329
(1999).
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Congress cannot intrude on the inherent powers of courts over equity?
Prior to enacting any of the proposed forms of legislation, however, Congress
would have to take into account a different response from the judiciary--one proffered
ex ante, while bills are pending. Indeed, before any judges had ruled in Great- West on
the availability of relief and hence on ERISA jurisdiction, the federal judiciary, qua
judiciary, had expressed opposition to affording relief in federal court to certain kinds
of ERISA claimants. In its 1995 Long Range Plan, the Judicial Conference of the
United States had recommended to Congress that "[tihe jurisdiction of the federal
courts to adjudicate routine claims for benefits under ERISA employee welfare benefit
plans should be abolished, except when application or interpretation of federal
statutory or regulatory requirements are at issue." 258 Great-West accomplished such a
result for a different set of ERISA claimants 259 and warned others that federal power
may not be available to help them. More generally, the federal judiciary has actively
opposed the creation of a host of other federal remedies, as is discussed in Part III,
below.
C. Impoverishing the Job of Judging
The Chief Justice has been a leader in bringing the problem of judicial
compensation to the forefront.260 He-and many other federal judges-worry that the
salaries of federal judges are too low when contrasted with their peers in private
practice. The Chief Justice has argued that these salaries harm judicial morale. 6 I use
258. LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 5, at 35, reprinted in 166 F.R.D. 49, 95 (1995)
(Recommendation 12(b)).
259. The issue in Great- West was remedies under § 502(a)(3) of ERISA. Great-West Life &
Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 206 (2002). The Long Range Plan's reference to
benefits due would relate to claims brought under § 502(a)(1). See LONG RANGE PLAN, supra
note 5, 166 F.R.D. at 95-96.
260. William Rehnquist, 2001 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2002),
available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/year-end/200 lyear-endreport.html
(commenting that judicial salaries are negatively affecting the pool of candidates interested in
judgeships by skewing towards more individuals coming from the public sector and fewer from
the private sector). See also FEDERAL JUDICIAL PAY EROSION: A REPORT ON THE NEED FOR
REFORM (The American Bar Association & The Federal Bar Association eds., 2001); 1999
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT at 19 (recommending legislation to raise salaries ofjudges, as
well as other federal officials). Social scientists may well debate the causes for shifts in patterns
of routes to judgeships; salaries are one of many variables to be analyzed. See Lee Epstein, Jack
Knight & Andrew D. Martin, The Norm of Prior Judicial Experience (and its Consequencesfor
the US. Supreme Court), 91 CAL. L. REv. (forthcoming Jan. 2003).
261. See Linda Greenhouse, Pay Erodes, Judges Flee, and Relief Is Not at Hand, N.Y.
TIMES, July 17, 2002 at A 14 (discussing the appearances of the Chief Justice and Justice Breyer
before the National Commission on the Public Service, at which they expressed concerns about
the number of federal judges who have left the bench). They provided information on federal
judicial pay falling below levels of pay to law professors and judges in Canada and England. See
also Williams v. United States, 240 F.3d 1019 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 1221
(2002). Article III judges were plaintiffs in that action; they had relied on a 1989 statute, the
Ethics Reform Act, and the compensation clause of Article III to argue that the congressional
failure to provide automatic salary increases for judges between 1995 and 1999 was
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the term "impoverishing" in the title of this section to refer to that ongoing discussion
as well as to suggest that rulings such as Grupo Mexicano and Great- West impoverish
the job of judging in another way-by undermining the sense of utility of federal
judges.
Imagine oneself a trial judge faced with a claimant whom one knows to be legally
entitled to funds. Imagine oneself confident that the funds will not be available by the
time a final decision is made. Indeed, as the application is made to stop the assets from
being dissipated, the debtor offers no defense.262 Assume that such a judge hews to
congressional mandates but that the case involves no statute to interpret, or that a
relevant statute provides for legal relief but makes no mention of other remedies.
Under English law, a response-subject to appellate review-is possible, explained as
necessary because
We live in a time of rapidly growing commercial and financial sophistication and
it behooves the courts to adapt their practices to meet the current wiles of those
defendants who are prepared to devote as much energy to making themselves
immune to the courts' orders as to resisting the making of such orders on the
merits of their case.263
But for a United States federal judge, such adaptation is not permitted.264 Presiding
in such cases becomes frustrating. Similarly, imagine oneself ajudge who believes that
a mistake, identified before entry of final judgment, has occurred but the time stated in
a federal rule for lawyers to object has passed. Federal trial judges have been told they
lack power to intervene to rectify such errors. No longer do such judges retain the
"error-correcting power that is 'inherent in every court ofjustice so long as it retains
control of the subject matter and of the parties.' '265 Judges have either to tolerate their
own inability to be effective or to attempt, through off the record negotiations, to get
litigants to agree to do what law cannot require them to do.266 If achieving such results
through settlement, reviewing courts cannot assess whetherjudges were functioning as
"loyal agents" or "cooperative partners" with Congress.
This constrained understanding of adjudication's potential is at odds not only with
trends in other common law countries but also with developments in both state and
federal systems. Statutes, rules, and practices today focus on "alternative dispute
unconstitutional. The Court denied certiorari, over a dissent from Justice Breyer, joined by
Justices Scalia and Kennedy. Id. at 1221-1228.
262. See Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 342 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (describing the
concerns of the trial judge that the debtor was using court process to delay entry ofjudgment and
gain the time to dissipate assets owed to the creditor). At the hearing on December 19, 1997 on
the motion to freeze assets, the trial judge asked: "why is that equitable?" See Transcript of the
Hearing, in Petition for Certiorari at Appendix 29a-54a, Grupo Mexicano de Desarallo, S.A. v.
Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308 (1999) (No. 98-23 1).
263. Derby & Co. v. Weldon, I All Eng. Rep. 1002, 1007 (C.A. 1989).
264. See the discussion of the Mareva injunctions, supra notes 126-128 and of Grupo
Mexicano, supra Part II.A.5.
265. Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 443 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting
United States v. Morgan, 307 U.S. 183, 197 (1939)); see also discussion supra notes 99-104.
266. See also Resnik, Trial as Error, supra note 88, at 943-46 (discussing the other
incentives for judges to be involved in settlement efforts).
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resolution" mechanisms, through which judges rely on more flexible and informal
means to work with parties. The interest in having judges be "problem solvers,"
coordinating services with other government entities, has resulted in many
innovations, 267 sometimes termed "therapeutic jurisprudence, 268 or "restorative"
justice.269
The divide between the majority and the dissent in Grupo Mexicano and Great-
West is not only a basic disagreement about the authority of Congress and the national
and state governments. As Justice Stevens has described, a "fundamental"
disagreement exists about whether judges, working on ordinary cases, retain "the
power of a court to correct a miscarriage ofjustice while it retains jurisdiction over a
case." 270 The majority's approach sharply limits the ability of trial judges to use law to
respond to the particulars of a case. Much of the debate about judicial role has pitted
"judicial activism" against "judicial restraint." But these terms no longer capture the
spectrum. Judicial disability better captures the degree to which the strictures of Grupo
Mexicano and Great- West limit judges' efficacy.
III. BREACHING BOUNDARIES BY CLAIMING POLICYMAKING PREROGATIVES: THE
PROGRAMMATIC JUDICIARY
If a basic predicate of such limitations on federal judges is the presumption that
federal judges should serve primarily as agents awaiting the signals of Congress, that
predicate does not operate to constrain the Rehnquist Judiciary's efforts to influence
those signals. In contrast to the disabling approach towards judges in ordinary
adjudication, the Rehnquist Judiciary is the engine of its own authority when advising
Congress about rightsholding. The Rehnquist judiciary argues that fewer claimants
ought to be able to bring disputes to federal courts and, more broadly, that Congress
ought to hold a presumption against generating new federal rights if enforced through
federal litigation.
I turn now to analyze the statutory sources and practices that have resulted in this
other shift in judicial role, this time at the collective level, operating through
policymaking organs speaking for the Article III judiciary. I do not argue that the idea
of a judge attempting to affect social policy is new. To the contrary, throughout both
English and United States history, some judges-as individuals-have tried to use
whatever political influence they had, and many have been directly involved in the
267. See, e.g., Michael Dorf & Charles Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and Emergent
Experimentalist Government, 53 VAND. L. REv. 831 (2000) (describing the creation of "drug
courts," linking judicial proceedings to other efforts to wean addicts from drugs so as to break
cycles of incarceration).
268. Peggy F. Hora, William G. Schma & John T.A. Rosenthal, Therapeutic Jurisprudence
and the Drug Treatment Court Movement: Revolutionalizing the Criminal Justice System's
Response to Drug Abuse and Crime in America, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 439 (1999).
269. See, e.g., JOHN BRAITHEWAITE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND RESPONSIVE REGULATION
(2002) (discussing developments in Australia and elsewhere). Braithewaite called for institutions
such as corporations to provide access to justice programs (not all of which had to be based in
courts) and to undertake self-audits to assess the access provided and to monitor the quality of
such programs.
270. Ste Carlisle, 517 U.S. at 448 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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drafting of statutes. 271 Moreover, on a few occasions, Supreme Court justices have
banded together to try to persuade Congress to alter their working conditions. For
example, in 1792, the Supreme Court justices joined in a petition to Congress to
terminate their circuit riding.272 In the 1920s, justices pressed Congress to revise the
Supreme Court docket and shift much of it from mandatory to discretionary review.273
My discussion, in contrast, is focused on the question of the judiciary as an institution
using its corporate voice to advance specific agendas about whether litigants ought to
have access to federal adjudication at all.
And, in that respect, the problems explored here are new. Only in the twentieth
century did federal judges gain the capacity to function as a cohort and thus have to
decide when and how to use a collective voice. Today, the Judicial Conference is
comprised of thirteen chiefjudges of the appellate circuits and the chiefjudge of the
International Trade Court, who gain their authority to serve through seniority, 74 joined
by twelve district judges elected from each circuit for terms,275 and the Chief Justice.
That group also relies on many committees, comprised not only of Conference
members but of others, selected by the Chief Justice. 276 In earlier days, the Judicial
271. See JAY, supra note 81, at 12-22 (discussing English judges); Manning, supra note 17,
at 44 (quoting Madison's discussion of English judges as "so far connected with the legislative
department as often to attend and participate in its deliberations, though not admitted to a
legislative vote"). See also A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT:
THE RISE OF THE ACTION OF ASSUMPSIT 599-620 (1975) (discussing the legislative history of the
Statute of Frauds); Crawford D. Hening, The Original Drafts of the Statute of Frauds (29 Car. H
c. 3) and their Authors, 61 U. PA. L. REV. 283 (1913) (reproducing and analyzing the drafts to
determine which justices played what role in drafting clauses). For discussion of American
judges in the early period, see JAY, supra note 81, at 91-105 (detailing Chief Justice John Jay's
involvement in the Washington administration). For more recent history, see EDWARD A.
PURCELL, BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE
POLITICS OF FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICA 201-16 (2000) (discussing Felix
Frankfurter's activities).
272. See Wythe Holt, "The Federal Courts Have Enemies in All Who Fear Their Influence
on State Objects ": The Failure to Abolish Supreme Court Circuit-Riding in the Judiciary Acts of
1792 and 1793, 36 BUFF. L. REV. 301,333-34 (1987) (describing thejustices' petition as focused
on the practical difficulties of the travel). Holt noted that the petition did not suggest specifically
how to alter the system. He saw the system of riding circuit as a means to save money by
economizing on the number of judges needed to staff the courts while bringing a federal
presence to various parts of the country. Id. at 340.
273. The effort, popularly known at "The Judges' Bill," was pressed by William Howard
Taft, as Chief Justice, and supported by other members of the Court. See Edward A. Hartnett,
Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years After the Judges'Bill, 100 COLUM.
L. REV. 1643, 1661-1704 (2000) (describing Taft's designation of Justices Day, Van Devanter,
and McReynolds to draft the bill; the pursuit of its enactment; the testimony of several justices;
and Taft's lobbying efforts). Members of the Supreme Court also prepared an analysis of the
bill, introduced it into the congressional record, and claimed their authorship, albeit also noting
that drafting was undertaken at the request of Congress. Id. at 1675-77.
274. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2000).
275. The term is for "not less than 3 successive years nor more than 5 successive years." Id.
276. See THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS COMMITTEES 2 (Sept. 15,
1998) (on file with author) (stating that the "Chief Justice has sole authority to make committee
appointments"); id. at 10 (listing several standing committees, on which all circuits are normally
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Conference sometimes polled circuits or judges before taking public positions.2 "
While some vetting of issues through the committee structure continues, the twenty-
seven members of the Conference now vote to determine positions for the Article III
judiciary, comprised of more than 1200 life-tenured judges and about 800 judges
without life tenure.278 Below, I examine the statute creating the Conference and the
represented and on which committee members presumptively serve three-year terms, as well as
other committees, including the Executive Committee and the Budget Committee, on which
"members serve at the pleasure of the Chief Justice"). See generally Alan Morrison & D. Scott
Stenhouse, The ChiefJustice of the United States: More Than Just the Highest Ranking Judge, I
CONSTITUIONAL COMMENTARY 57 (1984) (discussing the Chief Justice's competing time
commitments and the breadth of his authority).
277. This practice was termed the "Phillips Plan" after One Phillips, the judge who initiated
it. See PETER GRAHAM FISH, THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 248-54 (1973)
[hereinafter FISH, POLITICS OF ADMINISTRATION]; 1945 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 6-7 (Sept.
1945) (detailing one such poll). That practice developed in response to the distress of district
judges, then excluded from membership in the Conference but affected by its decisions. In 1957,
districtjudges gained membership on the Judicial Conference. See Act of Aug. 28, 1957, Pub. L.
No. 85-202, 71 Stat. 476. Thereafter, the Conference noted that it no longer needed to poll
district judges. See 1958 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 275 (Sept. 1958) (formally rescinding
the Phillips Plan).
An explanation of the format of footnote references to the Judicial Conference Reports is in
order. The Conference initially met once yearly, sometimes had special sessions, and now
generally meets twice annually. Over the last eighty years, the publication of its reports has
taken different forms. Initially, the reports were reproduced in other legal journals and forwarded
to Congress with materials from the Attorney General. Later, the reports were published in
conjunction with the Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts. More recently, many reports are available on the website of the United States Courts.
Over the years, and depending on the form of publication, the titles of the reports have also
varied somewhat.
Were conventional "Bluebooking" employed, the continuity of reporting would be confused
by references to the slightly different titles and institutional authorship. To avoid such confusion,
I have adopted a uniform template-listing the year of a report, the title Judicial Conference
Report, the pages at which specific references appear, followed by the month and the year.
Further, given the frequency of references to these works with essentially the same titles, no
supra or infra references are made.
278. For data as of 1999 on the composition of the judiciary, and specifically, the numbers of
active and senior Article III judges and bankruptcy and magistrate judges lacking life-tenure, see
Resnik, Inventing the District Courts, supra note 236, at 613-16. Neither bankruptcy nor
magistrate judges hold positions on the Judicial Conference, although they often serve on
committees of the Conference. In 1978, when Congress revised the charter for the bankruptcy
courts, it had provided bankruptcy judges with a seat on the Judicial Conference. See
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-598, § 208, 92 Stat. 2549, 2660 (amending 28
U.S.C. § 331 to provide that in addition to a district judge from each judicial circuit, "two
bankruptcy judges" would also sit on the Judicial Conference and further that the "bankruptcy
judges to be summoned shall be chosen at large by all the bankruptcy judges. Each bankruptcy
judge chosen shall serve as a member of the conference for three successive years .... ").
Subsequently, the Supreme Court held that the 1978 revisions had given too broad ajurisdiction
to bankruptcy judges. See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50
(1982). When Congress replaced the 1978 statute, it did not include provisions for bankruptcy
judges to serve on the Judicial Conference. See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship
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topics that the Conference has put on its agenda.
A. The Statutory Parameters
In 1922, Congress created the forerunner of today's Judicial Conference by
requiring the Chief Justice to chair an annual conference composed of appellate judges
from each circuit and charged with assessing dockets and proposing means to respond
to congestion.279 The innovation of what was called the Conference of Senior Circuit
Judges (and was later renamed the Judicial Conference of the United States) was
coupled with authorization for an additional twenty-two district court judgeships, a
significant increase in the size of the federal trial bench, then numbering 105.280
As the legislative report for the statute explained, the problem was "congestion"-
spawned by Prohibition and by the enactment of new federal laws dealing with crimes
related to drugs, espionage, car theft, and income tax evasion.28 1 An ad hoc
commission of three judges and two United States Attorneys, convened through the
Department of Justice, had proposed that Congress create eighteen "judges at large,"
able to move to different districts "to assist resident judges in disposing of the arrears
of business." 28 2 Chief Justice William Howard Taft was an enthusiast (and source) of
that proposal,283 but members of Congress were not. The legislature chose instead to
create specific district court judgeships while reserving the possibility of leaving
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984).
279. See 1922 Judgeship Act, supra note 4.
280. See Additional District Judges for Certain Districts, Etc., H.R. REP. No. 482, to
accompany H.R. 9103, at 2 (67th Cong., 1st Sess., Nov. 17, 1921) [hereinafter "1921 House
Report on Judgeships].
281. Id.
282. Id. at 4 (referring to the "voluntary commission" consisting of districtjudges J.E. Sater,
John C. Pollack, W.I. Grubb, and of United States Attorneys William H. Hayward, M.F. Clyne,
aided by George E. Strong, a special assistant to the Attorney General, who served as the
commission's secretary). The Commission's report is at Appendix D, id. at 18-21. Given the
variation from district to district in volume, the report preferred a means by which to provide
"general relief throughout the entire country" rather than adding judges to particular districts. Id.
at 18. The commission distinguished among the sources of congestion. Some were structural,
such as increases in population and a changing economy, while others were seen as an artifact of
specific laws, such as Prohibition. The commission saw an at-large system as particularly useful
for the "existing temporary excess of business." Id. at 18.
283. Chief Justice Taft provided an initial draft of the legislation. See Walter F. Murphy,
Chief Justice Taft and the Lower Court Bureaucracy: A Study in Judicial Administration, 24 J.
POL. 453,455 (1962). Thereafter, Taft testified in support of the bill at the Judiciary Committee.
See Additional Judges, U.S. District Courts; Hearings on S. 2432, 2433, 2523 Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. at 11 (1921). See also ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 1921 at 3-4 (describing the proposal as
stemming from the Commission "in cooperation with the Chief Justice of the United States and
myself'). Under one version of an at-large scheme, the Chief Justice would have had power to
dispatch judges as needed. See William Howard Taft, Adequate Machinery for Judicial
Business, Address Before the Judicial Section of the American BarAssociation (Aug. 30, 1921),
in 7 A.B.A.J. 453,454 (1921).
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subsequent vacancies unfilled.8 4
Through that legislation (and here forwarding the goals of Chief Justice Taft), 285
Congress also provided a means of transferring judges from one district to another.
The statute required the Conference of Senior Circuit Judges to "prepare plans" for
judicial reassignments "where the state of the docket or condition of business indicates
the need.,286 To enable the Conference to do so, Congress obliged senior district
judges to provide information on "the number and character of cases on the docket, the
business in arrears, and cases disposed of," as well as to make "recommendations as to
the need of additional judicial assistance for the disposal of business" during the
coming year.28 7 Congress instructed the Chief Justice, the only member from the
Supreme Court and the Conference's presiding officer, to convene annual meetings
and specified both time and place.288
284. 1922 Judgeship Act, supra note 4, § 1 (creating specific judgeships rather than
judgeships at large). See also 1921 House Report on Judgeships, supra note 280, at 5
(explaining that additional judges should be assigned to particular districts and that judges
should be residents of those districts). See generally FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS,
THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 234-45
(1927); Murphy, supra note 283, at 458 (describing how a proposal for judges "at large" would
have upset patronage arrangements).
285. See William Howard Taft, Attacks on the Courts and Legal Procedures, 5 KY. L.J. 3,
14-15 (1916) (discussing the need for either the "Chief Justice, or a council ofjudges appointed
by him, or by the Supreme Court, to consider each year the pending Federal judicial business of
the country and to distribute Federal judicial force of the country through the various district and
intermediate appellate courts"); see also William Howard Taft, Possible and Needed Reforms in
Administration of Justice in Federal Courts, 8 A.B.A. J. 601 (1922); William Howard Taft,
Three Needed Steps of Progress, 6 A.B.A. J. 34 (1922). As noted, the legislation was not
identical to that which Taft had sought; he had wanted the power to direct the assignment of new
judges and to have them float from district to district as needed.
The Senate passed the Act, as it emerged from conference, with 32 voting in favor and 16
opposed. The House enacted the measure by a vote of 139 in favor and 78 in opposition. See 62
Cong. Rec. 12248-49 (Sept. 8, 1922); 62 Cong. Rec. 12365-66 (Sept. 11, 1922). Opponents
worried about Congress giving judges the power to make assignments ofjudges. One legislator
objected at length to the bill's proposed investiture of executive power in the Chief Justice and
argued it raised serious problems of constitutionality. See 62 Cong. Rec. 4853-63 (March 3 1,
1922) (statements of Senator John K. Shields of Tennessee). Some of the opposition to the bill
may have been prompted by opposition to giving Taft the power to assign judges to particular
districts. Interest in limiting his power was, in turn, influenced by debates about Prohibition,
which Taft favored and some senators opposed. See DAVID H. BURTON, WILLIAM HOwARD TAFT:
IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE 125-27 (1986).
286. 1922 Judgeship Act, supra note 4, § 2.
287. Id. But district judges were reassured that it was "not intended that such conference
should result in any mandatory interference with the district courts, nor pursue any inquisitorial
course but to consider certain reports as to the state of the business in the various districts." 1921
House Reports on Judgeships, supra note 280, at 3. Further, the Chief Justice did not have
complete control over assignments. See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 284, at 239-40.
288. 1922 Judgeship Act, supra note 4, § 2 ("It shall be the duty of the Chief Justice to
summon to a conference on the last Monday in September, at Washington... or at such other
time and place.., as the Chief Justice... may designate."). Judges were allowed their "actual
expenses of travel and.., subsistence, not to exceed $10 per day." Id. This micromanagement
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As transcripts of the early meetings of the Judicial Conference record, at the yearly
conference, each senior circuit judge commented, district by district, on whether
particular judges were sufficient to the task of handling their allotted cases. 289
Thereafter, the Conference generated a brief, annual report, provided by the Attorney
General to Congress along with the Department of Justice's annual compilation of
statistics on federal filings.290 The transcripts of the Conference reveal a group of
jurists diligent in detailing each district's work and reflective about what the
Conference might appropriately do through its newly generated corporate voice. Recall
that during the Conference's early decades, the federal judiciary was often criticized,
particularly by Progressives, who perceived the federal bench to be hostile to labor and
protective of corporate interests. 9 Some members of Congress proposed divesting or
limiting federal jurisdiction. One suggestion was to abolish diversity jurisdiction
altogether.292 Frustrations with the Supreme Court's rulings also led to proposals,
called "court-packing" to change the number ofjustices.293
In the early 1930s, Conference members discussed whether the group ought to
address the specific question of a proposal to strip the federal courts of diversity
jurisdiction. The minutes record discussion of the impropriety and ill-advisedness of
taking such a position. As Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes put it, to record
opposition would be to put judges in a "very vulnerable position" that would "weaken.
. their prestige, and their independence, if they appeared to be campaigning in their
own interests. '294 While urging individual judges to enlist bar associations to oppose
stemmed in part from concerns that the meetings were an excuse for trips to Washington. See
Norman J. Padelford, The Federal Judicial Conference, 26 AM. POL. SCi. REv. 482,485 (1932).
289. Transcripts of the proceedings are at the National Archives in Washington, D.C. See
Record Group (RG) 116, Entry 4, Records Related to Judicial Conference Meetings, 1922-1958
[hereinafter Judicial Conference Meeting Records]. Another source for the exchanges within the
Judicial Conference is the history written by Peter Fish. See FIsH, POLITICS OF ADMINISTRATION,
supra note 277, at 56-57.
I have reviewed materials from 1925 until the early 1940s, when stenographic minutes were
either no longer made or archived within that set of papers. The first transcript dates from 1925
and the last from 1941. Another set of minutes (rather than transcripts), beginning in 1953 and
ending in 1967, can be found in the Earl Warren Papers in the Library of Congress.
Reports of Conference Committees provide additional insight into the meetings. Committee
records are also at the National Archive, RG 116, Entry 5, Records Relating to Judicial
Conference Committees, 1940-1955 [hereinafter Judicial Conference Committee Records]. In
addition, many of the reports of the committees of the Conference are available at the library of
the General Counsel's Office of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. When I
cite to materials from that collection, I refer to them as Judicial Conference Committee
Reports/AO Collection.
290. Between 1923 and 1929, for example, each annual report was about ten pages.
291. See PURCELL, supra note 271, at 64-91.
292. See Hearings on S. 937, S. 939, andS. 3243 Before Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 72nd Cong. (1932).
293 See FIsH, POLITICS OF ADMINISTRATION, supra note 277, at 112-24 (commenting that the
creation of the Administrative Office in 1939 was a partial response to improve the morale and
image of the federal judiciary).
294. 1932 Transcript at 241-42, in Judicial Conference Meeting Records, supra note 289,
Box 8.
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the proposal, the Chief Justice opposed collective action, and none was taken.295
What prompted that decision? Members of the Conference may have read its
statutory mandate as limited to inquiry into workload, judgeships, and dockets, or they
may have thought it impolitic at the time to assume a great license. We know that at
least some question about the proper scope of their role existed. Conference members
decided to ask Congress to revise the statutory charge to authorize it to do more than
consider "congestion in the courts and the remedies for it."296 As Conference reports
explained, clarification of the legislation would have been desirable "to avoid any
question as to the scope of authority which the Congress intended to confer. 29 :
Therefore, repeatedly in the early 1930s, the Conference requested that the Attorney
General to recommend to the Congress that the Conference have the power to address
"changes in statutory law affecting the jurisdiction, practice, evidence, and procedure
of and in the different district courts and circuit courts of appeals as may to the
Conference seem desirable."
298
Whether those requests stemmed from a legal judgment about the statute's strictures
or a political judgment that it would be wise to elicit signals about congressional
receptivity to the Conference taking up more topics is unclear. Political sensitivities
surely were at work. Chief Justice Hughes's reference, quoted above, about judicial
vulnerability might be read to mean that taking a position, particularly if unsuccessful,
would be harmful or might unleash opposition. After all, only a few years earlier, in
debates about whether to create a conference for judges, opponents in Congress had
warned that such a conference would enable the federal judiciary to become a
"propaganda organization for legislation for the benefit of the Federal judiciary," and
that such a "self-seeking" institution would enable the judiciary to "perform a
legislative function" that would undermine the legitimacy of the federal courts.299 The
295. Other judges agreed. See comments of Judge Alschuler at 1932 Transcript, 237A, in
Judicial Conference Meeting Records, supra note 289.
The judges had a different attitude toward individual efforts. See Minutes of 1922 Meeting
10-11, in Judicial Conference Meeting Records, supra note 289, at Box 1 (Dec. 1922-Sept.
1923) (indicating that then Chief Justice William Howard Taft, concerned about the need for
reform of the Supreme Court's docket, urged that each judge be given a copy of then pending
legislation and "write personal letters advocating... passage to members of the House and
Senate"). No official action was taken. See 1922 Judicial Conference Report, published under
the title The Federal Judicial Council, 2 TEX. L. REv. 458, 459 (1924). See also BURTON, supra
note 285, at 129-130 (describing what he termed Taft's personal "lobbying" efforts against
limitations on diversity jurisdiction).
296. See Transcript of 1930, at 304, in Judicial Conference Meeting Records, supra note 289,
at Box 6 (Oct. 1929-Oct. 1930), Folder entitled "1930 Minutes and Transcript with Index."
297. 1931 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 12 (Sept. 1931).
298. 1930 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 8 (Sept. 1930); 1931 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
REPORT 12 (Sept. 1931); 1932 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 12 (Sept. 1932). The suggestion
for this language is detailed in the minutes of the 1930 Transcript, Judicial Conference Meeting
Records, supra note 289, at 322.
299. See Statement of Mr. Lea, 62 CONG. REC. 202-03 (Dec. 10, 1921); Padelford, supra note
288, at 482. Clarence Frederick Lea, a Democrat from Northern California, served thirty-two
years in the House. He was known as one of the authors of the Pure Food and Drug Act,
and of the legislation creating the Civil Aeronautics Authority, and as an opponent of the
Electoral College. In some of the elections, he had the nomination from both the Democratic
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Conference's repeated requests in the early 1930s for a wider charter were not enacted,
and by 1934, Chief Justice Hughes suggested that the Conference "say nothing more
about it." 3
0
On a few occasions thereafter, Congress returned to amend the statute creating the
Judicial Conference and to pass new legislation related to judicial organization. In
1937, Congress included the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia as a member of the Judicial Conference.30 1 A brief report accompanying that
amendment explained that, because the Conference has been "helpful in expediting and
simplifying court business" and "undoubtably improved trial court procedure and
expedited the hearings and trials of cases," adding a representative for the D.C. Circuit
was sensible.30 2 Two years thereafter, Congress minimized the role of the Department
of Justice in administering the courts by creating the Administrative Office ("AO") of
the United States Courts.30 3 The judicial branch thereby gained a mechanism to do its
own data collection and budget preparation.
In 1948, as part of a general revamping of Title 28 (the Judicial Code), Congress
made more edits to the Judicial Conference statute, recodified at 28 U.S.C. § 331.
Congress changed the name to the Judicial Conference of the United States, linked
membership to the status of chiefjudge (obtained through seniority), deleted details on
scheduling of meetings, and added a new sentence providing that the "Chief Justice
shall submit to Congress an annual report of the proceedings of the Judicial
Conference and its recommendations for legislation." 304 The legislative history
described revisions of Title 28 in general as stylistic rather than substantive, aimed at
ending needless searches into the Statutes at Large, eliminating anachronistic
provisions, and simplifying language. 305 As to the specific rewording of the section on
and Republican parties. See Clarence Lea, 89, Served in House, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1964 at
27.
300. See Transcript of 1934, at 134, in Judicial Conference Meeting Records, supra note 289,
at Box 10.
301. See Act of July 5, 1937, Pub. L. No. 179, ch. 426-27, 42 Stat. 848.
302. See S. REP. No. 75-3, Providing Representation of United States Courts ofAppeals for
the District of Columbia on Annual Conference ofSenior Circuit Judges, at 2 (1937) (also noting
that the Conference debated "rules of practice and procedure and other like matters tending to
expedition and simplification"). See also H.R. REP. No. 75-163 at 2-3 (1937) (attaching a letter
from Attorney General Homer Cummings, forwarding the recommendation from the Judicial
Conference that its charter be amended to include a judge from the D.C. Circuit).
303. See Act of Aug. 7, 1939, ch. 501, § 302, 53 Stat. 1223, 1223 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 601-13 (2000)). See generally THE HISTORY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTS: SIXTY YEARS OF SERVICE TO THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (Cathy A. McCarthy &
Tara Treacy eds., 2000) [hereinafter AO HISTORY].
304. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 15, § 331, 62 Stat. 902.
305. See REVISION OF TITLES 18 AND 28 OF THE UNITED STATES CODE: HEARINGS ON H.R.
1600 AND H.R. 2055 BEFORE SUBCOMM. No. 1 OF THE HoUs. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 80th
Cong. at 3 (1947) (statement of Rep. Edward J. Devitt, from Minnesota and a member of the
House Committee). Some commentators disagreed. See Charles Alan Wright, Foreword to
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLE 28, UNITED STATES CODE, JUDICIARY AND JUDICIAL PROCEDURE
(Roy M. Mersky & J. Myron Jacobstein eds., Gaunt & Sons, U.S. Government Documents,
1971) (describing the Code as providing "answers to some problems... but creating many
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the Judicial Conference, the Revisor's Notes addressed decisions to omit certain details
on when and where the Conference met. The Notes also explained that the sentence,
quoted above, charging the Chief Justice with reporting to Congress was added "to
authorize the communications to Congress of information which now reaches that
body only because [it is] incorporated in the annual report of the Attorney General. 3 °6
Since then, Congress has made a few other changes to Section 331. In 1957,
Congress provided for one district judge from each circuit to become members of the
Conference. 30 7 In 1958, Congress authorized the Conference to carry on "a continuous
study of the operation and effect" of procedural rules. 30 In 1980, Congress brought the
Conference into the process of disciplining federal judges.30 9 Amendments to the 1938
Rules Enabling Act, which provides for the Supreme Court to promulgate federal
procedural rules, are also relevant. In 1988, Congress required that the Conference's
committees (which propose and draft rules) open their meetings and records to the
public and also gave the Conference the power to abrogate local rules inconsistent with
national rules.a 0
Under the terms of the statute today, Congress requires the Judicial Conference to:
riddles of its own" and describing the Reviser's Notes as evidencing that he was "wholly
unaware of the significance of what he was doing") [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLE
28].
A major focus of the hearings was the proposed inclusion of the Tax Court within Title 28
and a provision-added in the House-to permit nonlawyers to appear before it. Proponents
cited the practice of accountants appearing before the then Board of Tax Appeals; opponents
argued the superiority of lawyers and the power of courts to determine who appeared before
them. See Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 80th Cong.,
2d Sess. on H.R. 3214, Apr. 22-24, 26, and June 7 (1948) at 15-16 (statements of Chaucey W.
Reed, and Edward Devitt); at 167 (statement of W.A. Sutherland, American Bar Association).
306. Revisor's Notes, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLE 28, supra note 305, at A 1, A 45.
307. Act of Aug. 28, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-202, 71 Stat. 476. See also H.R. Rep. No. 172,
Providing Representation ofDistrict Judges on the Judicial Conference of the United States, to
Accompany H.R. 3819, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. at 2 (Feb. 27, 1957) (explaining that, given that
"many of the recommendations of the Conference deal with judicial matters handled daily in the
district courts," those judges should be included because they were a "valuable source of
information" on "the problem of court congestion and delay in litigation"). In 1996, Congress
amended the provision to create terms of not less than three nor more than five years and to
permit senior as well as active judges to serve. Act of Oct. 19, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-317, 110
Star. 3857.
308. Act of July 11, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-513, 62 Stat. 497. Congress also charged the
Conference with recommending changes to procedural rules "to promote simplicity in
procedure, fairness in administration, the just determination of litigation, and the elimination of
unjustifiable expense and delay." Further details of how to do so were provided in the 1988
Amendments to the Rules Enabling Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642, codified at 28
U.S.C. §§ 2072-74 (2000).
309. Pub. L. No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2040 (1980), codified at 28 U.S.C. § 372 (also providing
that, if the Conference chose to create a standing committee to deal with discipline and
disability, as per 28 U.S.C. § 372(c), the Chief Justice would select its members and that such a
committee as well as the Conference would have the power to take testimony and subpoena
witnesses).
310. Act of Nov. 19, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 401-02, 102 Stat. 4650.
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make a comprehensive survey of the condition of the business in the courts of the
United States and prepare plans for assignment ofjudges to or from circuits where
necessary... [and to] submit suggestions and recommendations to the various
courts to promote uniformity of management procedures and the expeditious
conduct of court business ... [and to make] an annual report of the proceedings of
the Judicial Conference and its recommendations for legislation.
31 1
What then has Congress asked the Judicial Conference to do? Interpretive choices
and ambiguity rest on the relevance of original legislative intentions and of legislative
records. In 1948, when the language was added directing the Chief Justice to forward
legislative recommendations to Congress, did it refer back to the original 1922 focus
on assessing dockets and the need for judgeships? Did that text ratify practices as they
had developed by 1948? Or, did the text license a new range of activities? As I detail
below, under the guidance of a series of chief justices, interacting with changing
configurations of presidencies and congresses, the Conference has taken various
stances on those questions.
B. Practices and Politics
In the early decades, the Conference focused primarily on workload. The
Conference made several requests to Congress, first conveyed by the Attorney General
and then directly, asking for legislation to create more judgeships.3 12 Aware of the
need to persuade Congress of needs for more numbers, the Conference supported its
views through collection of information on filings and evidence ofjudicial efforts to be
efficient.31 3 To do so, the Conference relied on committees, both standing and ad
hoc, 314 focused on particular issues such as statistics or the pretrial process.3 15 Over
time, the Conference came to worry that it asked for judgeships too often and at
points-such as election years-not conducive to obtaining political assent. To be
more effective, the Conference developed a system of weighting cases and tried to
issue requests for more judgeships at specified intervals. 316
311. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2000).
312. See, e.g., 1934 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 5 (Sept. 1934) (urging, "in accordance
with its previous recommendations," that situations in New York and California be "promptly
relieved by providing for the necessary number of judges to dispose of the business of these
highly congested districts").
313. See, e.g., id. at 2-5 (describing the problems with and efforts to reduce congestion).
314. See Memorandum of the Judicial Conference's first two meetings convened on
December 28, 1922 and September 26, 1923, 1923 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 2 (on file with
the author) (listing committees, including a "Committee on Need and Possibility of Transfer of
Judges" and committees focused on rules and procedures for district judges as well as for
bankruptcy, equity, and appellate procedure), also published at Appendix, The Federal Judicial
Council, 2 TEX. L. REV. 458-63 (1923-24).
315. See FISH, POLITICS OF ADMINISTRATION, supra note 277, at 269-73.
316. The Conference developed a means of "weighting" the burden of different kinds of
cases. See Report of the Committee on Judicial Statistics 3-8 in Judicial Conference Committee
Reports/AO Collection, supra note 289, Binder Sept. 1955, Vol. II, Item 16; Minutes of the
Meeting of the Statistics Committee (June 10, 1952) in Judicial Conference Committee
Records, supra note 289, at Box 9; Report of the Study of Relative Weight to be Given to
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In brief summary, as the decades unfolded, the Conference was actively involved in
requesting judgeships, monitoring caseloads by improving data collection, securing
funding for its operations, law libraries, and benefits for its employees, expanding its
role in making rules of practice and procedure for the federal system, and developing
training and education sessions for judges. The Judicial Conference also took up other
questions, such as courthouse construction, juror qualifications, and criminal justice
administration (including supervision of the Department of Probation, the incarceration
of youthful offenders, the development of federal public defender services, and
procedures for habeas corpus filings).1 7
But the archival materials and the published reports of its meetings during the 1920s
through the 1960s demonstrate an ongoing self-consciousness about what questions
were properly before the Conference. 318 In the early 1930s, Chief Justice Hughes noted
that the one could interpret the enabling statute to make the Conference a
"considerable force in the field of legislation," but he also warned that the Conference
had to "keep clear of any questions of policy. '3'9 And, in the minutes and reports, one
frequently finds the comment that certain issues are "matters of policy" to be left to
legislative decisionmaking.
320
Of course, the central question is to determine which issues raise "questions of
policy" left to Congress and which fall within the Conference's ken. Different methods
of analysis and answers are plausible. One approach could be predicated upon efforts
to interpret the statutory charter. For example, one could adopt a view, consistent with
the current Supreme Court's majority discussion in Great-West,32' that statutes-if
silent on an issue--ought to be read to preclude a particular action. Moreover,
Congress, when delegating rulemaking powers to the federal courts, warned the
judiciary not to use "practice and procedure" to "abridge, enlarge, or modify any
substantive right." 322 Given the absence of specific direction by Congress to the
Conference about what kinds of legislation to propose, coupled with that statute's
references to a "comprehensive survey of the business in the courts" and management
and procedure, Section 331 could be read to direct the corporate judiciary to propose
legislation only about new judgeships or the internal practices and court procedures.
Further, were one an interpretavist guided by legislative history, one would draw
Different Types of Cases, id. at Box 43 (Sept. 1947); Report of the Committee on Statistics, id.
at Box 46 (Sept. 1948-Mar. 1949). Citing the time lag between requests for judgeships and their
being filled, the Conference switched from a four-year to a two-year cycle in 1977. See 1997
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 6.
317. See AO HISTORY, supra note 303, at 21-66.
318. See Resnik, Trial as Error, supra note 88, at 959-65 (describing committee reports,
minutes of meetings, and annual reports).
319. Transcript 252-53 (1931), in Judicial Conference Meeting Records, supra note 289, at
Box 6 (Oct. 1929-Oct. 1930) (Folder 1930 Minutes and Transcript with Index).
320. See, e.g., 1953 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 14 (Spec. Sess., Mar. 1953) (in some
versions, reprinted as an Appendix at 231) (noting that a proposed application to military
personnel of a law on fugitives from justice "raises an important question of legislative policy
for the determination of the legislation branch of the Government and upon which the Judicial
Department should not express an opinion"). Other examples are provided below. See infra notes
342-51.
321. See supra Part II.B.
322. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a)-(b) (2000).
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meaning from the limited focus of the original 1922 enactment as well as from the
narrow stated purpose of the 1948 revisions. Because proposals to broaden the charter
were made but not enacted, the text and legislative history could be read to authorize
the Judicial Conference to work only on staffing and process.
But others might interpret the statute differently-by noting the indeterminacy of
the reference to "legislation" and by pointing to other enactments that provide a role
for the Conference in procedural rulemaking and that oblige it to do so in a public
fashion. Given the words "recommendations for legislation" and the means for public
input on rulemaking, perhaps the Conference has been delegated a broad range of
questions, limited only by a requirement that an issue relate to the federal courts. That
interpretation requires facing the question of what, if any, constraints ought to stem
from within the judiciary, determining to limit itself either because of its own
conception of role, fears of generating negative responses, or concerns that a too-
expansive reading might result in an unconstitutional delegation of power.
Another way to reason about the statute's meaning is to look at practices under it
over the last eighty years. Through analysis of behavior, one could extract implicit
judicial interpretations of the charter, as well as congressional toleration,
encouragement, or ratification of specific Conference practices. To do so requires both
cataloguing the issues and determining how to decide whether a particular question is
or is not part of the "business in the courts." 323 As several decisions interpreting the
Rules Enabling Act illustrate, problems emerge about when to characterize a question
as administrative or procedural and when to consider a problem substantive. Many
issues are both procedural and substantive, in that important matters of social policy
are frequently expressed through decisions about process.324
Here, I will focus not on the borderline but on questions readily understood as
substantive. Specifically, I examine Judicial Conference responses to proposals for
congressional enactment of new civil causes of action. Further, my interest is not
whether Congress asked for commentary by the judiciary-which it does sometimes
but not always. 325 Rather, the question is how the judiciary shaped its own practices
about when to voice approval or disapproval of proposed new causes of action that
would permit litigants not otherwise before the federal courts to bring lawsuits.
Before embarking on this analysis, I should note that other topics merit inquiry,
including the allocation of cases within the federal courts,326 as well as the allocation
323. I explore some of these issues in Judith Resnik, Programmatic Judiciary, 74 S. CAL. L.
REv. 269, 291-93 (2000) [hereinafter Resnik, Programmatic Judiciary].
324. See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965); John Ely, The Necklace, 87 HARV. L.
REv. 753 (1984).
325. See, e.g., 1952 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 28 (Spec. Sess. Mar. 1952) (noting the
Conference's distress that, on several occasions, the Congress had considered matters "in which
the Judiciary had a very vital interest" without obtaining input from the Conference). The kinds
of matters were not specified. See generally Charles Gardner Geyh, Paradise Lost, Paradigm
Found: Redefining the Judiciary's Imperiled Role in Congress, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1165, 1196
(1996) [hereinafter, Geyh, Redefining the Judiciary's Imperiled Role] (describing how the
judiciary "professes" never to speak about pending legislation outside annual conference reports
except at the request of a member of Congress).
326. As noted supra note 279, in 1922-23, the Conference considered the question of the
docket of the Supreme Court. Chief Justice Taft was a major proponent of shifting that Court's
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of cases between federal non-Article III courts (such as administrative agencies) and
the Article III judiciary. 327 Moreover, commentary aimed at augmenting staff, adding
judges, and the like also has political implications. And the longstanding attitude of
judges to think themselves policymakers on detention, incarceration, and prisons is
another subject area worthy of exploration. 328
Diversity jurisdiction is yet another example, which does not fit squarely within the
focus on new federal civil causes of action, yet has been an important source of access
to the federal courts, which once had lawmaking power in diversity cases. The decision
jurisdiction towards cases chosen from certiorari petitions, and he and other justices helped to
draft the legislation. How to characterize what, if anything, the Judicial Conference did, is a
question. According to the report of the meetings, "[w]hile no formal action was taken by the
conference with regard to these bills, the consensus of opinion was that the changes therein
provided for were advisable and should be put into effect." Memorandum offirst two meetings,
1922-23, supra note 314, at 2,2 TEX. L. REv. at 459. One could read this description as evidence
of the Conference's self-restraint in using its collective voice or as evidence of its willingness to
state a "consensus" of support about legislation that would affect whether certain litigants had
access, as of right, to the Supreme Court. Further, the Conference's position might also have
been understood to be irrelevant in that the pressure to shift the allocation of cases within the
federal courts and to remove many cases from the Supreme Court's mandatory docket came
from the Supreme Court justices themselves as a cohort. See supra notes 283, 285.
327. As to the question of specialized courts and the allocation of cases between agencies and
courts, initially, the Conference was leery of remitting litigants to non-Article III courts. For
example, in the 1940s, the Conference objected to proposals to shift work to "railroad courts."
See 1941 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 8 (Sept. 1941). The Conference also objected to
suggestions to create a general Administrative Court. See 1949 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT
20-22 (Sept. 1949). But in the 1950s, the Conference also became more protective of its own
dockets. For example, the Conference objected to proposals to shift complaints of unfair labor
practices from the NLRB to the district courts. See 1954 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 33
(Sept. 1954); 1955 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 276 (App., Spec. Sess., Mar. 1955).
More recently, the Conference has become a major proponent of shifting cases, when
possible, to non-Article III courts. For example, 1995, the Conference endorsed the placement
of more federal benefit litigation in non-Article III tribunals. See LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note
5, reprinted in 166 F.R.D. 49, 94 (1995) (Recommendation 10: "Where constitutionally
permissible, Congress should be encouraged to assign to administrative agencies or Article I
courts the initial responsibility for adjudicating those categories of federal benefit or regulatory
cases that typically involve intensive fact-finding.").
328. The activity of sentencing was once conceived as uniquely the province of the individual
judge, who, when acting within the scope of statutes setting very broad parameters, was not
required to give reasons for particular sentences. Further, the decisions were generally not
reviewable. Sentencing was thus a peculiarly individualized act, for which judges had no obligation
of developing common law. Archival materials indicate that judges saw it as their preserve,
objecting to proposals including appellate review of sentencing and legislative oversight. But
judges were not successful in warding off congressional intervention, and since the 1980s, when
Congress enacted the federal sentencing guidelines, a commission sets permissible parameters from
which judges can only depart by stating reasons. Sentencing decisions now result from articulated
policies that are to be applied across a spectrum of individuals. Criteria focus on the nature of the
offense and certain facts about defendants. Not only are trial judges' judgments circumscribed by
the guidelines but appellate review is also available to police adherence. Such changes in the
practices of sentencing illustrate how issues can shift from being understood as exclusively the
subject of case-by-case decisionmaking to the realm of legislative policy.
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of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins329 constrained that behavior, and since then, diversity
jurisdiction has had more limited parameters. As noted, in the 1930s, the Conference
did not take an institutional position opposing proposals to limit federal diversity
jurisdiction.33 ° By the 1950s, however, the Judicial Conference was proffering a
corporate comment, affirming its commitment to this "historic" form of federal
jurisdiction, 3 while recommending that Congress increase the jurisdictional amount
required and deem corporations citizens of both their states of incorporation and their
principal places of business.332 Further, under the guidance of Chief Justice Warren,
the Conference supported a broader inquiry, to be undertaken by the American Law
Institute ("ALl"), on the respective charters of the state and federal courts. 333
Describing diversity as the "most controversial" head of jurisdiction, the 1969 ALl
Study proposed both its retention but also some curtailment.334 Not until 1977, under
the leadership of Chief Justice Burger, did the Judicial Conference reverse its support
for diversity jurisdiction and propose its almost complete abolition.335
But for the purposes here, a narrower focus is useful. What injuries ought to be
recognized as legally cognizable harms that the most visible judges within our polity
ought to address? The Judicial Conference's positions about admitting or excluding
new litigants to the federal courts are readily perceived as high-stakes questions. The
phrase "making a federal case out of it," which entered common parlance during the
middle of the twentieth century, expresses popular sentiments about the import of
falling within federal jurisdiction. 336 Moreover, historically, the Conference has
approached this problem differently, suggesting that judges themselves saw its special
329. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
330. See supra notes 294-95.
331. See 1951 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 27-28 (Sept. 1951).
332. Id. See also 1952 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 15 (Sept. 1952); 1955 JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE REPORT 275 (App., Spec. Sess. Mar. 1955).
333. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIvIsIoN OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN
STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 1 (1969) (crediting a speech by the Chief Justice in 1959 about the
need to assign cases to each system that would be "most appropriate in light of the basic
principles of federalism" as prompting its decision to undertake the project). It was also under
Chief Justice Warren that the Judicial Conference became more active in opposing specific
proposals to vest federal courts with certain kinds ofjurisdiction.
334. Id. at 3-4. As to federal question jurisdiction, the ALI Study supported altering the
removal provision and abolishing the amount in controversy requirement. Id. In 1971 the
Judicial Conference endorsed legislation implementing some of the ALI proposals. See 1971
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 79 (Oct. 1971); 1973 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 48 (Sept.
1973).
335. See 1977 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 8 (Mar. 1977); see also 1978 JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE REPORT 8 (Mar. 1978) (proposing also that, if diversity jurisdiction were retained,
new limitations be imposed).
336. See ERIC PARTRIDGE, A DICTIONARY OF CATCH PHRASES 52 (1977) (defining the phrase
to mean "Don't exaggerate the importance of something" and dating it from 1950). A review of
data-based court opinions suggests that judges used that phrase in the 1960s and occasionally
thereafter. See, e.g., Braden v. Texas A. & M. Univ. Sys., 363 F.2d 90, 93 (5th Cir. 1981) (per
curiam) ("Just as Section 1983 does not create a cause of action for every state-action tort, it
does not make a federal case out of every breach of contract by a state agency") (citations
omitted).
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freight. Further, unlike some topics that judges may gain special insight into through
doing their daily work,337 the issue of what new cases should be eligible to become part
of that work is not a topic about which they can claim unique knowledge. While judges
may have preferences about what kinds of cases they enjoy or find cumbersome and
while they may have political or legal views about how a wise legislator ought to
allocate federal judicial time, they do not possess factual information about what has
yet to come before them.
Turning then to the historical record on whether the Conference ought to take
positions, three general responses can be found within the history of Conference
practices.338 A first is to pass-to decline comment on particular provisions because
they were a "matter of policy" not proper for the judiciary. That posture was embraced
repeatedly for about the first quarter of the Conference's existence. With the important
exceptions of sentencing339 and habeas corpus, 340 the Conference declined to comment
on which litigants ought to be able to be heard by the federal courts.
A second approach is to comment selectively on specific kinds of claims. For
example, beginning in the 1950s, the judiciary occasionally argued that particular
kinds of cases already within its domain could be shifted to other institutions. The
Conference recommended that federal judicial authority over seamen's wages be
337. Compare, for example, the question of certiorari jurisdiction to the Supreme Court,
revised in the 1920s and discussed supra note 273. An argument for judicial participation could
rest on expertise. In 1922, the nine members of the Supreme Court had firsthand information
about processing cases required to be decided under the mandatory docket. See, e.g., Procedure
in Federal Courts, Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 25-27 (1924)
(testimony of Justice Van Devanter) (describing the increase in cases, growing from 526 in 1913
to 720 in 1923, as well as how the justices reviewed petitions).
338. Special thanks are owed to Anya McMurray and Anna Rich, who have joined me in
reading and rereading Judicial Conference Reports as we developed an understanding of the
items on the agenda and of the positions taken.
339. During some eras, sentencing might have been conceptualized as so idiosyncratic as to
be drained of qualities of policymaking, but since the sentencing guidelines, it is more difficult
to conceptualize sentencing in that fashion. See supra note 328. Under Chief Justice Taft's
leadership, the Conference addressed the need for uniformity in sentencing of probation
violators. Yet, according to Burton, Taft "was careful of the Constitution and continued to hold
that the meetings ofjudges should be confined largely to 'an examination of ajudge's capacity
to dispose of his caseload."' BURTON, supra note 285, at 128. Also under that rubric came
concerns for material provisions for judges, such as the need for district judges to have libraries.
Id.
340. See, e.g., A Bill to Amend§ 2254, Hearings on H.R. 5649 Before Subcomm. No.3 of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (June 8, June 24, 1955) at 2-11 (statement
of John Parker, chair of the Judicial Conference Committee) (objecting that, because of the
Supreme Court's holding in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953), state prisoners had too much
access, resulting in a "flood of applications" to federal courts and causing friction between state
and federal courts) [hereinafter, 1955 Habeas Corpus Hearings]. Thurgood Marshall, then
special counsel to the NAACP, took exception to the position, proffered by Judge Parker, that
the bills did not pose substantial access problems. Id. at 78-81 (testifying that "the net effect of
the proposed bill" would be "completely to eliminate the power of Federal courts to entertain
habeas corpus petitions filed by State prisoners to test the constitutionality of the State
proceedings which have resulted in their conviction of crime"). See also Winkle, supra note 24
(discussing efforts of the judiciary to limit prisoners' access).
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reassigned to an administrative body. 34 I Further, the Judicial Conference was
repeatedly both attentive to and unwelcoming of prisoner petitions.342 In addition, the
judiciary objected to a series of congressional proposals that federal courts become
involved in enforcement of state-ordered alimony and child support.343
On the other hand, in 1953, when a bill proposed a civil action against those
attempting to bribe government employees, the Conference, relying on conclusions of
one of its committees, took a different view. The Conference concluded that, because
"this bill deals with a subject matter, the creation of a new civil case of action" it
involved "the determination of public policy" for the legislature, not the judicial
branch. 3 " In 1961, when the Bureau of Budget sought comments on pending
amendments to the Interstate Commerce Act, the Judicial Conference demurred, noting
that the "methods of enforcing" that Act "would appear to involve a question of policy
for the Congress and the Executive Branch" and therefore that comment was not
"appropriate. 345 In 1963, when new civil rights acts were proposed, the Conference
declined to comment on the "general questions of policy involved in the legislation. 346
In 1970, the Conference perceived creation of federal jurisdiction for certain types of
consumer class actions to be "primarily a matter of legislative policy." 347
Under this selective approach, the Conference sometimes opposed and sometimes
supported bills granting, divesting, or limiting jurisdiction. 348 Sometimes, the
341. See 1951 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 29-30 (Sept. 1951). As mentioned (supra note
332), in that year, the Conference also revisited the question of diversity jurisdiction and
recommended its retention, but with an increase in the amount in controversy. Id. at 27. See also
1952 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 18 (Sept. 1952) (again recommending approval of bills
shifting decision making about the disposition of wages and effects of seamen out of federal
courts); id. at 15 (again recommending some additional limitations on diversity jurisdiction).
342. See, e.g., 1954 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 22-23 (Sept. 1954) (circulating a
recommendation by a Conference Committee for legislation limiting state prisoners' filings in
federal courts); 1955 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 271-272 (App., Spec. Sess. Mar. 1955)
(reporting that a "large number of judges" expressed unqualified approval of the
recommendation by the Conference's committee on limiting filings); 1955 JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE REPORT 23 (Sept. 1955) (renewing support for leiglsation limiting habeas
applicants to federal courts); supra note 340.
343. See, e.g., 1957 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 37 (App., Spec. Sess. Mar. 1957); 1959
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 35-36 (Sept. 1959); 1961 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 23
(Spec. Sess. Mar. 1961); 1963 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 73 (Sept. 1963); 1977 JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE REPORT 53 (Sept. 1977); 1981 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 64-65 (Sept. 1981).
344. 1953 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 14 (Spec. Sess. Mar., 1953) (also printed in some
editions of the Report at 232 (App., Spec. Sess. Mar. 1953).
345. 1961 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 79 (Sept. 1961).
346. 1963 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 74 (Sept. 1963).
347. 1970 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 13 (Sept. 1970). See also id. at 78 (declining to
comment on consumer protection legislation as it involved "legislative policy on which the
Conference should take no action"); 1971 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 79 (Oct. 1971) (taking
no position on a series of bills as they "involve basically a matter of legislative policy on which
the Conference should not express an opinion"); 1973 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 48 (Sept.
1973) (declining to comment on proposals for consumers that related to the powers of the
Federal Trade Commission and the availability of class actions).
348. See, e.g., 1958 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 264 (Spec. Sess. Mar. 1958)
(disapproving of a proposal to prevent federal courts from hearing challenges to decisions to bar
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Conference proffered as a justification for any comment the impact a bill would have
on workload,349 and sometimes it added a comment on workload while declining to
reach the "merits.,,35° And, beginning in the 1950s, the Conference started to identify
kinds of cases or claimants that it deemed inappropriate, with brief comments that
either the cases were wrong for the courts, the courts wrong for the cases, or the kind
of filing lacked historical antecedents.351
A third option is to have a general approach-either for or against-the creation of
federal remedies located in the federal courts. Examples of such a posture are more
recent, beginning during the leadership of Chief Justice Warren Burger and coming to
fruition under Chief Justice William Rehnquist. Chief Justice Burger initiated the
practice of making annual "state of the judiciary" addresses to Congress.352 During his
tenure, the AO also created a subdivision focused on legislative affairs. 353 And, as
noted, it was under Chief Justice Burger that the Judicial Conference first advocated
abolition of diversity jurisdiction.354
Since assuming the position of Chief Justice, William Rehnquist has used the
platform provided by the annual address to protest or to warn against congressional
provisions of new jurisdiction to the federal courts.355 During his tenure, the AO began
a person from practicing law because of "subversive, criminal, or corrupt activities" or "refusal
to answer questions in a state judicial, legislative, or executive inquiry").
349. See, e.g., 1977 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 53 (Sept. 1977) (citing workload
problems when opposing legislation enabling unemancipated minors to have a federal right to
support from parents).
350. See, e.g., 1963 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 74 (Sept. 1963) (declining to comment on
the desirability of enacting new civil rights legislation, and noting that the provisions would
increase filings somewhat but that it would "not impose an unreasonable burden on the federal
courts"); 1973 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 48 (Sept. 1973) (declining to comment on
consumer bills because the issues "involved primarily legislative policy upon which the Judicial
Conference should not comment, except to urge Congress to consider the impact upon the
federal courts which such legislation would have").
351. See, e.g., 1959 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 8 (Sept. 1959) (disapproving of a
proposal to transfer unfair labor practices from the NLRB to the district courts on the grounds
that "it would enlarge the jurisdiction ... to embrace litigation of controversies of a type and
character which the district courts are not organized or equipped to adjudicate and for which
there appears no historical precedent"); 1975 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 50 (Sept. 1975)
(disapproving of legislation that would provide for claims relating to unfair consumer practices
and noting that "Congress should be advised that this legislation would alter the fundamental
character of the federal courts as courts of limited jurisdiction and that the Conference does not
regard the United States district courts as the proper forum for action under such legislation.").
352. See Warren E. Burger, ChiefJustice Recaps, 1995 in Year-End Report, THIRD BRANCH,
Special Issue, Jan., 1996 at I (describing Chief Justice Burger's initiation of that practice).
Those statements are not official policy of the Judicial Conference.
353. AO HISTORY, supra note 303, at 87 (describing the beginnings in 1976 of the Office of
Legislative Analyses, subsequently termed the Office of Legislative Affairs).
354. See 1977 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 8 (Mar. 1977) (approving legislation to abolish
diversity jurisdiction except in narrow circumstances), discussed supra note 335.
355. See, e.g., ChiefJustice Rehnquist Reflects on 1994 in Year-End Report, THIRD BRANCH,
Jan. 1995 at 1-4 (reprinting the 1994 speech in which the Chief Justice summarized and
explained when he thought judicial comments and proposals were appropriate); id. at 3
(describihg the Judicial Conference's opposition to health care reforms that would locate too
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to provide "judicial impact statements" that predicted what effects proposed legislation
would have on the federal judiciary.3 6 And, as noted, under his leadership in 1995, the
Judicial Conference issued its first-ever Long Range Plan, a document setting forth the
judiciary's "core values and mission" 35 7 in an effort to establish goals for the future of
federal courts and provide "an integrated vision and valuable framework for policy
making" for the Conference.358
That monograph offered more than ninety specific recommendations and more than
seventy "implementation strategies," endorsed officially by the Judicial Conference, as
well as a good deal of commentary, not specifically endorsed by the Conference. 359 As
to new federal rights, the Long Range Plan advised against new enactments if
accompanied by enforcement in federal court. Specifically, Congress was to be
encouraged to exercise restraint in the enactment of new statutes that assign civil
jurisdiction to the federal courts and to do so only to further clearly defined and
justified federal interests. 360 As to what "clearly defined and justified federal interests"
included, the Long Range Plan listed cases arising under the Constitution; those that
"deserve adjudication in a federal judicial forum" because the states cannot
"satisfactorily" deal with them and they involve either "strong need for uniformity" or
"paramount federal interests;" disputes about foreign relations, government units or
officials as litigants; disputes among states, and disputes affecting substantial
international or interstate interests.
361
No mention was made about the desirability of developing new kinds of federal
many cases in federal courts and the "considerable sentiment in the federal judiciary... against
further expansion of federal jurisdiction") [hereinafter Rehnquist 1994 Report]; William H.
Rehnquist, 1996 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, THIRD BRANCH, Jan. 1997 at 1, 3
(supporting the proposed statutory limitations on prisoner filings then pending); William H.
Rehnquist, 1998 Year-End Report of the Federal Judiciary, THIRD BRANCH, Jan. 1999 at 1, 2
(criticizing the "trend to federalize crimes that traditionally have been handled in state courts" as
"threaten[ing] to change entirely the nature of our federal system") [hereinafter Rehnquist 1998
Report]. The History of the Administrative Office, which provides an overview, director by
director, of the Administrative Office, also commented on the shift in approach under the
leadership of the current Director, Ralph Mecham, appointed by the Chief Justice; the report
captures that attitude with the title of the chapter, "Better Advocacy of Third Branch Needs." See
AO HISTORY, supra note 303, at 151.
356. Given the many variables, the ability to make such assessments has been contested. See
CONFERENCE ON ASSESSING THE EFFECTS OF LEGISLATION ON THE WORKLOAD OF THE COURTS:
PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS (A. Fletcher Mangum ed., Federal Judicial Center) (1995).
357. AO HISTORY, supra note 303, at 178.
358. See LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 5, reprinted in 166 F.R.D. 49,51 (1995) (explaining
its purposes in an introductory letter from L. Ralph Mecham, the Director of the Administrative
Office of the U.S. Courts).
359. Director Mecham's letter explained that:
Judicial Conference approval... extends only to the 93 recommendations and 76
implementation strategies. All other text in the Plan, including commentary on the
approved items, serves to explain the drafters' reasoning and provide background
information but does not necessarily reflect the views of the Judicial Conference.
Id.
360. LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 5, reprinted in 166 F.R.D. at 88 (Recommendation 6).
361. Id.
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rights. Rather, in commentary, the Plan counseled that, "[a]bsent a showing that state
courts cannot satisfactorily deal with an issue, Congress should be hesitant to enact
new. legislation enforceable in the federal courts, and should not do so in any event
without a concomitant reduction of federal jurisdiction in other areas. 3 62 And the Plan
proposed that "[a]ny new cooperative federal-state program to establish national
standards for employee benefits (e.g., health care) should designate state courts as the
primary forum for review of benefit denial claims. 36 a
In support of its recommendations that Congress ought not lodge enforcement of
yet-to-be specified rights in federal courts, the Long Range Plan offered two central
rationales. A first, based on a perceived threat to the collegiality and law making
abilities of the Article III judiciary, was to keep the number of life-tenured judges
down. 364 The demand for more judges came from workload demands, and the
Conference proposed fewer cases rather than more life-tenured judgeships. In addition
to urging restraint in conferring jurisdiction, the Conference also made specific
suggestions about assigning certain disputes to federal agencies365 and devolving as
much as permissible to magistrate and bankruptcy judges.366 The second reason for
declining to create federal rights was explained as stemming from the Conference's
understanding of the desirable allocations of power within this federation. The
Conference read the nation's Constitution and history as preferring states to the federal
government as the primary source of rights and remedies.367 Picking among competing
strands of constitutional theory about state and national governance,3 68 the Plan
stressed what it termed "the more fundamental constitutional principle that the national
government is a government of delegated powers in which the residual power remains
in the states."
369
In sum, over its history, the Judicial Conference has deployed three different
362. Id. at 88-89.
363. Id. at 96 (Recommendation 12c) (also recommending that administrative exhaustion be
required before filings are permitted in state courts).
364. Id. at 77-80 (describing different scenarios of growth and expansion, termed
"troubling," and imposing "the greatest loss ... [to] the notion of courts as collegial bodies").
365. See, e.g., id. at 94 (Recommendation 10) ("Where constitutionally permissible,
Congress should be encouraged to assign to administrative agencies or Article I courts the initial
responsibility for adjudicating those categories of federal benefits or regulatory cases that
typically involve intensive fact-finding").
366. Id. at 107-09 (Recommendations 21-23) (relating to powers of magistrate and
bankruptcy judges and calling for study of the bankruptcy appellate panels and limiting appeals
when magistrate judges preside by consent at trials); id. at 101 (Recommendation 65) (proposing
using magistrate judges to the extent constitutionally permissible).
367. See id. at 81-83.
368. As many scholars have discussed, many visions of the proper allocations of state and
federal authority exist. See L.auren Robel, Impermeable Federalism, Pragmatic Silence, and the
Long Range Plan for the Federal Courts, 71 IND. L.J. 841, 841-44, 849-51 (1996) (criticizing
the Plan's arguments on federalism to demonstrate that they are neither "historically mandated
nor constitutionally required"). See also Richard Fallon, The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law,
74 VA. L. REv. 1141, 1224-25 (1988) (outlining the differing predicates of preferences for state
and federal governance and citing an array of Supreme Court decisions supporting each
alternative).
369. LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 5, reprinted in 166 F.R.D. at 81.
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approaches towards commenting on how to shape national policies about creating and
enforcing new rights. How might one determine which of these different attitudes is
the best interpretation of the congressional mandate to Congress or the best use of the
judicial branch's voice? As I read the statute and its history, the basic charter of the
Conference remains close to the original charge, focused on judgeships, dockets, and
court management. The text and the legislative history of both the initial grant and the
amendments broadening the Conference's membership (to include judges from the
D.C. Circuit and the district courts) point to a narrow understanding of what Congress
meant when referring to the "business" 370 of the judiciary and "legislation dealing with
the judiciary, '37' rather than one encompassing proposed legislation creating causes of
action.
On the other hand, Congress has not reined in the Conference when it has moved
outside those parameters. Moreover, members of Congress have frequently solicited
the Conference's opinion on particular proposals, and many argue that the courts and
Congress need to improve their means of communication.372 Thus, both text and
practices permit interpretative choices. My approach comes not only from a view of
what constitutes a better reading of the statute, but also from constitutional and
political theories about the desirability of separated powers. When attempting to shape
its own docket through proposing that some claimants, but not others, hold federally
enforceable rights, the judiciary puts its own legitimacy at risk.
IV. THE PROBLEMS OF LIFE-TENURED PRINCIPALS
In a recent essay, I offered the term "programmatic judiciary"3 73 to capture the
current posture of the federal judiciary's leadership, forwarding its vision of what
kinds of rights Congress ought to make enforceable in federal courts. Here, I elaborate
on some of the problems generated by a programmatic judiciary.
A. Comparing the Judiciary's "Policy Predilection074 and Its Judgments
One concern is that the role of the judiciary as commentator cannot be kept discrete
from the role of the judiciary as adjudicator. In the late 1930s, after the Court had
come under attack, the Administrative Office was formed. 375 A question emerged
about that new office's relationship to the Supreme Court. Some feared that, were all
members of the Court to become involved in the administrative apparatus, decisions
made at the administrative level would be attributed to the Court. If unpopular or ill-
370. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2000).
371. See H.R. REP. No. 172, supra note 307, at 3.
372. See generally JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS: TOWARD INSTITUTIONAL COMITY (Robert A.
Katzmann ed. 1988).
373. Resnik, Programmatic Judiciary, supra note 323, at 283-93. See also Resnik, Trial as
Error, supra note 88, at 1024-3 1.
374. Johnson v. Collins Entm't Co., Inc., 199 F.3d 710, 730 (4th Cir. 1999) (Luttig, J.,
concurring).
375. See Pub. L. No. 299, 53 Stat. 1223 (Aug. 7, 1939), codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §
601 et seq.
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advised, those decisions could tarnishjudicial authority. Overtime, the Chief Justice
became the sole member of the Supreme Court to have the power to appoint and
remove the Director of that office.377 Similarly, associate justices have no official role
in the Judicial Conference.378
That separation has served to insulate eight justices of the Supreme Court from the
work of both the Administrative Office and the Judicial Conference. But the Chief
Justice is understood as having a great deal of authority over the administrative wing
of the federal judiciary. His power appears secure from intervention by other justices
and, thus far, from Congress. Only a few rebellions by lower court Judicial Conference
judges against the Chief Justice have come to public light.379 But the problem of
drawing connections between the policy of the Conference and the judgments of the
Chief Justice on the Court has not been solved. Indeed, overlap between the views of
the Chief Justice and the policies of the Judicial Conference can be found on several
issues. 380 The years in which the Judicial Conference has been most active in opposing
creation of new civil claims coincide with the years in which the presiding Chief
Justice was appointed by Republican Presidents, was himself identified with hesitancy
about vigorous federal rights enforcement, and has succeeded in marshalling majorities
on the Court to limit federal adjudication. 8
Further, as the Judicial Conference becomes more active and opines on legislative
proposals to create or to constrict rights, commentators can compare advice from the
judiciary's administrative component with decisions rendered not only by the Supreme
Court but from lower court judges. Maintaining distinctions between adjudication and
policymaking becomes difficult, as was discussed in an intriguing exchange between
two members (J. Harvie Wilkinson III and Michael Luttig) of the Fourth Circuit, ruling
376. Peter G. Fish, William Howard Taft and Charles Evans Hughes: Conservative
Politicians as Chief Judicial Reformers, 1975 SUP. CT. REv. 123, 141-42 (noting also Chief
Justice Hughes's concern that problems or scandals in any federal court might reflect badly on
the Chief Justice if judicial administration were too centralized).
377. See 28 U.S.C. § 601 (describing the Administrative Office, supervised by a "Director
and a Deputy Directory appointed and subject to removal by the Chief Justice of the United
States, after consulting with the Judicial Conference").
378. See 28 U.S.C. § 331.
379. See Linda Greenhouse, Vote Is A Rebufffor ChiefJustice, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1990 at
A16 (describing the Chief Justice's endorsement of a proposal limiting federal appeals from
prisoners on death row and the rejection of his approach by the Judicial Conference and
commenting that the disagreement reflected "a deep ideological split within the Federal
judiciary, with judges appointed in a more liberal era still holding leadership positions on the
lower courts even as the Supreme Court itself [came to be] 'dominated by conservatives').
380. Compare Rehnquist 1994 Report, supra note 355, at 2-3 (explaining why he thought
judicial commentary on federal rights to be appropriate), andRehnquist 1998 Report, supra note
355, at 1-2 (objecting to the federalization of crime and describing the importance of federalism
and of state court enforcement of rights) with LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 5, reprinted in 166
F.R.D. 49, 81-83 (1995) (providing a statement of federalism), and id. at 84-88 (opposing the
federalization of crime).
381. Moreover, the activities of the Chief Justice and centralization ofjudicial authority can
affect how the Court conceives of and does its work. See Robert Post, The Supreme Court
Opinion as an Institutional Practice: Dissent, Legal Scholarship, and Decisionmaking in the
Taft Court, 85 MiNN. L. REv. 1267 (2001).
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on a question of federal jurisdiction.382 Both jurists are understood to be sympathetic to
limitations on federal power. Both agreed about the substantive outcome in the case-
that a federal court ought to stay its hand (under an equitable abstention doctrine
known as "Burford Abstention" 383) and defer to state processes. Therefore, they agreed
that an injunction against operators of video poker (alleged to have violated federal
racketeering and state trade and lottery laws) had to be reversed and the case dismissed
from the federal docket.384
As the majority decision written by Judge Wilkinson put it, the district court had
impermissibly entered the "treacherous waters of state political controversy. 3 85 The
trial court had erred by "attempting to answer disputed questions of state gaming law
that so powerfully impact the welfare of South Carolina citizens. 38 6 That judge had
interfered with a state regulatory scheme that was at the "heart of the state's police
power."387 Invoking Grupo Mexicano, the court commented on the specially
constrained status of federal equitable powers, invoked by the district court but without
a "federal statute [that] expressly authorizes the relief... sought.
3 8
While agreeing that Burford abstention was proper,389 Judge Luttig wrote a separate
concurrence. He argued that the majority had erred in its overly-expansive explication
of the abstention doctrine and in its leveling undeserved "criticism" against the district
court.390 Specifically, Judge Luttig identified the majority's underlying premise to be
"that statutes conferring jurisdiction on the federal courts should be interpreted very
narrowly and, correspondingly, prudential exceptions to such congressionally
conferred jurisdiction construed very broadly, to the end that federal courts remain
tribunals of limited jurisdiction." 391
382. Johnson v. Collins Entm't Co., Inc., 199 F.3d 710 (4th Cir. 1999).
383. See Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943). That equitable doctrine provides that
if an issue involves problems governed by a comprehensive state regulatory and administrative
system, federal courts ought to stay their proceedings to avoid disrupting integrated state
processes. In subsequent cases at the Supreme Court level, efforts to ground abstention on
Burford have often been rejected, resulting in a view that the doctrine has limited applications.
See, e.g., New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of the City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350,
358-63 (1989).
384. Johnson, 199 F.3d at 715 (majority decision); id. at 729 (Luttig, J., concurring). The
case had been filed by individuals, described as "habitual gamblers," in state court. Defendants
had removed to federal court and, when confronted with a request for injunctive relief, sought
abstention. Id. at 717-18.
385. Id. at 721.
386. Id. at 720.
387. Id. at 715.
388. Id. at 726-27 (explaining that, without "a solid foundation in statute for its remedy and
with the substantial risk of compromising the independence of state regulatory policy and
efforts, the case was a classic one for exercise of" abstention). The district court had entered a
permanent injunction based on its "inherent equitable power." Id. at 718.
389. Judge Luttig's concurrence saw the question of abstention as much "closer" than did the
majority. Id. at 732 (Luttig, J., concurring) (noting that the defendants had both removed the
case and sought abstention and arguing that the RICO claims, which were arguably "principal
claims" raised, could not be assumed to be pretextual).
390. Id. at 732-33 (Luttig, J., concurring) (quoting about a dozen examples).
391. Id. at 729.
2003]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Judge Luttig described this position as "accepted and advanced by many on the
bench," as well as "understandable and reasonable given the trend toward
federalization. ' 392 But he described that view as "one of policy, not law itself' and
therefore not one that could "permissibly influence our interpretation of statutes or...
prudential exceptions. 393 Further, he argued, judges ought not construe statutes
narrowly or expansively because of their own disagreement with congressional
decisions that federal courthouse "doors should be open to such disputes, [for, ifl the
Congress sees fit to provide citizens with a particular cause of action, then we as
federal courts should entertain that action-and unbegrudingly. 3 94
The Luttig concurrence called the majority to task for its "over use of... particular
rhetorical sound-bites," the consequence of which was that "the court could fairly be
seen as having decided this case based solely upon its policy predilections.' 39 The
concurrence cited an opinion essay, Fear of Federalism, written by Judge Wilkinson
and published in the Washington Post a month before the Fourth Circuit's ruling.3l
The essay criticized congressional grants of jurisdiction that had "invade[d] the
province of domestic relations law," which he argued belonged to the states. The
reference was to the Violence Against Women Act ("VAWA"), the constitutionality of
which was then pending before the Supreme Court.39 7 Judge Wilkinson described the
"sad linkage of states' rights and racial segregation, 39 but argued that local
government, rather than national laws, provided the best hope of diminishing racial
and ethnic conflict by fostering civic loyalties through "[mJicro-allegiances. ' 9 He
concluded that the "great contribution of the Rehnquist Court" would be to "change
the national attitude toward the rightful role of states.' "
Judge Wilkinson contrasted the "blunderbuss solutions of a centralized
bureaucracy'4 with local innovations, said to create diversity of policies.4 2 Recent
392. Id.
393. Id.
394. Id. at 729 (invoking and citing Justice Frankfurter, who had been the author of another
famous abstention doctrine-R.R. Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941)).
Dissenting in Burford, Justice Frankfurter commented that, were he a member of the legislature,
he might be opposed to diversity jurisdiction, but that, as ajurist, he ought not to abstain. Rather,
he "must decide this case as a judge and not as a legislative reformer." Burford v. Sun Oil Co.,
319 U.S. 315, 337 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
395. Johnson, 199 F.3d at 730 (Luttig, J., concurring) (providing, in support of his argument,
several quotes from the majority) (emphasis in original).
396. See J. Harvie Wilkinson, III, Fear of Federalism, WASH. POST, Nov. 26, 1999 at A45.
The Johnson decision was issued on Dec. 27, 1999. See Johnson, 199 F.3d at 710.
397. See Wilkinson, supra note 396, at A45. The Court had agreed to review a Fourth Circuit
decision, Brzonkala v. Virginia. Polytechnic Institute, 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999) (en banc),
that had held unconstitutional the civil rights remedy of the Violence Against Women Act. After
Judge Wilkinson wrote, the Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit holding that Congress lacked the
power to create a civil rights remedy. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
398. See Wilkinson, supra note 396, at A45.
399. Id.
400. Id.
401. Id.
402. Judge Wilkinson did not argue that all problems could be solved by the "atomistic
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empiricism undermines his assumption that local decision necessarily engenders
diverse responses. One powerful study demonstrates the degree to which a few
national and transnational conglomerates provide a great many of the "local" services
in states. Examples range from prisons to garbage collection, controlled from state to
state by relatively few corporate actors.4 °3 Others chart the degree to which state
judicial elections are also infused with national funds and affected by national
campaigns.
4 4
But Judge Luttig did not object to his colleague's descriptions as erroneously
projecting a pastoral image onto the landscape of federalism. Instead, he warned him
against what might metaphorically be described as tipping his hand. Of course, I
cannot know of the prior discussions between the jurists nor of the motives of ajudge,
agreeing with concerns about the harms of "federalization" and on the merits of a case,
deciding to write a detailed concurrence, identifying with specificity a dozen or so
sentences to which he objected. But I can understand the weight of his concerns. For
once the activities of lobbying on jurisdiction are taken into account, the convergence
between policy positions and adjudication of a specific case is disquieting.
For example, in the 1995 Long Range Plan, the Judicial Conference argued against
the "federalization" of crime,405 and in the same year, the Supreme Court ruled in
United States v. Lopez that Congress lacked the power under the Commerce Clause to
create a federal crime for possession of a gun within a certain distance of schools.0 6
The 1995 Long Range Plan insisted on the primacy of states, and a few years later a
majority of the Supreme Court elaborated that premise to craft an expansive view of
sovereign immunity.4 °7
Similarly, the decision in United States v. Morrison40 8 was not the first time in
which the federal judiciary opined that violence against women was not a problem for
decision-making of the market," Id.
403. Joshua Civin, Outsourcing Federalism: Privatization, Devolution, and the Market for
Public Services (Jan. 2003) (on file with the author).
404. See, e.g., Anthony Champagne, National Summit on Improving Judicial Selection:
Interest Groups and Judicial Elections, 34 Loy. L,A. L. REv. 1391, 1405-07 (2001) (detailing
ideological interest groups active in contributing to judicial elections in many states); Anthony
Champagne, Political Parties and Judicial Elections, 34 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1411, 1424 (2001)
(citing races in Texas, Alabama, Michigan, and Ohio).
405. See LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 5, reprinted in 166 F.R.D. 49, 84-85 (1995)
(Recommendation 2) ("In principle, criminal activity should be prosecuted in a federal court
only in those instances in which state court prosecution is not appropriate or where federal
interests are paramount."). See also William H. Rehnquist, Remarks on the Federalization of
Crime, Address to the American Law Institute, May 11, 1998 [hereinafter Rehnquist, 1998 ALl
Address] (citing the Long Range Plan and commenting that "recently passed federal legislation,
and some currently pending legislation" does not meet the Conference's criteria for when federal
criminal legislation was appropriate, and specifically critical of two pending bills on juvenile
crime). See generally Rory K. Little, Myths and Principles of Federalization, 46 HASTINGS L.J.
1029 (1995).
406. 514 U.S. 549, 559-61 (1995).
407. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S.
44 (1996) (developing a new claim that states possess dignitary interests). See also Meltzer, State
Sovereign Immunity, supra note 59, at 1038 n. 111 (describing the recent vintage of the view that
states possessed "dignitary interests" protected by the Constitution).
408. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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the federal courts. The Judicial Conference initially opposed creation of a civil rights
remedy in VAWA. Projections of filings (subsequently shown to be far off the mark)
were submitted to Congress in support of the proposition that the proposed new
remedy would be unduly burdensome. 4°9 Further, the Chief Justice spoke out against
that statute after its enactment, when its constitutionality was before the courts. In
1998, in a speech given at the annual meeting of the ALI, the Chief Justice commented
on VAWA as well as other federal statutes, all of which he described as inappropriate
expansions of federal jurisdiction.410 He argued that "traditional principles of
federalism that have guided this country throughout its existence" meant for such
issues to be governed by state law. Rather than a loyal agent of Congress, he
questioned the quality of its decisionmaking. "One senses from the context in which
[these bills] were enacted that the question of whether the states are doing an adequate
job in this particular area was never seriously asked.",411 (In fact, the legislative record
of VAWA expressly addressed the problems faced by women seeking protection in
state courts from violence and did so by relying, in part, on some twenty reports
prepared at the direction of state judiciaries themselves.) 412 As forecast by his earlier
statements, in 2000, the Chief Justice penned the majority decision holding the civil
rights remedy in VAWA an unconstitutional exercise of congressional commerce and
equal protection powers.413
B. Lobbying the Judiciary
In addition to weakening the legitimacy of adjudication through active policy
pronouncements that suggest decisions stem less from individualized fact finding and
application of legal principles than from views held on general policy, a programmatic
judiciary becomes an attractive venue for those hoping to influence the judiciary's
decisions on what positions to adopt. While classical narratives about the
independence of the judiciary presume that threats stem from the executive and the
legislature, contemporary discussions need to recognize that repeat player litigants
have both interest and means to attempt to influence the judiciary.1 4
409. The initial opposition included reference to an estimate that, were the Act passed, more
than 50,000 cases would be filed annually, some 13,450 of them in federal courts, imposing
more than $62 million in costs and involving thousands of hours of work. See Violence Against
Women: Victims of the System, Hearing on S. 15 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
102d Cong. 10 (1991). See generally Victoria F. Nourse, Where Violence, Relationship, and
Equality Meet: The Violence Against Women Act's Civil Rights Remedy, 11 Wis. WOMEN's L.J.
1 (1996). Subsequently, the Judicial Conference decided to support educational and other aspects
of VAWA and not to take a position on the cause of action. See 1993 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
REPORT 28 (Mar. 1993).
410. See Rehnquist, 1998 ALl Address, supra note 405, at 18.
411. Id.
412. Those reports are listed in Justice Souter's dissent in Morrison, 529 U.S. at 630 n.7.
413. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 601.
414. The challenges of how to respond to such interests are evident in a current high-profile
issue about whether judges ought to accept paid-for trips (sometimes to pleasant locales) to
attend seminars for judges on specific topics, such as law and economics. See William H.
Rehnquist, Remarks at the American Law Institute 4, 5 (May 2001) [hereinafter Rehnquist,
2001 ALIRemarks] (describing the 20/20 television program "about a seminar held last winter
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The classical narratives also assume that the only endpoint of efforts to influence
judges is obtaining a judgment one desires. But the development of a programmatic
and policy-generative judiciary provides another reason: lobbyists seek to affect the
at a resort in Tucson attended by a number of federal judges"). Funding for such programs often
comes from foundations, corporations, or institutes associated with particular points of view.
In 2000, members of Congress proposed legislation to regulate these practices. See Judicial
Education Reform Act of 2000, S. 2990, 106th Cong. (2000) (providing that judges not be
permitted to accept "anything of value in connection with a seminar" and that the Federal
Judicial Center give judges funds only for seminars "conducted in a manner so as to maintain the
public's confidence in an unbiased and fair-minded Judiciary"). A revised proposal is under
consideration. See Statements from Senators John F. Kerry and Russell Feingold, "Judicial
Junkets," ABCnews.com (Apr. 6, 2001) available at http://abcnews.go.com/sections/2020
/2020/2020_010406judges-statement.html (commenting that "at the end of the last Congress,
we introduced legislation... [and hoped] that our bill would finally be enough to trigger action
by the Judicial Branch. It was not. We will introduce new legislation .... "). See also Comments
of Senator Durbin on the Nomination of D. Brooks Smith to be United States Circuit Judge,
107th Cong., 2d Sess. 148 Cong. Rec. 7651, 7654 (July 31, 2002) (expressing his concern about
"Judge Smith's frequent attendance at judicial seminars sponsored by special interest groups and
funded by corporations with litigation pending before his court. Most importantly, he remains
unwilling to report the value of those seminars on his financial disclosure forms .... ").
The Judicial Conference and the Chief Justice objected to the legislative proposal. They
opposed what they termed the "sweeping restrictions on educational programs," and argued that
judicial ethics were not in need of being revisited. Further, they stated that the proposed
statutory limits raised "potential constitutional issues, such as imposing an undue burden on
speech." Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Judicial Conference Opposes
Sweeping Restrictions on Educational Programs (Sept. 19, 2000), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/PressReleases/press09192000.html. See also Rehnquist, 2001 ALl
Remarks, supra, at 5-8 (objecting to the legislation); Administrative Office of the United States
Courts, Existing Judicial Ethics Rules Protect Public Interest (Nov. 29, 2001), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/Press-Releases/ethics.pdf(describing congressional testimony by the
Chair of the Judicial Conference Committee on the Codes of Conduct, appearing before the
House Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property, and arguing that existing
ethical guidelines exist to inform judges who attend "privately funded educational programs").
The American Bar Association ("ABA") has taken up the question of whether it ought to
issue an ethics opinion on the issue. That action inspired opposition from some within the
judiciary and has spawned disagreements about the process by which the ABA drafted a
preliminary opinion. See Jill Hertz Blaustein, Turmoil Over Judges'Expense-Paid Travel, 28
LITIG. NEWS 1 (Nov. 2002) (describing commentary from Marvin Karp who, as Chair of the
ABA's Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, defended the ABA, and
commentary by the Director of AO, who had written a memorandum objecting to the ABA's
"secret activities," argued to have improperly relied on the Community Rights Counsel, an
organization that had released a detailed critical report on judicial involvement in seminars);
James G. Glazebrook, Chair's Column, ABA JUD. Div. REC., Summer 2002 at 28,28 (criticizing
"[o]rganizations with specialized agendas" for "attacking federal judges" who attend seminars
hosted by other organizations, and naming the Community Rights Council and the Alliance for
Justice as leading the attacks and The Foundation for Research on Economics and the
Environment, George Mason University's Law and Economics Center, and the Liberty Fund of
the Manhattan Institute's Center for Legal Policy as the attacked).
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judiciary's promulgation of rules and recommendations. 41 5 Again, the problem is not
only theoretical. The degree to which the federal judiciary has come to be understood
as a forum for policies on access to the federal courts was vivid in the winter of 2002.
A group of lobbyists tried to persuade the Judicial Conference to join efforts to
convince Congress to divest state courts of jurisdiction over class actions, arising
under state law, but involving large sums ofmoney and defendants doing business on a
national scale. The setting was a proposal by an Advisory Committee to the Judicial
Conference to amend the federal class action rule. Congress has, since 1988, obliged
the Judicial Conference to enable public input on proposed rules, 416 which, as noted,
are not supposed to "abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right."4 17 But, of
course, rule changes can have political implications. Thus, the judiciary has the burden
of crafting its own rulemaking boundaries.
In 2002, such an effort came from a subcommittee of the Judicial Conference-the
Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure4 18'-which circulated two
kinds of proposals on class actions for public comments.419 The first, a draft rewording
of Rule 23, proposed textual amendments aimed at increasing judicial control over
attorneys who seek certification of classes and approval of settlements. 420 A second
415. See generally FIGUEIREDO & FIGUEIREDO, supra note 15.
416. See 28 U.S.C. § 2073(a), (c)(1) (2000). Those provisions, part of amendments made in
1988, came in the wake of criticism that the ruledrafting process was too closed. See JACK B.
WEINSTEIN, REFORM OF COURT RULEMAKNG PROCEDURES (1977); Howard Lesnick, The Federal
Rule-Making Process: A TimeforReexamination, 61 A.B.A.J. 579 (1975). Professor Geoffrey Hazard
disagreed, arguing that rulemaking did not often involve issues on which identity-groups had views
and warning against the politicization of the processes. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Undemocratic
Legislation, 87 YALE L.J. 1284 (1978) (reviewing JACK B. WEINSTEIN, REFORM OF COURT
RULEMAKING PROCEDURES (1977)). See generally Robert Bone, The Process of Making Process:
Court Rulemaking, Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887 (1999).
417. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2000).
418. The body is charged with drafting proposals to be reviewed by a Standing Committee on
the Rules of Practice and Procedure and then by the Judicial Conference of the United States.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2073(b) (2000).
419. See Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the
United States, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF
BANKRUPTCY, CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND THE RULES OF EVIDENCE, REQUESTS OF
COMMENT (circulated Aug. 15, 2001) [hereinafter 2001 ADVISORY COMMITrEE DRAFT RULES],
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/proposed021502.htm.
420. Specifically, the proposal called for judicial selection and appointment of class action
lawyers. 2001 ADVISORY COMMIT-EE DRAFT RULES, supra note 419, at 30-42 (proposed section
23(g)); more judicial control over attorney fees and additional requirements for notice of class
certification, id. at 39-50. Also proposed is that more detailed information at settlement be given
to district judges. Id. at 50-69.
The set of proposals offered an interesting effort to respond to many concerns about class
actions. I, like many others, thought some of the interventions well advised and suggested a few
alternatives. For example, the proposed rule addressed the problem of "side settlements" in
which attorneys make agreements for individual clients that differ from those provided for the
class as a whole. Such settlements may be used to convince individual objectors not to oppose a
proposed settlement. The Advisory Committee draft called for such information to be revealed
so that a judge, charged with evaluating a proposed settlement, has relevant information. See
Judith Resnik, Money Matters: Judicial Market Interventions Creating Subsidies andAwarding
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proposal, denominated a "Reporter's Call for Comments," was expressly circulated in
a sub-statutory manner42'-not as a formal rule proposal but rather as a means of
eliciting responses. One question it raised was whether federal judges could, through
Fees and Costs in Individual and Aggregate Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 2119, 2183-85
(2000). See also Testimony of Brian Wolfman, Staff Lawyer, Public Citizen Group, Before the
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States
12-14 (Jan. 22, 2002) (on file with author) (discussing needs for disclosure); Brian Wolfinan,
Letter of Nov. 23, 1999 to the Honorable Anthony J. Scirica, Chair, Standing Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure and to the Hon. Paul V. Niemeyer, Chair, Advisory Committee
on Civil Rules, re: Proposed Amendments to Rule 23(e) Concerning Disclosure and Approval of
Side-Settlements (on file with author) (proposing revised language to Rule 23(e) for disclosure
of all side settlements, including attorney fee agreements).
Commentators on the proposed draft Rule 23 had a range of views. Some objected that the
rulemakers had not gone far enough. See, e.g., Statements of John Bronsteen & Owen Fiss on
the Proposed Amendments to Rule 23 11-17 (Jan. 22, 2002) (on file with author) (calling for
notice to all members of all classes when certified). Members of the plaintiff bar raised concerns
that requiring notice to all classes, at certification, would increase the costs of litigation and deter
the pursuit of needed class actions. See, e.g., Memorandum from Bill L. Lee, Partner, Lieff,
Cabraser, Heiman & Bernstien, to the Civil Rules Advisory Committee 6-7 (Jan. 22, 2002) (on
file with author) (describing the costs of litigating a case involving public transportation in Los
Angeles and comparing the proposal to current provisions, requiring only that class members be
notified if the class is certified as a "B(3)" class, focused on monetary relief).
After these and other hearings on the proposed draft, the Advisory Committee forwarded
somewhat modified proposals to the Standing Committee. See Memorandum of David F. Levi,
Chair, Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules od Civil Procedure, to Anthony J. Scirica,
Chair, Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 89-247 (May 20, 2002) (on file
with author) [hereinafter Advisory Committee May 2002 Report] (also providing summaries of
testimony from the hearings), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/jcoa-2002/
cvrules.JC.pdf. Discussions of the changes made can be found in the May Report. Id. at 114-15,
117-24. For details of the sequence of proposed revisions over more than the decade before, see
id. at 116-17. The commentary on each rule is summarized id. at 125-247.
421. When a rule is formally proposed, the Rules Enabling Act requires notice and comment.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2071(b) (2000). In contrast, the circulation provided on overlapping class
actions was more informal. See Edward H. Cooper, Reporter's Call for Informal Comment:
Overlapping Class Actions 1-2 (Sept. 2001) (on file with author) [hereinafter Reporter's Call for
Comments] (describing the charge to the Reporter, Professor Edward H. Cooper, by the
Advisory Committee to provide an "informal circulation" of possible responses to the
"proliferation of competing and overlapping class suits, pending simultaneously in federal and
state courts"). The draft, designed to elicit comment, had not been "endorsed by the Advisory
Committee," but was to "stimulate discussion" of the "real-world problems" that could or could
not be adequately addressed through rulemaking or by less formal judicial means. Id. at 5. As the
Federalist Society newsletter on the two drafts circulated by the Committee put it, the proposals
for notice and comment addressed problems that class members may have with their own
attorneys. Concerns about "how best to protect class action defendants from the popular plaintiff
tactic of filing virtually identical class action complaints in multiple fora" were in an earlier
stage. See CLASS ACTION WATCH: A PUBLICATION OF THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY'S
LITIGATION PRACTICE GROUP AND ITS CLASS ACTION SUBCOMMITTEE, Vol. 3, No. 1, Winter 2002
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rulemaking, gain the authority to enjoin overlapping or competing class actions
(including those filed in state courts) to centralize litigation in federal court or whether
legislation was required.422 Ongoing litigation had brought such problems to the fore.
Some judges have used the All Writs Act or removal statutes to bring into the federal
courts cases filed in state courts. Other judges have declined to do so in light of the
Anti-Injunction Act, which counsels against interference with pending state court
litigation.423
At one hearing held in Washington in January of 2002,424 some twenty-five people
testified before Committee members, a group composed predominantly of federal
judges, joined by a state judge as well as a few academics and lawyers. 425 More than
half of the witnesses identified themselves as representing institutional defendants
(insurance companies, specific corporations, or the defense bar), with a smaller
number describing themselves as affiliated with institutional plaintiffs, such as civil
rights or consumer groups.
426
422. Reporter's Call for Comments, supra note 421, at pts. I, II (providing as a possible
change a Draft 23(c)(1)(D), permitting a court refusing to certify or decertify a class to "direct
that no other court may certify a substantially similar class" unless new law or facts created a
new certification question). The draft also included a potential Rule 23(e)(5), under which a
refusal to approve a settlement would "preclude any other court" from approving a substantially
similar one. An alternative, id. at pt. V, considered proposing that the Rules Enabling Act, 28
U.S.C. § 2072 (2000), be amended to permit rulemaking to cover such injunctions; that the Anti-
Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2000), be amended to permit injunctions in class actions
against state proceedings, or that the Full Faith and Credit statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000), be
amended to make orders refusing to certify classes preclusive in other jurisdictions.
At a conference convened by the Advisory Committee at the University of Chicago in the fall
of 2001, a panel of academics discussed these proposals. Several recorded their skepticism about
the capacity of the federal courts, through rulemaking, to gain powers to enjoin state class
actions.
423. See 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2000) (All Writs Act); 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2000) (removal); 28
U.S.C. § 2283 (2000) (Anti-Injunction Act). The Supreme Court has since held that the All
Writs Act cannot be the basis for such removal. See Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. v. Henson,
123 S. Ct. 366 (2002).
424. See Witness List-Civil Rules Hearing, Washington, D.C. (Jan. 22,2002) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Witness List]. See also 2001 ADVISORY COMMITTEE DRAFT RULES, supra
note 419 (providing for hearings on the civil rules in November in San Francisco, in January in
Washington, and in February in Dallas).
425. See Civil Rules Advisory Committee, Minutes, Jan. 22-23, 2002, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/minutes.htm (last visited June 21, 2002) (discussing the meeting
and the twenty-five witnesses who testified). The Advisory Committee currently includes seven
federal judges, a state judge on the Supreme Court of Texas, two academics, three lawyers, a
member of the Department of Justice, ex officio, an academic reporter, and two judicial liaisons
from other conference committees. See Federal Rulemaking: The Rulemaking Process at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/newrules3.htm (last visited Oct., 26, 2002).
426. See Witness List, supra note 424, (listing testimony by Norman J. Chachkin, Director of
Litigation, on behalf of the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., Leslie
Brueckner, on behalf of Trial Lawyers for Public Justice, and Brian Wolfman, on behalf of
Public Citizen Litigation Group, as well as testimony from more than a dozen executives and
lawyers who in their comments identified themselves as working on behalf of businesses
situated as defendants in class actions).
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Repeatedly, those identified with the defense said, in essence, that the revised Rule
23 draft was an improvement, in that it would help curb abuses of class actions. But,
they argued, the better the federal courts became in constraining misbehaving
plaintiffs' lawyers, the more attractive plaintiffs would find state courts. Further, they
complained, some state judges were too ready to certify classes and to approve
settlements. Such certifications created, in their view, a national problem for various
industries and insurers.
These witnesses had a proposed solution: federalize class actions as a means of
reining in wayward state court judges and plaintiffs' lawyers.427 They urged the
Committee to support efforts to federalize cases involving state causes of action about
consumer rights or tort liability. 428 As one witness put it, "there must be a way to
remove multi-jurisdictional class actions to federal court. 429 Several witnesses
referred to pending bills (the "Class Action Fairness Act") that would alter standards
for diversity jurisdiction to enable removal of state class actions to the federal
courts.43 ° Some of the witnesses before the Committee had also testified in support of
427. See, e.g., Overlapping Class Actions: Preliminary Statement of Judith Mintel, Associate
General Counsel, State Farm Insurance Companies to the Advisory Committee on the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 3 (Jan. 22, 2002) (on file with author) [hereinafter Mintel Testimony]
("We believe... that it is not possible to deal effectively with the question of overlapping class
actions without addressing class action practice at the state court level at the same time.");
Robert E. Scott, Jr., On the Subject of the Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure-Rule 23 (Class Actions) 1, 3 (Jan. 22, 2002) (on file with author) (commenting
from his own experience and based on input from Lawyers for Civil Justice ("LCJ"), "a national
coalition of leading corporate counsel and defense bar organizations" of which he was then
president, and urging support of legislation to move cases into federal court); Statement of Linda
A. Willett, Vice President and Deputy General Counsel, Bristol Myers Squibb Co., Before the
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules 4 (Jan. 22, 2002) (on file with author) ("We ... urge that
the Committee propose preclusion rules or legislation that would work ... to ensure that the
federal courts will be able to effectively and freely exercise their Article III powers.").
428. See generally Georgene Vairo, Judicial v. Congressional Federalism: The Implications
of the New Federalism Decisions on Mass Tort Cases and Other Complex Litigation, 33 Loy.
L.A. L. REv. 1559, 1564 (2000) (discussing the 1999 proposals to "move more state claim based
litigation to the federal courts" and objecting to "stripping state courts of their ability to hear
class actions involving state law claims").
429. Bruce E. Alexander, Senior Vice President and Litigation Counsel, First Nationwide
Mortgage Corp., Rule 23, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Proposed Amendments (Jan. 22,
2002) (on file with author).
430. See., e.g., S. 1712, Class Action Fairness Act of 2001, 107th Cong. (2001). Its findings
include that abuses of class actions were "keeping cases of national importance out of Federal
court" and making judgments of one state's law "bind the rights of the residents" of other states.
Id. §2(a)(4). A companion bill was presented in the House. See H.R. 2341, 107th Cong. (2001);
H.R. 2341, 107th Cong. (2002) (the Class Action Fairness Act of 2002, which is the same as
H.R. 2341). These proposals would amend federal diversity jurisdiction and permit removal of
proposed class actions, if "any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different
from any defendant" or involves foreigners on either side, and if the matter in controversy
exceeds $2 million. Federal courts would have jurisdiction, unless a "substantial majority of the
members of the proposed" class and defendants were from the same state in which the action
was originally filed and the claims were governed under the laws of that state, or the proposed
class was fewer than 100 people, or the primary defendants were state officials against whom
2003]
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these bills in Congress.431
Their plea to the Judicial Conference Committee was twofold: that the Conference
make its own rules to curb class actions, and that it support their efforts in Congress to
divest the state courts of jurisdiction over class actions so as to curb powers of state
judges.432 As one witness explained, "the Committee's first action after the conclusion
of these proceedings [should] be to fully endorse two bills, pending in Congress, H.R.
2341 and S. 1712, that will ensure that interstate class actions filed in state courts be
readily removed to Federal Court. 433
My point here is not to argue the merits of federalization of these class actions but
rather to make plain the political stakes. As Professor Georgine Vairo has explained,
the appeal of state court litigation for plaintiffs' attorneys comes in part from a
perception that federal judges are hostile to certain forms of litigation and impose more
stringent requirements of causation than do some state judges.434 Defendants share that
perception; they hope that, were cases channeled to federal courts, fewer cases would
be certified and fewer settlements approved. 43 Opponents of these proposals-
including some members of the House of Representatives, dissenting from the version
passed by the House-argue that its enactment would "weaken enforcement of laws
concerning consumer health and safety, the environment, and civil rights," and would
make it "far more difficult for consumers and other harmed individuals to obtain
federal relief could not run. See H.R. 2341, § 4.
431. See, e.g., Class Action Fairness Act of 2001, Hearing on H.R. 2341 Before the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong., 18-34 (2002) (statement of John Beisner, Partner,
O'Melveny & Myers). See also John H. Beisner & Jessica Davidson Miller, They Are Making a
Federal Case Out of It... In State Court, Civil Justice Report, Manhattan Institute, Sept. 2001,
reprinted in Hearing on H.R. 2341, supra note 430, at 98-144 and in 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 143 (2002). That journal, which is not funded by Harvard, has been described as the
"leading forum for conservative and libertarian legal scholarship." See Christopher C. Posteraro,
Preface, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y v (2002) (discussing the journal's founding decades earlier
and that it was especially appropriate given that occasion to hold the Twentieth Annual
Federalist Society Student Symposium). The prior unnumbered page lists the members of the
Board of Advisors and makes the disclaimer as to funding.
432. The degree to which state courts can affect litigants in other states is in part an artifact
of federal law. The United States Supreme Court has held that a state court settlement that
included state and federal securities claims could be preclusive of subsequent federal litigation,
even though the federal securities claims were within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal
courts and the state courts lacked the power to try those claims. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.
v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367 (1996).
433. Statement of Lewis H. Goldfarb, Hogan & Hartson LLP, Before the Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules 3-6 (Jan. 22, 2002) (on file with the author) (also discussing misuses
of class actions and attaching an article by Noam Neusner, The Judges of Madison County, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 17,2001, at 39-40). See also Mintel Testimony, supra note 427, at 5
("[W]e urge the Advisory Committee to express support for such federal legislation, to review
the proposed legislation and recommend any changes needed to ensure that it achieves its
important goals."); id. at 18 ("State Farm urges the Advisory Committee to endorse publicly the
concepts in H.R. 2341 and S. 1712.").
434. See Vairo, supra note 428, at 1604-05.
435. Id. at 1609-25 (discussing the 1999 versions of these bills and exploring their
constitutionality).
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justice in class actions at the state or Federal level. 436
In short, proponents of the legislation have been clear about their goals,
understandably focused on protecting their clients' interests. Yet none expressed
hesitancy when requesting that federal judicial committees join them on the quest to
federalize this set of cases. Rather, they assumed it possible that the Judicial
Conference could be enlisted to support their efforts to take cases arising under state
law and move them to federal court.
437
As of the fall of 2002, the Judicial Conference had not formally responded to the
efforts to take up this cause. Its past record on the issue of federalization of class
actions is mixed. As noted, in the early 1970s, the Judicial Conference declined to
comment on proposals for consumer class actions-classifying such issues as
legislative matters for Congress, not the judiciary, to determine. 438 By the 1990s,
however, the Conference had begun to offer some views on this issue. For example, for
large scale tort claims, the Judicial Conference's 1995 Long Range Plan supported
relaxing diversity requirements in multiparty, multiclaim cases to enable more to be
filed in and to stay in federal court. 439 Yet, when worries about computer failures at the
dawn of the twenty-first century arose and legislation was proposed-dubbed
"Y2K"-to protect consumers, the Conference opposed drafts permitting new federal
class action claims. In its view, federal adjudication was not appropriate, given "the
objective of preserving the federal courts as tribunals of limited jurisdiction."440 In
436. H.R. REP. No. 107-370, at 129, 131 (2002) (providing the views of dissenters).
437. A host of potential lobbyists exists, some more likely than others to think the federal
judiciary receptive to their point of view. For example, some criminal defense lawyers believe
that a national problem exists because of certain forms of unfair treatment of defendants in state
courts. Proponents of such views might want a federal judicial committee to change procedural
rules on habeas corpus. Past positions taken by the judiciary may make such a scenario unlikely.
See Winkle, supra note 24 (describing proposals in the 1940s to restrict prisoners' access);
Statements of Judge Parker and Thurgood Marshall, 1955 Habeas Corpus Hearings, supra note
340 (debating such proposals); Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws,
The Pathologies of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, 47 DUKE L.J. 1 (1997) (describing the interrelationship between the Rehnquist
Court's rulings on habeas that had limited access before parallel but not identical statutory
revisions were enacted). But the point here is to understand that many groups could want to
enlist judicial support for their positions.
438. See 1970 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 13 (Mar. 1970); 1971 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
REPORT 79 (Oct. 1971); 1973 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 48 (Sept. 1973); discussion supra
note 347 and accompanying text.
439. LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 5, reprinted in 166 F.R.D. 49, 91 n.16 (explaining that
while, in Recommendation 7, the Conference supported limiting the cases qualifying for
diversity jurisdiction, it also was in favor of expanding diversity in this respect).
440. See 1999 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 17 (Mar. 1999) (opposing legislation
providing federal jurisdiction); News Release, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (Mar.
16, 1999), at http://www.uscourts.gov/PressReleases/jcc99.html (describing Judicial
Conference opposition to bills "expanding federal court jurisdiction over Y2K class actions"
because "[f]ederalization of class actions will deprive the judicial system of the contributions
that state courts would otherwise make in meeting the substantial burdens that Y2K litigation
may impose"). See also Statement of Judge Walter K. Stapleton on Behalf of the Judicial
Conference of the United States, Hearings on H.R. 775, Year 2000 Readiness and
Responsibility Act Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary (Apr. 13, 1999), available at
2003]
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addition, in the late 1990s, the Conference registered opposition to earlier versions of
the 2002 Class Action Fairness Act.44
Whether that decision will change is not yet clear. After circulating its informal call
for comments about whether judicial rulemakers could deal with overlapping class
actions, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules concluded that using federal
procedural rules to make changes to deal with state-based class actions would "test the
limits of authority under the Rules Enabling Act,' 442 and suggested legislation as the
appropriate route.443 The Federal-State Jurisdiction Committee of the Judicial
Conference, however, has reiterated that opposition to such bills, as the Conference
had done in 1999, is desirable.444
My concerns, however, do not turn on either the lobbyists' successes or on the
http://www.house.gov/judiciary/stap0413.html (objecting to the provision of original federal
jurisdiction over claims based on state law but noting that the Judicial Conference had supported
minimal diversity litigation for mass torts). Congress enacted a version of the legislation,
permitting Y2K cases to be filed in state or federal court and limiting the availability of class
actions in such cases. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6601-6617 (1999).
441. See H.R. Rep. No. 107-370, at 123 n.3 (2002) (reporting that "on July 23, 1999, the
Executive Committee of the [Judicial] Conference voted to express its opposition to the class
action provisions of [the Interstate Class Action Jurisdiction Act of 1999]".) See also Executive
Committee of the Judicial Conference, Memorandum of Action (July 23, 1999) (on file with
author) (discussing the proposed expansion of federal jurisdiction and noting that, in light of the
serious concerns of the various Conference committees, the Executive Committee voted on
behalf of the Judicial Conference to express opposition to the bills "in their present form.").
Further, "[tihe Committee recognized the complicated nature of the issues involved in class
action and mass tort litigation and encouraged further deliberate study of the areas," including
cooperative work to develop "an alternative approach." Id. See also Class Action Bill Passes in
House, THiRD BRANCH, April 2002, at I (discussing H.R. 2341, The Class Action Fairness Act
of 2002, described as "significantly expand[ing] federal jurisdiction in class action cases,
thereby sweeping much of this litigation into federal court"; also noting that the Judicial
Conference had not yet taken a position on the bills but had earlier opposed similar legislation).
442. Advisory Committee May 2002 Report, supra note 420, at 301.
443. While taking no position on the specific pending bills, the Advisory Committee called
for a statute to provide "some form of minimal diversity legislation... to permit large, multi-
state class actions to be brought in--or removed to-federal court." Id. at 301 (explaining that to
do so would "avoid or alleviate some of the most severe problems that are engendered by
repetitive and overlapping class actions... [and would] also further the important principle that
in a federal system, no one state's courts should make decisions that are binding nationwide even
as to class members who were injured in the forum state."). Focusing on "state class actions in
which the interests of no single state predominate," the Advisory Committee requested that the
Standing Committee "support the concept of minimal diversity for large, multistate class actions,
in which the interests of no one state are paramount, with appropriate limitations or threshold
requirements so that the federal courts are not unduly burdened and the states' jurisdiction over
in-state class actions is left undisturbed." Id. at 301-02. See also David F. Levi, Memorandum to
the Civil Rules Advisory Committee: Perspectives on Rule 23 Including the Problem of
Overlapping Classes (May 7, 2002), attached as an addendum to the Advisory Committee May
2002 Report, at 302-20.
444. Report of the Federal-State Jurisdiction Committee to the Judicial Conference for the
meeting of September, 2002, Judicial Conference Committee Reports/A O Collection, supra note
289, (Sept. 2002) (notes on file with the author).
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wisdom of their position. The import of these exchanges rests on the fact that lobbyists
went to the federal judiciary to make an argument that the judiciary ought to go to
Congress to ask it to redraw jurisdictional lines. Whether the issue is computer failures,
health benefits, violence against women, civil rights for African Americans, or
consumer class actions, and whether it would be wise or unwise for federal courts to
take up these cases, it is for Congress and not the judiciary as a collective to decide.
Once the Judicial Conference takes on the role of distinguishing among litigants-
arguing against federal jurisdiction for consumers at risk of injury from computer
failures but for federal jurisdiction for others-it becomes a place that lobbyists need
to be. The judiciary thus reduces its own ability to remain distant from partisanship.
C. Distinguishing Forms of "the Judicial Power"
Institutions are not static, and what judges do has changed over time. Moreover,
many countries today-England included-have a judiciary not separate from but
working within the executive."45 While some might try to assimilate the judicial
corporate voice into that fold or accept it as an appropriate evolutionary response to
changing times, this new role does not easily fit within American conceptions of
separated powers, serving both to authorize and to limit judicial power.
Separation of powers marks several concerns. One, expressed through
constitutional grants of life tenure and protected salaries, is the need for judges to be
free from either executive or legislative encroachment. "Judicial independence" has
become a shorthand44 6 for the effort to keep federal judges sufficiently insulated from
political processes so as to be able to provide disinterested judgments on the conflicts
that politics produces." 7 A second concern, less clear from constitutional text but
developed early on and now also included under the rubric of separation of powers, is
that judges might encroach on executive or legislative prerogatives, thereby interfering
with and undermining democratic processes. Discussions of separation of powers thus
alternate between worrying about adjudicators overreaching and worrying about other
branches of the federal government leaning too hard on judges."48 Less explored is the
445. Robert Stevens, The Independence of the Judiciary: The Case ofEngland, 72 S. CAL. L.
REv. 597 (1999).
446. As others have elaborated, judicial independence is a cluster of concerns. See generally,
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH (Stephen B.
Burbank & Barry Friedman eds., 2002); Pamela S. Karlan, Two Concepts of Judicial
Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REv. 535 (1999); Pamela S. Karlan, When Freedom Isn't Free: The
Costs of Judicial Independence in Bush v. Gore (Stanford Public Law and Legal Theory
Working Paper Series, Research Paper No. 39, 2002) available at
http://ssm.com/abstractid=311086.
447. The need to appeal to partisan politics is what critics of elections for judges bemoan. See
Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 122 S. Ct. 2528 (2002); Charles Gardner Geyh, Why
Judicial Elections Stink (Summer 2002) (manuscript on file with the author).
448. See, e.g., Geyh, Judicial Independence, JudicialAccountability, supra note 19; Vicki C.
Jackson, Congressional Control of Jurisdiction and the Future of the Federal Courts-
Opposition, Agreement, and Hierarchy, 86 GEO. L.J. 2445 (1998); Richard L. Revesz,
Congressional Influence on Judicial Behavior? An Empirical Examination of Challenges to
Agency Action in the D.C. Circuit, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1100 (2001); J. Clifford Wallace, An
Essay on Independence of the Judiciary: From What and Why, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURVEY AM.
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question of how collective Third Branch actions outside adjudication might do harm
either to other branches or to the judiciary itself.
I share the concern that judges ought to see their charter as bounded, although I also
join those welcoming a cooperative dialogue with Congress, through both decisions
and discussions.449 What has developed in the United States under the Rehnquist
Judiciary, however, are restrictions on judicial action in individual cases coupled with
few boundaries for the Judicial Conference in general policy making. My view is that
this formulation has it backwards, in that adjudication has many built in constraints,
whereas the more the judiciary becomes generative of policies, the less it will be able
to be free from partisanship. Moreover, for separation of powers to work at any level
requires insistence on functional distinctions between different branches of
government. When judicial advice moves beyond idiosyncratic efforts by individual
judges to regular corporate commentary, the judiciary loses more of its unique
character. The lines between judicial and legislative decisionmaking become
increasingly blurred.
When judges in individual cases shape remedies, they are subjected to several
constraints. First, judges who preside are generally assigned through random,
computer-based programs. Trial level judges have relatively little ability to forward
particular issues over time.45 0 Second, those judges are deeply dependent on litigants to
develop the analytic predicates to support adjudicated relief. Third, the exercise of
power through adjudication requires detailed, sometimes tedious, and labor intensive
work, mining records for the requisite facts and reading cases and statutes for the
relevant law. Fourth, both litigants and judges have many incentives to avoid that labor
by finding mechanisms to settle disputes. 45' Fifth, and especially when ordering
equitable remedies, trial level judges are subjected to prompt appellate review;
Congress has authorized interlocutory review of preliminary injunctive relief.452 That
appellate process in turn can generate a debate within or across circuits about the
propriety of particular rulings. And even when the Supreme Court decides, revision
LAw 241 (2001).
449. See generally Michael C. Dorf& Barry Friedman, Shared Constitutional Interpretation,
2000 SUp. CT. REV. 61 (examining the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Dickerson,
120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000), and the degree to which constitutional rulings provide subconstitutional
remedies); Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court 1974 Term-Foreword. Constitutional
Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1975) (examining the role of the Court in announcing rules
beyond constitutional requirements); Geyh, Redefining the Judiciary's Imperiled Role, supra
note 325, at 1224-49 (calling for a new institution to enable cooperative work).
450. In a few instances, assignments are not random. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2000)
(providing for the Multidistrict Litigation Panel to consolidate cases pending in different districts
but involving common facts before a single judge, whom it selects, for pretrial purposes).
Further, trial judges can select the cases in which to write and publish decisions, thereby
affecting the shape of the law. In addition, judges who have assumed senior status have some
ability to decline certain kinds of cases.
451. See, e.g., Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, Most Cases Settle, Judicial Promotion and
Regulation of Settlement, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339 (1994); Resnik, Trial as Error, supra note 88,
at 943-49; Kent Svryerud & Sam Gross, Don't Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to
Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1996).
452. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (2000).
[Vol. 78:223
CONSTRICTING REMEDIES
remains available whenever a given opinion fails to convince subsequent justices of its
correctness.
453
In contrast, when judges invoke their corporate voice to advise Congress on
whether consumers, tort victims, ERISA litigants, or victims of gender-based violence
ought to have access to federal adjudicatory rremedies, they have no obvious
boundaries nor practices by which to formulate their judgments. And consider the
issues at stake. Reflect on the "new" federal rights of the twentieth century-involving
labor, securities, welfare, air and water quality, and nondiscrimination. Consider the
rights recently at issue, such as a new civil right for victims of gender-motivated
violence454 and a new civil right for family members seeking time away from work to
provide care for themselves and others.455 Think also of rights still in the offing, from a
range of proponents and encountering an array of opponents. The list includes
proposals for rights against health maintenance organizations and more broadly for
health care patients in general,456 as well as rights for "unborn children" and to enable
more religious practice in public settings. The Judicial Conference, on behalf of the
Article III judiciary, has sometimes been silent but has sometimes opposed a particular
innovation.457
453. See Mark J. Richards & Herbert M. Kritzer, Jurisprudential Regimes in Supreme Court
Decision Making, 96 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 305 (2002) (discussing the institutional constraints that
affect adjudication).
454. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994), struck in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-18
(2000).
455. See Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (2000), the
constitutionality of which as applied to states is now before the Supreme Court. See Hibbs v.
Nev. Dep't of Human Res., 273 F.3d 844 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. grantedsub nom. Nev. Dep't of
Human Res. v. Hibbs, 122 S. Ct. 2618 (2002).
Some debate the degree to which the Supreme Court's constitutional rulings of recent years
have in fact done much to limit national powers. See Bruce Ackerman, Off Balance, in BUSH v.
GORE: THE QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY 192 (Bruce Ackerman ed., 2002) (arguing that no major
statute that would mobilize popular politics has been invalidated); Jesse H. Choper & John C.
Yoo, The Scope of the Commerce Clause after Morrison, 25 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 843, 866
(2000) (suggesting congressional means by which to regulate commerce in light of that opinion);
Tushnet, supra note 15, at 55 ("Nothing in the Court's decisions threatens the core of the
expansion of national power that occurred in the New Deal and afterwards, which confirmed that
the national government had the power to intervene extensively in the private sector to
accomplish national economic goals," and noting that the national government's ability to
regulate state actors "has been weakened slightly"). For others, myself included, see Resnik,
Categorical Federalism, supra note 14, at 630-42, the limitations have been profound in terms
of congressional capacity to generate a range of new rights to redress inequality between women
and men. The outcome in Hibbs will tell us more.
456. See, e.g., The BiPartisan Patient Protection Act, S. 1052, 107th Cong., (2001), and H.R.
2563, 107th Cong., (2001). The Senate version provided that claims about Health Maintenance
Organizations failing to "exercise ordinary care in making a decision" but not involving "'non-
medically reviewable"' decisions could, after administrative rulings, be filed in federal court.
See S. 1052 § 402(a)(n)(1)(A)(B), (a)(n)(6). The House version permitted patients who had
exhausted administrative remedies to sue Health Maintenance Organizations in state courts if
injuries occurred from a medical decision and limited the removal of such actions to federal
court. See H.R. 2563 § 402 (a)(n)(l)-(3), (a)(n)(16)(b)(1)(e).
457. See supra note 409 (discussing the Conference's initial opposition and subsequent
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The life-tenured federal employees who raise their collective voices against new
causes of action have neither democratic mandate nor accountability when they
attempt to shape social policy through the exercise of non-adjudicatory authority. They
are not situated institutionally to weigh the costs and benefits of the generation of new
norms or the symbolic import of conferring federal rightsholding status on sets of
claimants. Nor can they claim a technocratic advantage; they have no unique
knowledge about how the many variables that affect the filing of lawsuits will play out
in causes of action not yet in existence.
Moreover, the Judicial Conference, under the Chief Justice's leadership, sets its
own agenda. No method is prescribed for gathering the information requisite to making
judgment. Some tradition of research, sometimes aided through gathering empirical
data, has developed, and a good deal of policy is crafted through committee work. But
the Conference is not obliged to poll the hundreds ofjudges on whose behalf it speaks.
No publicly-negotiated rules articulate what falls within the Conference's mandate.
Rather, the policy boundaries have been provided by the Conference's own Long
Range Plan, which itself has chosen among competing visions particular limits for
federal adjudication. No mechanism for review exists, and no means for revisiting
earlier decisions is built into the process. Constraints come only from the sensibilities
of the life-tenured about their own corporate voice and role in a democratic polity.
Of course, no litigant is bound by statements of the Judicial Conference. Moreover,
Congress is free to ignore judicial advice, although it is now hamstrung by
constitutional adjudications that-like the Conference's positions-limit federal
jurisdiction. But the Judicial Conference has been successful in its efforts to alter
specific legislation. Examples include the wording of the Civil Rights Remedy of
VAWA in the early 1990s and the decision not to give life tenure to bankruptcy judges
in the 1980s. 45' Further, individual judges are discouraged from breaking ranks with
official Conference policy, 459 and the policies become an expression of norms of the
decision not to take a position on the civil rights provisions of VAWA); LONG RANGE PLAN,
supra note 5, reprinted in 166 F.R.D. 49, 96 (1995) (Recommendation 12(c)) (proposing that
any new federal-state programs on health care designate state courts as the "primary forum" for
review of denial of benefits); 2000 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 8 (Mar. 2000) ("in any
managed care legislation ... the state courts [should] be the primary fora for the resolution of
personal injury claims arising from the denial of health care benefits, should Congress determine
that such legal recourse is warranted"); 2001 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 58 (Sept. 2001)
(addressing the Bipartisan Patient Protection Act," expressing "concern" about a new federal
cause of action, and encouraging Congress "to provide state courts with jurisdiction (concurrent
or otherwise) over any suits to compel insurance plans to provide interim medical benefits on an
emergency basis and to bar removal of such suits").
458. See Nourse, supra note 409 (VAWA); Countryman, supra note 24 (bankruptcy
legislation).
459. See, e.g., The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 and the Judicial Improvements Act of
1990: Hearings on S. 2027 and S. 2648 before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 101 st Cong.
208, 232-77 (1990) (testimony of Richard A. Enslen, United States District Judge, Western
District of Michigan) (speaking in favor of S. 2027, about which the Conference had taken a
different position). This norm is not codified but noted in discussions by individual judges,
deciding if, when, and how openly to be in conflict with either the Conference, the Chief
Justice, or personnel at the Administrative Office. Tensions on this issue surfaced during the
tenure of one of the Directors of the Federal Judicial Center. Management consultants were
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judiciary by which entrants to the federal judiciary are socialized into its ranks. The
Conference's positions become an educational vehicle, orienting new members to the
norms of the federal judiciary. That institution is now explicitly committed to opposing
the generation of new (and yet to be imagined) rights, if enforced through federal
jurisdiction.
The judiciary itself becomes seen as a political institution, as another agency in
Washington to be targeted by special interest groups. Indeed, as detailed above, the
federal judiciary has come to be perceived as sufficiently anti-rights that lobbyists
thought it worthwhile to spend time attempting to persuade the Judicial Conference to
join them in trying to federalize state-based class actions. Despite all the Conference's
general recommendations against new federal jurisdiction and the Court majority's
discourse on federalism and its claimed solicitude toward state lawmaking prerogative,
lobbyists read the federal judiciary as potentially willing to override state law460 by
urging that state courts be divested ofjurisdiction over class actions arising under state
law.
Assume that the Judicial Conference itself desires no association with such interests.
By regularly rendering opinions on policies about access to federal courts, the
Conference cannot avoid being seen as allied with specific political forces. The more
active in policy making, the more the Third Branch loses a space apart from politics.
Through such decisions, the body politic loses a sector of government that ought, as an
entity, to be agnostic (ex ante) about when and how to generate new rights so as to be
able (ex post) to legitimate any of its judgments on whatever choices Congress made.
brought in to review the allocation of authority between these two organizations within the
Judicial Branch.
An exchange in the early 1920s on the Judges' Bill (addressing the discretionary jurisdiction
of the United States Supreme Court, see supra note 273) suggest that, in earlier decades,
pressures also existed to go along with policies pressed by Chief Justices. A member of
Congress asked Chief Justice Taft if "each individual member of the Supreme Court" favored
enactment of the bill. Jurisdiction of Circuit Courts of Appeals and of the Supreme Court of the
United States, Hearings on H.R. 8206 before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 6,
29 (1924). Chief Justice Taft replied, "I am told by all the members that I can say that the court
is for the bill. There may be one member-I do not think more-who is doubtful about it, or, I
should say, doubtful about its efficacy; but he said to me that I could say the whole court was in
favor of the bill."Id. Professor Hartnett's analysis suggested that Justice Brandeis was the
doubter. See Hartnett, supra note 273, at 1684-85, 1691.
460. The majority has done so in preemption cases. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v.
Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 551 (2001) (holding, with the majority of five, that Congress, through the
Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, had preempted Massachusetts regulations
relating to outdoor and point of sale cigarette advertising). The four dissenters disagreed
"strongly." Id. at 591, 605 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and
Souter). Not all preemption cases rule that state law remedies are unavailable, nor do all that do
find preemption have a majority with the same members. See, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor
Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000) (holding that the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard, promulgated
under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, preempted a state common law tort
action about when obligations to provide air bags in cars arise). In that instance, the majority
included Justice Breyer, id. at 864, while the dissenters included Justices Stevens, Souter,
Thomas, and Ginsburg. Id. at 886 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also Fallon, supra note 10, at
471-72.
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The new norms of the Rehnquist Judiciary thus do most harm to the federal judiciary
itself. In individual cases, its powers have been divested, diminishing the utility of
adjudication. And, as the Conference takes up more "legislative policy," its legitimacy
as an adjudicator is undermined. As a principal in charge of a corporate agenda, the
Article III judiciary ought to become more conservative in its pursuit.
